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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
  
 
The Review Panel was established jointly by the Committee of Board Chairs (CBC) and CGIAR 
Secretariat to assess the governance structure, processes and practices of center boards against 
the backdrop of the best practices prevalent in the corporate and non-profit sectors, and to 
recommend steps to improve the effectiveness of board governance. A survey of board members, 
CGIAR members and other relevant stakeholders, followed by interviews with a sub-set of the 
stakeholders, and a review of relevant documents were the methods used by the Panel to gather 
information for this review. The major findings of the review are the following: 
 
v Several center boards have taken steps to improve their governance practices in recent 
years. Nevertheless, significant gaps exist in some of the boards, especially with respect  
to their oversight of strategy and finances. Their practices lag behind global best practices 
in these functions. Factors such as infrequent board meetings, lack of timely information, 
inappropriate mix of skills, and mismatch between financing patterns and the 
requirements of strategy have contributed to this outcome. 
 
v While the board composition in terms of the representation of stakeholders and diversity 
is on the whole balanced, there is scope for the reduction of the number of host 
representatives and CG nominees on the boards. Board size in some cases is larger than 
warranted when judged by the need for cohesion and focus. Some center boards meet 
only once a year, making it difficult for members to discharge their responsibilities 
effectively. 
 
v CGIAR’s orientation and leadership development courses are appreciated by the boards. 
But there is increasing concern on the part of board members that CG’s oversight 
mechanisms such as the Science Council, ExCo and the Secretariat may be placing undue 
administrative burdens on the centers. 
 
v Board practices in respect of self assessment and the evaluation of the Director General 
are not participatory and thorough in all cases. Follow up actions on EPMRs by some of 
the boards are not timely, and warning signals of impending troubles are not heeded by 
the boards in all cases. 
 
v Board accountability to its stakeholders is not easy to enforce due to the inherent 
limitations in the larger CGIAR System that supports and finances the centers. When 
board governance falters or fails, speedy remedial action to enforce accountability is 
difficult under these conditions.   
 
v In summary, while the governance practices of boards compare favorably with global 
best practices in some respects, the challenge for the CGIAR is to remedy the areas of 
weakness and unevenness of practices among the centers that are highlighted in this 
report. 
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The Panel came up with 31 recommendations. These recommendations are presented in detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5 and a full list is included in Chapter 6. The most important ones are 
summarized below: 
 
A. Board Structure, Size, Composition  
 
¨ The center board needs to reflect the range of diversity in the CGIAR stakeholders and at 
the same time it should have the needed mix of skills to ensure that their functioning will 
be effective and efficient.  At a minimum, two persons with adequate financial, business 
and accounting knowledge and experience should be members on every board. At least 
three members with science or science management background should be available to a 
board.  
 
¨ The frequency of board meetings should be determined by the nature and scope of the 
business to be transacted. Given the mix of functions of center boards, the Panel 
recommends that full board meetings should be held at least twice a year. In addition, two 
more meetings may be required to review quarterly reviews of finances and 
programmatic matters. In order to minimize costs, these additional meetings may be 
conducted through telephonic or video conferences or through delegation to an executive 
committee that reports back to the full board.  
 
¨ The proposals above may increase the time and attention that members may be required 
to give their boards. It will most certainly demand more time from the chairpersons of 
boards. This may necessitate a review of the compensation of Board members due to the 
increase in accountability, responsibility, expertise, and time required of them. This 
would apply, in particular, to board chairs and committee chairs.  
 
¨ The duration of a member’s term on a board should not exceed six years. The current 
practice of most boards to renew a member’s term after three years is a sound one. It is 
important, however, that boards review more rigorously members’ contributions before 
confirming them for a second term. 
 
¨ Keeping in view the need for a board that is compact, accountable and well focused on 
governance, it is recommended that the size of the board should be between nine and 
eleven members, excluding the DG (ex-officio). A smaller board enhances the chances of 
synergy, participation, and focus.  The Panel offers this as a guideline to be adapted to the 
needs of the centers. 
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¨ Consistent with their international status and mandate, centers serve many countries and, 
in many cases, more than one region. Center boards, therefore, need to have members 
from different regions and backgrounds. Hence, host country representation on a board 
should be limited to one nominee.  
 
¨ A similar rationalization of CGIAR nominees on boards is also in order. Presently, the 
number of nominees varies widely, the maximum being eight. It is recommended that the 
number of CGIAR nominees should not exceed two unless there are legal problems that 
may cause a center to lose its international status or privileges.  
 
B. Role of Boards in Strategy Setting and Performance Oversight  
 
¨ Limitations of time and the overload and urgency of the operational programs of centers 
often lead to a relative neglect of strategic functions in some of the boards. It is 
imperative that this imbalance is rectified by providing adequate time and resources to 
the boards to perform their strategic functions of planning, review and oversight.  
 
¨ Boards need to strengthen their role in ensuring that centers’ strategy fits well with the 
overall CGIAR priorities and strategies. This will require boards to ensure that there is a 
process in place that encourages management to embark only on programs or projects 
that are aligned with the agreed upon priorities.  
 
¨ Board’s oversight of performance should use the MTP as the starting point. An important 
function of the board is to see to it that the annual program and resources allocated to it 
are consistent with the specific objectives stated in the MTP relevant to the review. .  
 
¨ An important function of the board is to assess the risks associated with the Center’s 
programs, finances, human resources, management systems, and general operating 
environment. Risk assessment statements should accompany all documents on programs 
presented to the board. When the annual accounts and report are presented to the board, 
the DG and chief financial officer or Director of Finance should present a due diligence 
certification. 
 
¨ The financial approval/spending limits delegated to the DG and other senior officials 
should be authorized by and made known to the full board. DG should submit an annual 
or periodic report on such expenditure to the board. A similar practice should be adopted 
for the chair. 
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C. Board Renewal  
 
¨ CGIAR and center board orientation programs, executive leadership courses, and other 
development programs for new board members are critical for their effectiveness and 
better understanding of the CGIAR system and center’s business. It is recommended that 
the CGIAR orientation program be given to new members preferably after they have 
attended one board meeting that will give them some familiarity with the centers and 
their work 
 
¨ The annual evaluation of the center DG is the responsibility of the full board. A wide 
range of inputs, including feedback from center staff should be sought by the board as 
part of the evaluation process.  
 
¨ Boards should conduct their annual self assessment and an evaluation of the chair in a 
formal manner with clear guidelines. Committees and their chairs should also be 
evaluated in a similar manner. The board chair should discuss with each member his/her 
performance annually and offer guidance for improvement as appropriate. 
 
¨ Succession planning for board chair and members should commence at least a year ahead 
of the vacancy. For the DG, the succession planning process should be set in motion with 
an even longer lead time.  
 
¨ CGIAR should strengthen its consultation and nomination process in order to ensure that 
its nominees meet the competencies needed by the boards. The nomination process has to 
build on a better understanding of the profiles or the selection criteria between the 
CGIAR and the centers 
 
¨ For members-at- large, a Board should carry out a systematic analysis of its needs for 
expertise/skills/representation. In order to improve transparency in the recruitment 
process, CGIAR stakeholders and shareholders should be invited to submit nominees for 
the available membership slots. 
 
¨ Special attention needs to be given to increasing the efficiency of functioning of the 
boards. Appropriate agenda setting, timely circulation of papers/documents well ahead of 
meetings, and summarizing the issues for strategic discussion and decision making will 
enable members to be more effective.  
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¨ The board secretary should report to the board chair in regard to all board matters. 
Annual evaluation of the board secretary should be dealt with by the board chair in 
consultation with the rest of the board and other relevant officials. 
 
¨ In terms of grievance redressing and conflict resolution mechanisms for the staff, there 
should be a provision for an appeal of the last resort to the Board when all other remedies 
have failed. Such appeals should be directed to the board chair. The mechanisms need to 
be strengthened, made transparent, and fully communicated to staff.  
 
D. Accountability of Boards 
 
¨ The CGIAR centers are ultimately accountable to the poor in the developing countries. 
To ensure accountability towards these beneficiaries, center boards need to ensure that 
research priorities, products and processes are designed in such a way that they serve the 
needs of the poor. Sharing this information in a transparent manner is one way to 
demonstrate accountability. 
 
¨ The board is accountable to its stakeholders for the performance of the center. 
Asymmetry of information can be a serious barrier to the exercise of accountability. To 
effectively perform its roles and responsibilities, the board should seek and obtain all the 
necessary information from the management.  
 
¨ The CGIAR has put in place an overall system that provides a framework for ensuring 
that centers are held accountable for their performance. This includes a number of central 
bodies such as the SC which assists in the overall setting of priorities and strategies and 
evaluates the relevance and quality of programs, ExCo which performs delegated 
functions on behalf of the general membership, and the CGIAR Secretariat which assists 
in the implementation of CGIAR decisions. While these mechanisms provide guidance 
and checks and balances for accountability, the boards’ ability to perform their functions 
will be enhanced when there is greater coherence in the functioning of these parts. 
CGIAR members should assist center boards not only by providing overall strategic goals 
and directions, and other checks and balances but also by aligning the ir financial 
contributions and project support closely with these directions. 
 
¨ Central bodies established by the CGIAR, such as the SC, ExCo, and the CGIAR 
Secretariat, are essential for the formulation and implementation of the mission and 
strategies of the CGIAR System as a whole. In performing these functions, they should 
seek to minimize the administrative burdens placed on the centers and the boards through 
their interventions.  
 
¨ In the ultimate analysis, the board is responsible for the fit between the center’s programs 
and projects, and the overall CGIAR strategy. Irrespective of the vagaries of donor 
funding, accountability for the decisions and outcomes rests with the board. Special 
attention needs to be given by the board to the projects financed by restricted funding 
because departure from center strategy is most likely in this area. 
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¨ Boards should promote greater openness and transparency with respect to the governance 
of the centers. Annual reports of the centers should publish performance indicators, both 
outcome and process related, so as to enable all stakeholders to understand and assess the 
impact of their programs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 
Until recently, center governance has not appeared as frequently as system-level governance as 
an item in the CGIAR meeting agenda. Issues related to center governance were often discussed 
only in connection with an external program and management review (EPMR) report for a 
specific center. The system-wide implications of findings or recommendations were also hardly 
considered in such discussion.   
 
The last system review, the CGIAR reform program launched in 2001, and recent developments 
that called for restructuring at the center level have prompted increased attention to center 
governance. An aftermath of the closure of ISNAR in 2003, center governance and management 
became a focus of inquiry at the system level. Questions were raised on center board’s 
effectiveness and efficiency; whether or not they are adequately providing oversight on key areas 
of center management.  
 
There was a heightened interest in the center EPMR findings and recommendations and the 
extent to which the centers were implementing the agreed recommendations. A desk review of 
the governance-related EPMR recommendations for the 15 Centers and the extent to which they 
have been implemented was considered. However, given the fact that EPMRs are quinquennial 
reviews, it was argued that such a desk review would not capture the changes/adjustments that 
have taken place in most of the centers since their last EPMRs. Discussions at the Committee of 
Board Chairs (CBC) level led to a decision to commission instead a formal stripe review of 
Center governance. This decision was announced by the Chair of the CBC at the CGIAR Annual 
General Meeting held in Mexico in 2004. 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
This review of the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance at the Board of Trustees 
(BOT) level has been undertaken in the context of CGIAR’s reform program initiated in 2001.  It 
was commissioned by the CBC, jointly with the CGIAR Secretariat, in recognition of their 
responsibility to help improve governance at center and system levels.  
 
The objectives of the Stripe Review of Corporate Governance (SRCG) of CGIAR centers were 
to: 
i) Assess and evaluate the current corporate governance structure, processes, procedures/ 
practices, and overall performance of CGIAR centers’ BOTs; 
ii) Recommend to the CBC measures for improving the performance (i.e., effectiveness and 
efficiency) of center boards; and  
iii) Develop a code of best practice for center bards, and propose changes to the existing 
guidelines for center boards.   
 
Specifically, the review Panel was asked to canvass the boards to: 
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i) Examine the effectiveness of center boards in providing oversight and policy directions to 
the centers operations, including financial, program and administrative matters;  
ii) Capture some of the best practices of boards and survey the extent to which boards have 
responded to the particular operations, needs and circumstances of centers; and  
iii) Examine the composition and structure of the BOTs and how they conduct their business, 
and how they assist centers in the fulfillment of their mandates compared to the best 
practice in corporate and non-profit governance.   
 
The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the stripe review is given in Annex 1. In accordance with the 
TOR, the following overall approach and process were agreed upon:  
 
i) A team of three individuals--respectively with expertise in governance, finance, and good 
familiarity with the CGIAR-- was appointed in August 2005 to constitute the Review 
Panel; and a CGIAR Secretariat staff member served as Panel Secretary, assisted by a 
resource person and other staff as needed. The panel members with their short 
biographies are listed in Annex 2. 
 
ii) Boards conducting independent reviews were asked to make the results available to the 
panel; 
 
iii) A representative of the CBC, a senior member of the Systems Office, and two persons 
providing the perspectives of the CGIAR members and partners  were invited to serve as 
“advisory group” for the Review Panel. The composition of the advisory group is also 
shown in Annex 2. 
 
iv) The Panel was asked to rely on examination of relevant documents, use of survey 
questionnaire, interviews of Board Chairs and Center Directors General and other data 
collection instruments, and to report its findings initially to the CBC and the CGIAR 
Secretariat; and  
 
v) The Panel’s report (with CBC’s response) is expected to be shared with ExCo for 
discussion at its May 2006 meeting; and the report, with CBC’s written response and 
ExCo’s recommendations, is expected to be forwarded to the CGIAR for discussion at 
the AGM06 Business Meeting. 
 
Methodology 
 
As per its TOR, the Panel examined documents provided by the center boards/management and 
the CGIAR Secretariat; conducted a specially-designed questionnaire survey of board members 
(including the chair and DGs), CGIAR members, and selected EPMR Chairs/members and 
senior staff of centers; interviewed board chairs and members, DGs, and CGIAR members; 
interviewed selected stakeholders (from the Science Council and CGIAR Secretariat); and a 
Panel member less familiar with the CGIAR undertook a visit to one center to observe its board 
meeting.  At AGM05, the Panel also met with the CBC and the Committee of Center Directors 
(CDC) in separate meetings; and with members of the Advisory Group on several occasions.  
Annex 7 provides the list of persons interviewed. 
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The interviews covered some or all of the Panel’s TOR, depending on the affiliation of the 
person interviewed and his/her familiarity with the functioning of center boards.  In general, the 
following topics were covered to a varying degree: roles and responsibilities; structure and 
composition; strategy and direction; succession planning and development, and self assessment; 
financial oversight; performance oversight and accountability; risk and opportunities; legal and 
regulatory considerations; stakeholder relations and communications; and culture and protocol.  
Most interviews lasted about one hour; but some were shorter, depending on availability of time 
and the familiarity of the respondent with the work of center boards.  
 
The questionnaire survey was conducted for three weeks in Oct/Nov 2005, and for another three 
weeks in Dec 2005/Jan 2006. A total of 99 responses were received.  There were 80 responses 
for Questionnaire I (from board chairs, board members, DGs, and EPMR members), 11 for 
Questionnaire II (from CGIAR members) and 8 for Questionnaire III (from senior staff of 
centers including board secretaries).  The number of responses received for the two parts of 
Questionnaire I was not the same; nor was it the same for all the questions. (Part 1 was on BOT's 
engagement with center's strategic business, and Part 2 was on organization and management of 
BOT's business.) Response rate for Questionnaire II (17%) was lower than for Questionnaire I 
(40%).   
 
The survey results provided a reasonable database for the Panel’s further work. They included a 
large number of thoughtful and relevant observations regarding the current issues faced by the 
boards, the strengths and weaknesses of center governance, the new practices introduced recently 
by boards, and the possible further improvements needed—and provided an extremely rich 
source of ideas for the Panel.  
 
However, the limitations of the Panel’s work need to be noted as well.  In accordance with the 
approach and process adopted for the Stripe Review as outlined in the Panel’s terms of reference, 
the Panel did not make independent assessments of center governance by their boards.  The 
Panel did not visit the centers to observe boards in action, except in one instance  where a 
member of the Panel (who was less familiar with the CGIAR and the functioning of a CGIAR 
center board) was able to participate in a board meeting. The interviews conducted at AGM05 
provided a good although limited opportunity to validate survey results, as did the prior 
experience of two Panel members with center boards and the CGIAR. In the absence of direct 
assessment of board performance, the Panel was unable to make its own assessments that would 
apply to all center boards.  Given the diversity of the centers and their boards, conclusions and 
recommendations tend to be broad and would apply to different centers in different degrees.   
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GOVERNANCE IN THE CGIAR 
 
 
Growing Attention to Center Governance 
 
Governance has been a topic of discussion in the CGIAR since it was founded in 1971, but more 
frequently so in the past few years. Any initiative to  institute structural changes or reforms 
invokes a discussion of governance. However, the focus has been mainly on system level 
governance. As noted in Chapter 1, aspects of center governance or board operation are usually 
covered in the CGIAR meeting agenda primarily in connection with EPMRs of centers.  
 
The environment in which the CGIAR System and its centers operate has undergone important 
changes over the past 35 years. These changes have significant implications not only for the 
mission and programs of the centers, but also for their model and style of governance.  
 
The boards of the first international agricultural research centers, i.e. those created in the 60s or 
before the establishment of the CGIAR, reflected the governance mechanism adopted by the 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, two organizations which were instrumental in establishing 
them. The initial members of the boards were appointed by these foundations.  
 
After the establishment of the CGIAR, changes in board composition took place with the 
foundation-appointed members replaced by CGIAR-nominated but board-selected members. The 
centers that existed in the 70s were created against the backdrop of widespread food shortages 
and fears of a growing imbalance between population and food supply in developing countries. 
Many of the board members were scientists or research managers dedicated to the goal of 
developing new crop varieties that would contribute effectively to the diffusion of the impending 
crisis. Donors played a proactive role in financing the new centers, supporting outstanding 
scientists and motivating them to produce tangible results through their research. They assured 
the scientists adequate funds and infrastructure for research, and played a supportive role as 
advisors and cata lysts. Governance essentially consisted of timely provision of resources and 
autonomy for the scientists to get on with their work. Most board members saw themselves as 
“advocates” or “sponsors” for their centers.  
 
Center board members served on their personal capacities and not as representatives of their 
institutions/organizations. Boards essentially became “self-perpetuating” governance bodies and 
this transformation resulted in greater center board autonomy. Center autonomy has since then 
been one of the defining characteristics of the CGIAR (along with shared vision, donor 
sovereignty, independent scientific advice, and consensus decision-making).  
 
However, accountability became a key issue (see Box 1). As autonomous and self-perpetuating 
entities, center boards were generally regarded as self-accountable bodies. Accountability for 
their performance was not specified in the center charters/constitutions nor in any other legal 
documents. There was no direct accountability to the donors, and even for system-related issues, 
board decisions did not necessarily agree with the consensus decisions of the CGIAR. The center 
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board model that emerged served as a blueprint for governance of centers that were established 
or became part of the CGIAR network of research centers during the expansion phase in the 
early 90s. 
 
The extension of CGIAR’s research focus into other areas/commodities (agroforestry, forestry, 
fisheries, water management, and banana/plantain) increased the number of Centers in the 
network and made it a much larger and more complex system. In 1993, not long after the 
expansion period, the Group decided to create an Oversight Committee (OC) whose primary task 
was “to ensure that due care and diligence is exercised in the CGIAR’s and centers’ operatio ns.” 
Its first meeting discussed the uneven performance of center boards, noting among others the 
problems in two centers at that time. Although dealing largely with system- level governance 
issues, the OC maintained center governance as a regular item in its meeting agenda.  
 
A milestone in the overall effort to enhance center board operation and performance was the 
publication in 1997 of a series of 7 reference guides for Centers and their board of trustees. 
Under the auspices of the OC and in consultation with the Committee of Board Chairs, the 
CGIAR Secretariat developed the reference guides in collaboration with the National Center for 
Nonprofit Boards (NCNB). The first of a series, “The Role, Responsibilities, and Accountability 
of Center Board of Trustees - Board Reference Guide No. 1”, was formally endorsed by the 
CGIAR. Many center boards used the guides in preparing their board handbooks. The guides 
also provided a set of key criteria for in-depth assessment of board performance under the EPMR 
process.  
 
The Third System Review conducted in 1998 provided added impetus to the growing attention 
given to center governance. Devoting a chapter to center-level governance, the review report 
focused on  the importance of linking CGIAR and center governance, the role and performance 
of center boards, and governance of inter-center collaborative programs.  
 
In 2000, the CGIAR launched a change design and management initiative and undertook a far-
reaching program of reform beginning in 2001, affecting its governa nce, programs, science, 
management, and potential impact. Although primarily addressing system level issues, the 
reform program provided a backdrop for examining aspects of center governance that have a 
bearing on system effectiveness and efficiency. The CGIAR nomination process for Center 
Board membership and board orientation are specific areas being strengthened during the second 
wave of reforms.  
 
An aftermath of the closure of one center in 2003 after an unfavorable EPMR report heightened 
the interest and focus of inquiry on center governance and management. There was increased 
interest in the center EPMR findings and recommendations that relate to governance and 
management. Questions were raised whether the center boards are adequately providing 
oversight on key areas of center management. Donors became more aware of governance issues 
and the impact that they have on the ability of the centers to pursue their objectives and carry out 
their mission as research organizations. ExCo has played a critical role in bringing up center 
governance as a key item in the CGIAR agenda. 
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Box 1. Role of CGIAR Center Boards1 
 
The following comments were made by Shahid Hussain, then CGIAR Chairman, in his summation of the 
discussion of the external review of a Center in the mid-80s: 
 
 “In another context, I have said that the Boards are where the buck stops in our System, which 
means that the Boards as far as the individual Centers are concerned, are the final authority.” 
 
 “But the System is in a real dilemma when a Board fails. What do we do, except to wring our 
hands and withhold our money, and that’s not good enough, because we are wedded to the substance of 
these institutions.” 
 
 “Therefore I would like to say to the Chairman of the Board and the members of the Board that 
since you are the ultimate authority, the responsibility on you is considerable.” 
 
 “The responsibility on you is considerable because much of the Board is not nominated by 
anybody else, but by the Board members themselves. So for all practical purposes, you have self -
perpetuating Boards. And if these self -perpetuating Boards don’t rise up to the challenge of the 
management of our Centers, then clearly, either the concepts will have to change, or our Centers will be 
weakened substantially.” 
 
 
 
The Changing Environment of CGIAR Centers  
 
The environment that the centers are currently finding themselves in is a result of confluence of 
factors that emerged during the past two decades. The first of these was a shift in stakeholders’ 
role from being centers’ champions to one that are increasingly concerned about the centers’ 
governance, operation, and performance.  
 
i. The major stakeholders are increasingly playing an “activist” role with respect to 
governance in contrast to the role they played during the formative era of the System. 
 
This is not to say that CGIAR members ceased to be supportive of the centers and their mission. 
However, they began to take a more critical view of the centers and their boards. Approval of 
funds began to receive greater scrutiny. Questions began to be raised about the need to plan and 
evaluate their programs more systematically. Stakeholders began to examine the mission and 
priorities of centers more critically. The model of the CGIAR System and boards as a 
“cheerleading” mechanism began to recede and yielded a place to a more “activist” incarnation 
as an oversight mechanism. 
 
Three factors in the external environment of the centers may have created the initial impetus for 
this shift. One was the expansion of the number of centers and their diversified agenda. The 
                                                
1 References: Some Thoughts toward Ensuring the Successful Performance of Boards in the CGIAR System by J. 
Dillon  (1987); and  Governance and Management of the CGIAR Centers by  S. Ozgediz (1991). 
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expansion from four to 16 centers occurred over a period of 15 years or so, spanning virtually all 
regions of the world. There was a proportionate increase in the number of boards, followed by an 
expansion in the number of CGIAR members, including some from the developing world. The 
homogeneity of the earlier donor members and the collegiality of the boards they had created 
could no longer be sustained in this new era. More formal processes had to be adopted by the 
System, as new members and boards would not have been able to imbibe the earlier practices 
and styles of conduct wholesale. The size of the Consultative Group called for more delegation 
of work and responsibilities in the CGIAR  
 
A second environmental shift was the growing sense, especially among the donor countries, that 
the food crisis of the earlier decades was no longer a major threat, given the rising trend of food 
production and food stocks in the developing world. The success of the research by the centers 
and their new crop varieties may have contributed to this assessment. New challenges were 
considered under the international development agenda resulting in greater competition for 
donors’ investments. A major consequence was a visible reluctance on the part of the donor 
countries and agencies to sustain and expand their contributions to the larger network of centers 
that had come into being by the 80s.  
 
A third shift was the greater emphasis given by the donor community on performance and 
impacts of centers’ work. A new trend that emerged was a reduction in the unrestricted funds 
given to the centers by donor members, thus forcing them to seek project funds of a restricted 
nature.  The additional funding often was targeted for applied research or regio nal programs, not 
directly supporting strategic research. The CGIAR system had to make special efforts during this 
period to ensure that adequate core funds were available to the centers in real terms.  
 
It is the interaction between these environmental shifts that has resulted in a growing tendency 
on the part of CGIAR members to be more critical and activist in their oversight of the centers in 
recent years. Other factors have reinforced this trend. Thus, the expanded membership of the 
CGIAR system has increased the number of representatives that are less familiar with the 
system. There are only few representatives among the donors that are well informed about center 
boards’ operations. The large majority of them have limited, occasional, or secondary 
information; there is hardly any direct insight in to board activities. Lack of information is linked 
to staff rotation and limited time which they can or want to assign to CGIAR matters. 
Accordingly it is not surprising that board members reported to the review team substantial 
changes and improvements of their operations over the past years while many donor 
representatives continue to have substantial criticism and complaints with boards’ operations. 
The scarce knowledge of donors of the range and number of new practices recently introduced in 
the boards is an indication of insufficient communication between board members and donors. 
On the other side many board members do not understand well who the donors are and what they 
want. When members face greater resource scarcity (due to the tighter budgets of 
governments/donors), they would be inclined to take a critical view of the way boards perform 
their governance functions. It is natural that in this changed scenario, there was a growing 
tendency to question the boards on their performance and demand greater accountability for the 
use of funds by the CGIAR members. 
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ii. The higher standards and tighter regulation of corporate governance have increased the 
CGIAR system’s concern about center governance. 
 
Governance has been a dominant issue for the corporate sector and its stakeholders for the past 
decade or more. A variety of factors have contributed to this phenomenon. Investors, 
shareholders, capital markets, and governments have recognized the importance of good 
governance practices in the corporate sector, partly in response to the abuses and scandals caused 
by mis-governance, and partly because of the growing public awareness of the need for greater 
transparency and integrity in corporate transactions and decisions. Regulatory agencies have 
mandated new rules and practices, consistent with these developments. Adoption of new 
governance practices has spread also to the non-profit sector and the public sector. Thus a wave 
of governance reforms that call for increased transparency and openness, disclosure through 
annual reports, budgets, etc., and accountability through new norms of conduct by boards and 
management has occurred in many parts of the world.  Though the CGIAR centers do not come 
within the purview of any of the regulatory agencies of other sectors, it was inevitable that the 
stakeholders of the centers would be influenced by these recent developments and their relevance 
to the centers and their boards. The interactions between the CGIAR system and the private 
sector and non-governmental organizations in recent years have also contributed to the demands 
of stakeholders for governance reform. The recent restructuring of the CGIAR system and the 
new institutional mechanisms created through this process were partly in response to such 
demands. 
 
iii. The evolving patterns of center finances and inter-center alliances have created new 
pressures on board autonomy and governance. 
 
Unrestricted funds in the formative years made it possible for the center boards to maintain their 
autonomy and oversight of center operations in tact. As the share of unrestricted funds began to 
decline, the pressure on the boards for getting sponsors to fund new projects began to increase. 
Lack of control over funds not only makes it difficult to plan and implement long term strategies, 
but also causes the erosion of autonomy due to the pulls in different directions by diverse donors. 
Financial oversight, for example, becomes much more complex when a center has to carry out 
projects sponsored by multiple donors with their own priorities, accounting systems and 
reporting practices. Joint projects between centers and major initiatives such as “challenge 
programs” also tend to erode board autonomy and accountability, since some of them have 
governance mechanisms that are not center-based. Many decisions and oversight functions that a 
center board performs by itself have now to be shared with other centers and outside partners. 
All these are developments that necessitate a fresh look at the existing model of governance of 
the centers.    
 
iv. The expansion of the CG IAR system and other environmental factors mentioned above 
have created much unevenness in the governance arena across the centers. 
 
A small number of centers and boards in the early years made it easier for the constituents to 
exchange information on governance and learn from each other. The expansion and 
diversification of the CGIAR system has made it increasingly difficult for the boards to know 
what is happening elsewhere and to update their governance practices. The history, leadership, 
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and traditions of the centers vary widely, and given the competitive pressures and financial 
constraints, it has not been easy for all centers to address the key issues of governance on their 
own. Nor have all center boards paid adequate attention to attract the relevant professional staff 
to assist in important governance functions such as financial management. The overriding focus 
on “good science” and the relative unfamiliarity of most scientists with governance issues seem 
to have made it difficult for some boards to anticipate and deal with such problems. This may not 
have mattered much when a center was small and financial contributions were on the rise, but 
growth, complexity of operations and increased competition for funding have amplified and 
exposed this gap.  It explains why some centers are ahead in terms of good practices while others 
are lagging behind. An emerging challenge for the System is to bring all boards up to an 
acceptable level by enhancing the quality of board governance across all centers. The Alliance 
Board is a new institutional mechanism that has been designed to contribute to this process. 
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3. BEST PRACTICES IN GOVERNANCE 
 
 
The Evolution of Corporate Governance  
 
Governance is generally defined as the structures and processes used to manage the business and 
the affairs of an organization. These governance structures and processes also define the division 
of power, and establish mechanisms for achieving accountability. The aim is to promote strong, 
viable and competitive organizations.  It is important to note that only the board as a collective 
body, rather than individual trustees has the power to manage the affairs of the organization.  The 
main benefits of good governance include the clarification of legal and fiduciary responsibilities, 
clarification of roles and responsibilities between the board and management, improved 
transparency, improved corporate performance, and reduced liabilities. 
 
Historically, a board seat was often seen as a reward, patronage or a way of enhancing one’s 
resume. In other instances, board seats were accorded to funders or like-minded individuals 
within a given community.  Science organizations had scientists on the board, sports 
organizations had athletes on the board, and arts organizations had artists as board members.  
The concept was that people from the community of interest were best qualified to set or approve 
the direction of the organization.  As well, it was not unusual for the chief executive officer 
(CEO) to take effective control and run the organization with the board having ultimate approval, 
but in essence doing no more than rubber stamping management’s decisions and 
recommendations.   
 
This was not necessarily ineffective during good times but in the 80s and more particularly in the 
1990s, major financial failures repeatedly underlined the fact that directors had been negligent in 
carrying out their oversight duties.  As a result, research on and evaluations of governance were 
undertaken in a number of countries, including the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom.  These include the Dey report in Canada (1994/95), the Cadbury and Higgs reports in 
the United Kingdom (1990s), Germany’s first corporate governance code (2002), France’s first 
governance review (2002-04), and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (2002/03) in the United States.  
This last piece of legislation has brought on major changes in American laws and regulations, as 
well as in other countries wishing to harmonize with the dir ection taken in the United States. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was the United States’ legislative response to the Enron and 
Worldcom failures.  It contains highly prescriptive remedies that apply to any organization with 
public US debt or equity and it created larger penalties for white-collar crime (e.g., fines of $1 
US million to $5 US million, imprisonment to 25 years).  Altering structure was the only way 
that regulators could influence board behavior.  By imposing new duties and constraints on 
directors, policy makers hoped to avert future scandals.   
 
SOX has had a major impact on: the role and composition of the audit committee; the 
independence of directors; CEO and chief financial officer (CFO) certification / disclosure; and 
governance practices and behaviour in general.  Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
others have opted to harmonize their rules and/or legislation with SOX requirements. 
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The Evolution of Governance in Not-for-Profits 
 
There has also been a convergence in governance of the for-profit and not- for-profit worlds and 
now, good governance applies to all types of organizations and all sectors.2 The perception once 
held was that there was an enormous difference between the governance and requirements of 
directors/trustees on not- for-profits boards vs. those of for-profit boards.  In reality, that gap has 
dwindled substantially as accountabilities, competencies and workloads converge and become 
aligned. The primary difference that remains is how financial reporting is treated on a publicly 
traded board. Notwithstanding the different legislation and regulations under which they operate, 
the principles of good governance apply equally in both sectors. 
 
Although SOX did not specifically cover not- for-profit organizations, one of the unintended 
consequences of its passage is that its provisions have provided benchmarks which, if not 
adhered to, could give the impression of sub-standard governance to interested observers and 
stakeholders. The courts, the media, watchdog groups, donors/ funders and others are beginning 
to apply SOX standards to all organizations. Notwithstanding the fact that SOX did not address 
not- for-profit organizations, some US states are altering not-for-profit laws to include its 
provisions. Moreover, even if not- for-profits in the US are not complying with the law now, they 
should be aware that they probably will need to in the future. 
 
The term “governance” is no longer an adjective used to describe simple ideas on how things 
should run. It has become a catch-all phrase that has pervaded not only government structures, 
but also business and corporate frameworks as well. In simple terms, governance holds someone 
or a group accountable for the way organizations are run, to explain where the money has gone, 
and to show what that money has achieved. As previously mentioned, SOX has had an obtrusive 
impact on accountability measures in the corporate sphere; although not currently held up to the 
same standards legally as the for-profits, the American not-for-profits are being pressured to fall 
in line with the same standards as corporate organizations, as recent articles in the media have 
given rise to the impression that there is a widespread lack of transparency in the not- for-profit 
sector. SOX has not only affected American for-profits but is increasingly becoming the 
international standard which corporate organizations in other countries are being pressured to 
follow.  
 
Hence, corporate organizations are not the only ones to receive scrutiny for financial scandals.  
Governance is a hot buzzword used increasingly by international organizations; and is 
increasingly being used as a yardstick against which countries from both the developed and the 
developing world are being measured. As American not-for-profits feel the pressure to be 
accountable to their donors, it is not unreasonable to expect that international not-for-profits will 
as well. 
                                                
2 References: “Changing Governance Landscape for Nonprofits Requires Best Practices” by Steve Mariotti, NACD 
Jan 2005 Vol 29 Number 1; “Nonprofit Governance and Accountability”, by Lester M. Salaman and Stephanie L. 
Geller, The Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Listening Post Project, Communiqué No. 4, October 2005; “Not-for-Profit 
Governance: Trends in 2005” by Roger W. Raber, Charles W. Gould, and George C. Ruotolo Jr. NACD, October 
2005; and “Non-Profit Corporate Accountability”, a Guidebook, by the Healthcare Association of New York State 
and Healthcare Trustees of New York State.  
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Recognizing that SOX has impacted, and is impacting, the not- for-profit world, the following 
synthesizes a number of studies’ findings on current trends that nonprofits are adhering to and 
recommended best practices.  
 
What are Nonprofits Actually Doing? 
 
In an interesting study produced by the Center for Civil Society Studies Institute for Policy 
Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, the focus of attention was placed on what nonprofits are 
actually doing, rather than on prescriptive measures that nonprofits should be doing. Surveying 
responses from 207 affiliated nonprofit organizations and 40 randomly selected unaffiliated 
organizations both big and small, the study finds that contrary to the U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee’s discussion draft of June 2004, which focused attention on the shortcomings of 
governance and accountability in the not-for-profit sector, many not-for-profits do have 
functioning Boards, reasonable management and accountability practices, widespread use and 
adherence to best practice accreditation procedures, and ethical standards.  
 
The study shows that while nonprofits are far from perfect, they are neither huge non-transparent 
conglomerates with no accountability. The study also documents the difficulties and the 
constraints not- for-profits face in conforming to the stricter rules that could be imposed on them.  
For example, one of the US Senate Finance Committee’s staff proposals requires boards to 
establish, review, and approve program objectives and performance measures, and to report the 
results on Form 990 filings. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents opposed this, citing reasons 
such as inappropriate use of Form 990, the infeasibility of being able to carry out such a proposal 
when many organizations run a plethora of programs, the inability of boards to evaluate such 
information, and that the measures were just too costly to implement on a not- for-profit’s budget.  
 
In another survey, this one conducted by the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD) of 52 leading not-for-profit organizations (such as the American Red Cross, Volunteers 
of America), determined where for-profit and not-for-profit organizations’ practices are 
converging and diverging. Overall, governance is a key area that has been addressed strongly by 
the not- for-profits although the survey also indicates that progress is still needed.  
 
Best practices/ areas of strength among leading not-for-profits are:  
 
· director and officer liability insurance (100%)  
· written conflict of interest policy  
· accurate disclosure of information  
· engagement in fundraising 
· the formulation of a code of ethics  
· education for new directors 
· governance guidelines for their boards 
· written charters for some or all key committees  
· the establishment of a governance committee  
 
Also, 90% of respondents cited governance as “extremely important” or “very important”.   
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Among areas in need of improvement are:  
 
· the establishment of an entirely independent compensation committee (executive 
compensation has been a key focus for regulatory reformers)  
· meetings without the CEO (in-cameras) 
· CEO succession plans  
· a written list of a set of expectations and responsibilities of board duties  
· disclosure of what governance structures the nonprofits have put in place. 
 
Focusing on boards, nonprofits identified the following three areas as priorities: 
 
· corporate and executive performance 
· corporate governance 
· board-CEO relations  
 
Most trustees on average gave high marks to their boards in addressing key issues, although 
provisions for CEO succession was considered weak. Director’s compensation ranked low in the 
not- for-profit field, with only one out of every ten organizations paying compensation to their 
trustees. This is an interesting comparison to a recent European study which finds that 
compensation for directors at the for-profit level has risen substantially from 55 000 euros to 63 
500 euros in an attempt to attract higher caliber professionals.3 
 
In sum, the converging point of these surveys seems clear: not-for-profits are increasingly being 
held to account for the actions taken on behalf of the organization, if not legally, at least by the 
hand that feeds them--the donors/members. Although the studies used are narrowly focused on 
the developed world, the impact of American corporate financial failures and their repercussions 
(such as the SOX legislation) are being felt all over the world. As globalization makes the world 
smaller, scandals in one part of the world are easily felt in other regions, or at least to the effect 
that donors can easily reflect on whether or not the same problem could happen in their own 
backyard.  
 
Governance Best Practices 
 
Governance best practices include the principles, structures and processes that optimize the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the board. These practices will vary, depending on specific 
circumstances, including the legal and regulatory construct of an organization, the structure and 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders, and the stage of evolution and current challenges of 
the organization.  There is no doubt that one size does not fit all; and some leading practices may 
not be applicable to CGIAR center boards, or may not be feasible immediately within the 
CGIAR System.    
 
                                                
3 Catherine Albert-Roulhac and Peter Breen, “Corporate Governance in Europe: Current Status and Future Trends”, 
Journal of Business Strategy, Vol 26, No. 6, 2005, pp 19-25. 
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The key elements of governance or major accountabilities of a Board include: strategic planning 
and direction setting; performance oversight and assessment; financial oversight; risks and 
opportunities oversight; stakeholder relations and communications; and succession planning for 
the board and the DG.  For each of these, one needs to examine the following three dimensions:  
 
· roles and responsibilities of the board versus those of management 
· structure and composition of the board (its committees and the management team) 
· culture and protocol (ethics, values, code of conduct, behaviours, how meetings are 
conducted, relationships) 
 
Limitations of best practices  
 
Best practices will vary by circumstances, including the : 
 
· legal and regulatory construct 
· stakeholder/shareholder structure and interests 
· stage of evolution or maturity of the organization 
· current situation and challenges of the organization 
 
Thus, one size does not fit all. 
 
It is therefore important to recognize that some leading practices may not be realistic or 
applicable to some CGIAR center boards.  It is also important to recognize that the role played 
by a board can vary greatly depending on the stage of evolution of the organization. 
 
Some conditions that can affect a board’s ability to apply certain leading practices include the 
following: 
 
· competencies of the board members 
· competencies of the management team 
· board’s understanding of its role and responsibilities 
· board and management’s commitment to  sound governance practices 
· whether the organization is based in the developed or developing world 
· number of board meetings a year 
 
A Model of Best Practices and its Components: 
     
The following section is based on “A Model of Best Practices” 4 which can be located in Annex 3 
of this document. The model encompasses in a simple diagram a synthesis of the key 
accountabilities of any governing body or board, as well as the three dimensions within which 
these accountabilities apply. Although the areas of accountability could be broken down further 
into smaller elements, for the sake of simplicity, this model breaks them down into six core 
sections.  
 
                                                
4 Renaud Foster Governance Framework, Copyright 2006, Canada. 
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Referring to the model, the following provides a brief summary of some of the leading practices 
for each of the six areas of accountability as well as for the three common dimensions that apply 
to them: 
 
 
Box 2. Leading Practices within the Components of Board Governance 
 
The leading practices for each of the six areas of Board accountability, as well as for the three dimensions 
that apply to them, are outlined below: 
 
Areas of Accountability:  
 
1. Under Strategy and Direction Setting, the board: 
- contributes to the definition of the core purpose and vision of the organization 
- contributes to and approves the strategic plan 
- sets strategy and contributes to the development of objectives and plans 
- ensures that the operational plans are linked to the strategic plan 
- ensures that appropriate ethics and values are established and maintained 
 
2. Under Financial Oversight, the board (see Annex 5): 
- ensures legal responsibilities are met 
- establishes the delegation of authority to management 
- contributes to, and approves financial plans  
- assesses and controls regularly financial results 
- ensures integrity of financ ial reporting 
- ensures there is a process for the approval of the chair’s, CEO’s, and directors’expenses 
 
3. Under Performance Oversight/ Management, the Board sets objectives for and assesses the 
performance of: 
- the organization 
- the CEO / Director General 
- the board itself  
- the board chair, and committee chairs, committees and individual directors  
 
4. Under Risks and Opportunities, the board: 
- ensures that key risks and opportunities are identified and assessed 
      - ensures strategies are developed to minimize exposure to risks, mitigate existing risk and take  
        advantage of opportunities 
- ensures internal controls are established and monitored 
- reviews results and ensures updates 
 
5. Under Succession Planning , the board: 
- selects, compensates and manages the DG/CEO 
- assesses senior management’s capabilities and appointments 
- plans for board succession 
 - establishes profiles for directors/trustees and the chair 
 - ensures orientation and professional development of directors/trustees 
- ensures that an emergency contingency plan is in place for the DG/CEO and senior management 
 
6. Under Stakeholder Relations and Communications, the board: 
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- ensures key stakeholders are well  identified and associated to key events in planning and 
monitoring 
- ensures strategies and plans to deal with stakeholders as well as communicate with them 
- monitors the performance, financials and governance of those strategies 
- sets, or contributes to, strategies to resolve stakeholder issues 
 
Common Dimensions:  
 
Within the scope of each of the above components of the governance framework are three dimensions that 
affect how the model is applied.  They are: 
 
A. Roles and Responsibilities: 
· Best practices call for clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the board, its     
             chair and its committees from those of management 
 
B. Structure and Composition: 
· Structure and Composition relates to the organization and size of the board and its 
committees, including the number and independence of Directors, terms of office, 
representation strategies, diversity and competency requirements, and the mandates of the 
committees.   
· A basic rule of thumb is the three Cs: Competence, Commitment, and Compatibility.  
· Because of the increased importance of independence, Audit and other committees 
should consider the option of hiring independent outside counsel as a best practice to 
ensure they have done everything possible to provide financial oversight. If ever 
challenged on its independence, having independent counsel can strengthen the 
committee’s or the Board’s defense of its oversight responsibility. 
C. Culture and Protocol 
· Rules and regulations alone do not ensure good governance 
· Culture and Protocol is an often overlooked dimension of how the board  really operates; 
this includes the relationships among directors and those with management, meeting 
processes, decision making and information flow and values and ethics. 
 
At the core of the model are the legal and regulatory considerations which include: 
 
· Duties and responsibilities of the organization, and, 
· Other relevant legal and regulatory considerations including country agreements 
 
These clarify the legal, regulatory and fiduciary responsibilities and establish specific requirements or 
limitations for the operations of the board.  At the core, the duties of care, diligence and skill apply to all 
trustees.  
 
 
In the not-for-profit world, there are multiple constituencies to which the organization must 
answer making accountability difficult to implement. Perception is key to not- for-profits since 
they do not want to be seen using donor funds inappropriately, such as for personal luxuries (for 
example first class airfares, private cars, and expensive dinners). The responsibilities held by 
both for-profit and not- for-profit boards are largely equivalent; however in the case of not- for-
profits as the name implies, there are no profits, only the end results that the donor money 
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produces. Therefore, establishing a governance framework that allows not- for-profit boards to 
inform and communicate clearly and efficiently with their constituents, will help to build 
confidence from their various stakeholders. 
 
Examples of the application of SOX provisions and best practices in not- for-profits, including on 
the audit committee of the board, are given in Boxes 3-6 below5. 
 
 
                                                
5 The best practices that follow and that comprise Annex 4 are based on research, experience and association with: 
· National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) in the US 
· Schulich / Kellogg School of Business (Canada/US) 
· Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) in Canada 
· Governance legislation and reports (Cadbury, Higgs, SOX, Dey, etc.) 
· Securities exchange guidelines (US, Canada, UK, OECD) 
· Special studies on governance 
· Nashwa George, Montclair State University, Montclair, N.J. 
· Relevant publications and articles on Best Practices in not for profits  
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Box 3. Example of Best Practice Standards for Non-Profits 
 
Insider Transaction and Conflicts of Interest 
· Understand and fully comply with all laws regarding compensation and benefits provided to 
directors and executives. 
· Establish a conflict-of-interest policy and a regular and rigorous means of enforcing it. 
· Do not provide personal loans to directors and executives. 
 
Independent and Competent Audit Committee  
· Conduct an annual external financial audit. 
· Establish a separate Audit Committee of the Board. 
· Board members on the Audit Committee should be free from conflicts of interest. 
· Include at least one financial expert on the Audit Committee. 
 
Responsibility of Auditors 
· Rotate auditors or lead partners at least every five years. 
· Require disclosure to Audit Committee of critical accounting policies and practices. 
· Use Audit Committee to oversee and enforce conflict-of-interest policy. 
 
Certified Financial Statements 
· CEO and CFO should sign off on all financial statements. 
· The Board should review and approve financial statements and tax returns for completeness and 
accuracy. 
 
Disclosure 
· Disclose audited financial statements. 
 
Whistle-Blower Protection 
· Develop, adopt, and disclose a formal process to deal with complaints and prevent retaliation. 
· Investigate employee complaints and correct any problems or explain why corrections are not 
necessary.  
 
Document Destruction 
· Have a written, mandatory document retention and periodic destruction policy, which includes 
guidelines for electronic files and voice mail. 
 
 
 
Box 4. The Role of Audit Committees for Not-for-Profits 
 
An effective Audit Committee can increase the integrity and efficiency of the audit process, as well as the 
system of internal controls and financial reporting.  
 
The Audit Committee is an integral element of not-for-profit accountability and governance. It plays a 
key role with respect to the integrity of the organization’s financial information, its system of internal 
controls, and the legal and ethical conduct of management and employees. An Audit Committee’s 
responsibility will vary depending upon an organization’s complexity, size, and requirements. Typical 
Audit Committee responsibilities include: 
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· Approving the overall audit scope 
· Recommending the appointment of the external auditor 
· Overseeing the entity’s financial statement and internal controls  
· Helping to ensure that the audit is conducted in a cost-effective manner, and 
· Risk management oversight. 
 
Audit committees are an increasingly important component of effective accountability and governance.  
An audit committee’s activities should include the following: 
 
· Understanding how the internal control objectives are achieved within the entity.  
· Considering whether the control environment and procedures can accomplish their objectives.  
· Reviewing the auditor’s reports on internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations.  
· Determining whether material weaknesses, reportable conditions, or other findings were reported.  
· Reviewing suggested improvements to internal controls and following up to correct the 
weaknesses in internal controls.  
 
An effective audit committee should have open lines of communication with management, internal 
auditors, and outside auditors.  
 
An audit committee must review the financial statements, and, if appropriate, the comprehensive annual 
financial report and the underlying audit results, with the governing body and external auditors. The 
review should consider reasons for nonstandard audit opinions; changes in accounting policie s; areas of 
judgment in the financial statements; accounting and auditing problems that are a source of disagreement; 
material noncompliance with laws, regulations, and grant provisions; and changes in the report format or 
the nature of footnote disclosure from the prior year’s financial statements. 
 
 
 
Box 5. Audit Committee Composition and Responsibilities--Best Practices (Public Sector) 
 
An audit committee should have a charter that states its mission, objectives, authority, organization, and 
methodology. In addition, the charter could establish voting requirements, the liability of members, and 
their method of appointment. 
 
Specifically, the SOX Act stipulates that the Audit Committee shall: 
· Be composed solely of independent directors/trustees 
· Have one ‘financial expert’ director/trustee 
· Be directly responsible for appointment, compensation and oversight of auditors 
· Be responsible for the pre-approval and disclosure of audit & non-audit services 
· Be able to engage independent counsel or advisors 
· Establish a system to handle accounting complaints 
 
Audit committees should have three to six members, with some or all of the following qualities: 
· Good communication skills and the ability to work with others;  
· Knowledge of the needs, interests, and concerns of the  constituency;  
· Accounting and auditing expertise and experience; and  
· A willingness to ask hard questions and deal with controversial matters.  
 
An audit committee may often be empowered by the board to select or recommend the external auditors, 
which would be formally approved by the governing body. In doing so, the audit committee should 
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consider the following factors: 
· Auditor independence;  
· firm’s reputation and fees;  
· firm’s scope of services and experience with the public sector; and  
· firm’s quality-control standards.  
 
 
Box 6: Audit Committee -- Best Practices 
 
· A board-level committee, whether the "audit," "audit and compliance," "finance" or some other 
denominated committee, should assume all duties and responsibilities for auditing oversight. 
· The purpose, membership and function of the committee should be [written] in a charter or other 
document adopted by the board. 
· Committee members should meet articulated and strict independence criteria. 
· Committee members should possess [at least] a minimal leve l of financial expertise. 
· The duties and responsibilities of the committee should encompass specific matters relating to 
external auditors, internal financial controls and internal audits, corporate conflict-of-interest 
policies and the corporate compliance program. 
· When a single committee takes on multiple roles, such as "audit and compliance" or "audit and 
finance," the various roles of the committee should be clearly articulated, with reporting 
relationships well-defined. 
· The committee must be provided with adequate resources to allow it to effectively carry out its 
functions. 
· The committee may appropriately rely on information and advice from management and 
independently retained advisers and counselors and make decisions on the basis of such 
information and advice. 
 
 
 
Code of Ethics/Code of Conduct 
 
In addition, governance best practices are to be seen in the context of the values and ethics of the 
societal and center circumstances within which the board operates.  These values cannot be 
easily articula ted in a report, but they—as well as the values, norms, and behaviours that board 
members bring with them—are extremely important, even though they cannot be legislated.  It is 
difficult to over-emphasize the importance of ethical values in the conduct of governance. We 
endorse the view that guidelines on ethics could fruitfully supplement the CGIAR’s board guides 
currently in use. A best practice example of one such corporate guideline on ethics is the creation 
of a Code of Ethics/ Code of Conduct. 
 
A Code of Ethics outlines the set of fundamental principles upon which an organization’s 
operations are based. They outline what an organization should and should not be doing. Those 
for whom the code was intended are expected to understand and internalize the code while those 
who break it can expect disciplinary action. The following provides some general, basic elements 
for constructing a Code of Ethics. 
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Elements to a Code of Ethics6: 
 
1. Honest, ethical conduct, including when handling situations that arise out of conflict of 
interest. 
-This has received a lot of attention and is particularly important for DG and members of 
Boards. It is therefore important to have a code of ethics that prohibits conflicts of interest, 
and may require Board members to divulge any relationships that could possibly result in a 
conflict of interest (e.g. family relationships, financial relationships). 
 
2. Full, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure . 
-At its essence, this provision means honest disclosure of information, even when it may be 
difficult to do so. Disclosure is also a tricky subject as results can be manipulated and can 
mislead, as well as inform. Disclosure of an organization’s accounting performance can be 
open to multiple interpretations, from being over-cautious to overestimating. Using clear, 
plain text that is easily understandable is also important to transparent documentation. 
 
3. Compliance with governmental laws, rules, and regulations. 
-Those within the organization are responsible to know the rules and laws as they apply to 
individual positions as well as adhere to those regulations. Often, “legality” is seen as a 
minimal standard and many codes of conduct strive for a higher level of ethical conduct.  
 
4. Internal reporting of code violations. 
-The interests of the organization must always be at the fore and individuals within the 
organization must be encouraged to protect them; however policies such as “whistleblower” 
reporting are not always easy to implement. The process must be seen as safe in the fact that 
there will be no retribution for coming forward and that complaints will be taken seriously. 
Appropriate person(s) should be identified for reporting purposes, preferably someone with 
considerable status. In terms of auditing and accounting matters, procedures should be 
established that allows for the historical documentation of complaints. 
 
5. Adherence to the code. 
-In terms of best practices, organizations need to publicize actions taken for violations of the 
code through formal communication, such as newsletters, reports etc. 
 
  
Although the Panel is not recommending any guideline in particular, Annex 6 located at the end 
of this document provides an example of a general Code of Ethics that can be used as a reference 
by any not-for-profit and adapted to fit an specific organization’s structure. The example 
provides general provisions that should be incorporated into a Code of Ethics/ Conduct such as: 
 
· A general statement of commitment emphasizing the responsibility of the Board and its 
members 
· A list of ethical guidelines that include general statements on responsibilities and 
conflicts of interest, statements on the use of confidential information, and statements on 
the use of resources (such as expenses). 
                                                
6 Edward L. Pittman, “Corporate Ethics and Sarbanes-Oxley”, Wall Street Lawyer, July 2003. 
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· The acceptance of gifts and hospitality 
· The duties of a Board member as the representative of the organization 
· Interpretation and enforcement of the code 
· Penalties for violations of the code 
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4. BOARD STRUCTURE, STRATEGY SETTING, 
AND PERFORMANCE OVERSIGHT 
 
 
Roles and Responsibilities of Boards 
 
Before we discuss the roles and responsibilities of center boards, it is necessary to say a word on 
the nature of these boards. There are four basic features that distinguish them from many other 
boards. First, they have a representative character that is reflected in their composition. Thus, 
some board members represent host countries and the CGIAR System, while others are drawn 
from certain regions or other constituencies relevant to the CGIAR mission. Criteria and 
modalities exist to ensure that stakeholders and diverse constituencies are represented on center 
boards. Second, center boards require a mix of skills relevant to the tasks of governance and 
programs of the centers. Core competencies and experience in science and science management, 
finance and governance are essential for the smooth functioning of the boards. Third, they are 
autonomous bodies with their own charters and missions. But with autonomy comes 
responsibility and accountability. Guidelines and external oversight become inevitable in order to 
maintain the delicate balance between autonomy and accountability. Fourth, with the increasing 
demand and complexity, and as governance tends to become more important, the representative 
character can not be fully covered any more. Boards are less boards of trustees; they have 
become more boards of governors. Fifth, boards operate as part of a larger system within the 
CGIAR that provides the oversight and the broad framework necessary to ensure that their 
directions, responsibilities and accountability for performance are mutually consistent. As the 
centers have multiple stakeholders, CGIAR plays the lead role in responding to the complexities 
and ambiguities involved while also providing the resources and related assistance they need.  It 
is against this backdrop that the roles and responsibilities of center boards need to be assessed. 
 
The Panel’s terms of reference call for a systematic review of the roles and responsibilities, the 
structure, composition, and size of center boards, and a host of related issues. A number of 
questions have been explored in the process of making this assessment. board members, CGIAR 
members, and other stakeholders have provided useful responses to these questions. The Panel 
has also compared the design features and practices of center boards with those prevailing in the 
corporate world and other relevant sectors. Our assessment and conclusions pertaining to these 
issues are presented below. 
 
1. Are the roles and responsibilities of center boards appropriate and adequate to enable 
them to discharge their functions in the present environment? 
 
The CGIAR System’s policy statements on the roles, responsibilities and functions of boards 
serve as the departure point in making this assessment. It is necessary to follow this up with a 
review of how well the given policy guidelines have been implemented or adopted by the various 
boards. The evidence for this can be found in the prevailing board practices. It is important to do 
this cross check because good policies may exist on paper, but may or may not be followed in 
practice.  
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On the adequacy of policy statements, it is necessary to ascertain whether the CGIAR System 
has given proper guidance to the centers on the role, responsibilities and functions of their 
boards.  For this purpose, we have examined the relevant documents that guide the functioning 
of boards. The charters of the centers are the basic legal documents that specify the roles, 
responsibilities and functions of boards. Of necessity, the statements on board functions in 
charters are generic and brief. They need to be interpreted and elaborated depending on the 
context. This has in fact been attempted in the second set of documents called “Board Guides” 
that present more detailed guidelines on the roles, responsibilities and functions of center boards.  
Our assessment of these “Guides” is that they provide a rather comprehensive and systematic 
account of the subject. As we argue in a later section, they need some updating in terms of best 
practices due to the changes taking place in the standards of governance in both the corporate 
world and the public sector. Nevertheless, we have concluded that the policy guidelines provided 
by the CGIAR System through these “Guides” do no leave any major gap. 
 
Despite this finding, if there is evidence of some measure of unevenness in board governance 
across the centers, the problem lies at the level of internalizing these guidelines and translating 
them into practices and norms that reflect the intent of the stated policies. This task of 
operationalizing the policy guidelines has been left to the individual boards.  Several factors are 
at work that can cause a disconnect between policy and practice. It is not implied here that this 
problem has arisen because of a deliberate intent to mislead others or for personal gain. When 
boards consist primarily of scientists, for example, there will be a natural tendency to give 
greater attention to programmatic issues and much less to financial and administrative matters.  It 
may well lead to a failure to observe and probe certain performance problems and practices that 
may need immediate attention. An unintended consequence of this neglect is weak fiscal 
oversight that results in the emergence of avoidable crises for the centers. The problem here is 
not due to a gap in policy, but due to certain practices that are inconsistent with the stated policy. 
 
Similar problems of a policy-practice mismatch have occurred in other areas. Some boards have 
delegated most of the work on DG evaluation to executive committees. Though policy calls for 
the board to be responsible for this function, the delegation may end up with an evaluation 
process and results that keep the rest of the board in the dark. The committee may have reported 
back to the board for the record, but other members of the board may not be briefed on the 
outcome, and consequently may not have been able to play their mandated role in the evaluation 
process.  A pattern may then emerge of a small subgroup of the board making key decisions and 
exercising power at the expense of the board as a whole. Such practices are also influenced by 
other limitations such as infrequent board meetings and crowded agendas that result in further 
delegation by the board of responsibilities to committees, management, etc. Since nearly half of 
all center boards meet only once a year, this issue cannot by any means be regarded as trivial. 
 
2. Should center boards be redesigned to be like corporate boards? 
 
One proposal that seeks to remedy such problems and more generally to improve board 
governance and accountability is a plea for center boards to adopt the corporate model of 
governance.  In the corporate model, it is argued that problems of the kind noted above are 
minimized because the board will tend be smaller in size than a typical center board, meet more 
frequently, and will consist of persons with expertise in business and finance rather than with 
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narrow technical skills. Such a board will not discuss and decide on programmatic issues, but 
depend on advisory committees on programs. The board’s primary concern will be with the 
broader issues of governance, especially finance and the management of resources and external 
linkages. According to this view, the corporate model will make the center board more 
businesslike, with a stronger focus on outcomes, efficiency and the like. 
 
There is no doubt that a smaller board with skills in business and finance and clear performance 
focus will eliminate some of the problems of center boards that we have discussed above. But we 
need to examine both the pros and cons. In the CGIAR System, outputs and outcomes of the 
centers are not always easy to measure and oversee. The credibility of the boards comes partly 
from the stakeholders’ knowledge that persons with the relevant domain knowledge are present 
on these bodies.  An erosion of credibility will needlessly hurt the centers and their impact. 
Outsourcing science oversight may be neither easy nor desirable as a board without domain 
knowledge will find it difficult to judge the links between programs, funds, outcomes, and 
incentives.  This is in contrast to the board of a manufacturing business that deals with mass 
produced standard products. Sales, costs and profits can be easily overseen and assessed by the 
board, and technical matters can be left to the units below and the market.  But even in such 
corporate boards, persons with domain knowledge will be present, in addition to those with 
finance and governance expertise.  Thus those with knowledge of the products and their markets 
and competition are essential players on corporate boards.  
 
Similarly, center boards may need to retain some measure of representative membership, unlike 
corporate boards with stakeholders who share a common objective of making profits.  In the 
center boards, a part of their acceptability and impact will come partly from representatives from 
developing countries, for example, being on these bodies. We conclude that compact boards 
consisting only of persons with business expertise, though they may be more performance 
oriented, are not appropriate for the CGIAR centers.  What is required is a search for the positive 
features and practices of this model that can be incorporated into the center boards. 
 
Board Structure, Composition, Size, and Related Issues 
 
As the CGIAR centers are international research institutions serving the needs of developing 
countries, their initial sponsors created center boards primarily to provide the needed guidance 
and oversight of research activities.  This required that scientists relevant to the research were 
adequately represented on the boards.  In order to create links and credibility with developing 
country governments, their representatives, chiefly science administrators and experts, were 
invited to join the boards. In more recent years, as the scope of research widened, representatives 
of the private sector and NGOs have also been added to the boards. There is also some evidence 
of an improvement in terms of gender balance, although this is an area which needs continuous 
attention. (Male-to- female ratio in total board membership across centers decreased from 2.6 in 
2000 to 2.1 in 2005.)  
 
1. Is the boards’ structure and composition congruent with the centers’ mission and 
changing external environment? 
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Our survey responses show that boards have maintained a reasonable balance between the need 
for representation and the need for expertise and experience. Regions of the North and South are 
about equally represented on the boards. Representation is important both for forging links with 
client countries and groups and mobilizing funds and other support. When a center serves 
different regions, those familiar with these areas bring distinct and diverse perspectives on 
problems to the boards. It is, of course, true that not all stakeholders are adequately represented 
on boards. Thus, the ultimate beneficiaries of research, namely, the poor are not directly 
represented on these boards. They are indirectly represented by developing country governments 
and to some extent by a few representatives of NGOs who work with the poor and by other board 
members who are committed to work for the benefit of the poor. But there is an inherent 
limitation here in that not all stakeholders can be brought into the boards. It does raise the 
question whether the centers and their boards have devised other mechanisms to listen to the 
voice of the stakeholders who are not organized and do not have the means to be represented on 
the boards. 
 
Science expertise is important for doing good science and to ensure cred ibility among peer 
researchers. For historical reasons, this is one area to which the boards have paid much attention. 
Some might argue that science expertise has dominated the boards at the expense of other skills 
and experience. Financial and management expertise and experience, for example, are also 
essential for good governance and fiscal oversight.  The nature of a center’s mandate thus calls 
for a measure of diversity in its board’s membership. 
 
Survey responses confirm that, in some respects, boards have failed to maintain the balance 
implied in their board guidelines. Respondents have pointed to a lack of members with adequate 
financial and governance expertise as an important gap that needs to be remedied.  Survey 
responses also show that several boards have already taken steps to recruit more members to 
strengthen their financial oversight function. There is a similar need to find members with 
broader science backgrounds, including research management. Highly specialized scientists may 
be more useful as advisers or overseers of specific projects than as board members concerned 
with overall governance of the centers. 
 
All center boards have a built- in provision to bring in at-large members. This facility can be used 
to bring in persons with the required expertise or experience, depending on emerging needs. An 
important issue is how to open up this process so that a wider range of qualified candidates are 
available to the boards prior to the appointments. The current practice of most boards is to 
consult the CGIAR roster (candidates database) in order to identify and attract suitable persons. 
There is a clear need to update and streamline this roster so that it can act as a proper data base 
with relevant and complete information. 
 
There is a similar prob lem with the CGIAR that has the right to nominate a specified number of 
members on boards. One issue here is whether there should be wide variations in the number of 
CGIAR nominees on the different boards. For historical reasons, ad hoc decisions may have been 
made in the past that caused such wide variations. Our assessment is that there is no case for 
continuing this practice. More uniform guidelines and limits on the number of CGIAR nominees 
are necessary to make the board composition more balanced.    
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Recommendation 1): The CGIAR as a system represents a wide range of stakeholders. The 
center board therefore needs to reflect this diversity and at the same time have the needed mix 
of skills to ensure that their functioning will be effective and efficient. The boards have done 
reasonably well in being representative of the stakeholders and shareholders. There is, 
however, unevenness in the mix of competencies and skills present in some of the boards. 
In order to perform the role expected of them, the boards need to have a proper mix of skills to 
judge the quality and relevance of science, and to oversee the finances and overall 
accountability of centers. At a minimum, two persons with adequate financial, business and 
accounting knowledge and experience should be members on every board. At least three 
members with science or science management background should be available to a board. 
 
All center boards have established committees to facilitate more detailed deliberations of some 
of the specific functions entrusted to them. They also permit members to more actively 
contribute to aspects in which they have a special interest or expertise. Survey responses do not 
indicate any serious problem with the functioning of these committees. Since several of the 
boards meet only once a year, the executive committee, for example, also performs certain 
delegated functions between board meetings. Committees become suspect when members feel 
that they are dominated by “cliques” or are secretive.  Deliberations and recommendations of 
committees need to be reported back to the full board. The committee system can be even more 
intensively used, as proposed below, to improve the overall effectiveness of boards.     
 
Given the nature of the business of CGIAR centers, our conclusion is that one meeting per year 
is totally inadequate. Governance functions such as review of financial reports and performance 
call for more frequent meetings. A notable casualty of the annual board meeting is that the 
agenda gets overloaded, and leaves little time and attention to strategic planning and related 
issues. It also limits the opportunities for members to learn about the center’s work and maintain 
continuity. Ideally, a board should meet four times in a year to monitor and review the center’s 
performance, and to be in touch with new developments. A quarterly meeting will definitely 
strengthen fiscal oversight, and afford more time for the board to formulate strategy jointly with 
the management. The downside is that four meetings can be too expensive for the centers, given 
their limited budgets. We propose, therefore, that the full board meet twice a year, with provision 
for a video conference with all members or executive committee meetings twice a year. This 
would still permit four board or executive committee meetings in a year so that quarterly reviews 
of financial performance and other relevant matters can be conducted without fail. 
 
More frequent meetings and video conferences as proposed above will provide more time to the 
boards to attend to matters that may have been lower priority in earlier periods. One such 
business is strategy formulation and review on a periodic basis. Some centers have begun to 
devote a day or two for retreats on this subject. Such practices need to be shared widely and 
encouraged. Similarly, boards should devote more time to “listening to the ultimate stakeholders 
– the poor”. There are many ways to do this, including through the use of new technologies so 
that boards can have direct feedback from those they are meant to serve. 
 
Recommendation 2): The frequency of board meetings should be determined by the nature 
and scope of the business to be transacted. Given the mix of functions of center boards, the 
Panel recommends that full board meetings should be held at least twice a year. In addition, 
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two more meetings may be required to review quarterly reviews of finances and programmatic 
matters. In order to minimize costs, these additional meetings may be conducted through 
telephonic or video conferences or through delegation to an executive committee that reports 
back to the full board. The duration of each meeting may be reduced, depending on the 
requirements of different centers.  Increased frequency will also enable boards to meet in 
other regions where research projects or partners are located. 
 
Recommendation 3): The proposals above may increase the time and attention that members 
may be required to give their boards. It will most certainly demand more time from the 
chairpersons of boards. This may necessitate a review of the compensation of Board members 
due to the increase in accountability, responsibility, expertise, and time required of them. This 
would apply, in particular, to board chairs and committee chairs. 
 
2. How long should a member serve on a center board? 
    
Most boards have a policy of members serving for up to two terms of three years each. There is 
nothing automatic about a person being given two terms. Many boards probably review member’ 
contributions and decide to renew them only after the evidence is positive. It is not clear, 
however, that this practice is followed uniformly by all.  In exceptional cases, boards have 
extended the term of a member by a year or two beyond the two terms. The major reason for this 
exception is that occasionally continuity requires that a person stays on the board during an 
overlap period. This type of emergency can arise when several members retire over a short 
period, with very few left on the board with institutional memory of what happened in the past. 
A staggered term is another option to consider in dealing with such requirements. 
 
Some members have argued that the term should be extended by three more years so that center 
boards can have persons with longer experience and commitment to their work. It is true that 
members acquire greater knowledge about a center and will be able to contribute more, the 
longer they serve on its board. Many corporate boards follow this practice. In the CGIAR 
System, however, there are multiple stakeholders and regions of the world whose perspectives 
and inputs need to influence board deliberations and decisions. Given the changing nature of 
programs, boards also need to bring in persons with relevant expertise. If members stay on for 
nine years, for example, a board may not get the benefit of these perspectives. 
 
On balance, we see much merit in staying with the current practice of a ceiling of two terms of 
three years each that many boards have adopted. It is a sufficiently long period for members to 
contribute effectively to the board’s deliberations, and yet leaves some room for the board to 
induct new talents and expertise as needed. A cautionary note is that board members’ 
contribution and attendance should be reviewed every year. Board chair should give them timely 
feedback on this, and prompt action taken to terminate membership at the end of the first term if 
a member’s performance is deemed to be unsatisfactory.   
 
Recommendation 4): The duration of a member’s term on a board should not exceed six years. 
The current practice of most boards to renew a member’s term after three years is a sound 
one. It is important, however, that boards review more rigorously members’ contributions 
before confirming them for a second term. Members who fail to attend consecutive meetings 
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or do not contribute adequately in the judgment of the boards should not be offered a second 
term. Boards may choose to renew members for less than three years in order to have 
staggered membership to ensure continuity. 
 
3. What should be the size of a center board? 
 
The size of center boards presently varies from 12 to 18 members. The larger size of some 
boards can be traced to the need at the time of their origin to get several nominees from host 
countries or the region. It is also possible that cost did not figure as a major issue as only one 
meeting per year may have been envisaged. The board was also seen primarily as a forum for 
getting support from diverse stakeholders for the center. 
 
These underlying factors have all changed significantly since then. As discussed above, it is 
essential now that boards meet more frequently. Even though this might add to the center’s costs, 
we feel that the benefits of having a more engaged board far outweigh the added costs. 
Furthermore, larger boards find it difficult to recruit adequate numbers with commitment and the 
time to attend to board matters. The quality of deliberations is not necessarily improved by 
merely having more members on the board. In fact, other things remaining the same, it may be 
easier for the centers to find a smaller number of persons with commitment, relevant expertise 
and time than a larger number with the same attributes. In the emerging environment, it is not the 
size, but the quality of engagement of the board that will determine the effectiveness of 
governance. 
 
As noted above, representation of different stakeholders on the boards is one reason why some of 
the boards are large in size. Host countries and the CGIAR need to have their nominees on 
boards. We feel, however, that the number of nominees can be brought down without violating 
the principle of representation. Host country nominees range from two to four in several boards. 
Some of them are busy government policy makers who cannot be expected to give much time to 
center boards. This could be brought down to one nominee uniformly across all boards. It may 
call for an amendment to the center charters. Similarly, the CGIAR nominees range from two to 
eight in the boards. Though CGIAR is the primary stakeholder, its nominees on the boards could 
be brought down to between two and three, depending on the size of the board.  
  
In light of the foregoing discussion, our proposal on the size of the boards is that the range 
should be between nine and twelve members excluding the DG (ex-officio).  This range will 
permit the larger centers with diverse programs and serving many regions to have a slightly 
larger membership than the rest. This range will leave enough space for the boards to co-opt 
additional members to fill in gaps in the changing requirements of the centers. The proposed size 
is still large enough to permit the creation of the committees required to manage the affairs of the 
board. 
 
One factor that might limit the ability of the boards to attract persons who are willing to commit 
their time and engage productively in board deliberations as required is the matter of 
compensation. In the corporate world, substantial fees are paid to board members in view of their 
frequent meetings and other responsibilities. Center boards pay an honorarium of $300-400 per 
day to their members. It is true that most board members join center boards not for the income 
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they earn, but to participate and support a worthy public cause. Nevertheless, we feel that an 
active engagement through more frequent meetings that we have proposed will increase the 
demands on their time, and hence may call for a review of the policy on board honoraria. This 
will apply in particular to the board chair and committee chairs. Compensation could be a 
problem especially if members with financial and business expertise are to be attracted to these 
boards. There is no implication here that CGIAR honoraria should be on par with corporate fees 
for directors.         
 
Recommendation 5): Keeping in view the need for a board that is compact, accountable and 
well focused on governance, it is recommended that the size of the board should be between 
nine and eleven members, excluding the DG (ex-officio). A smaller board enhances the 
chances of synergy, participation, and focus.  A board with less than nine members may cause 
problems in terms of quorum and the mix of skills needed in a board. A much larger board 
may add unduly to costs, given the increased frequency of meetings. The Panel offers this as a 
guideline to be adapted to the needs of the centers. 
 
Recommendation 6): Consistent with their international status and mandate, centers serve 
many countries and, in many cases, more than one region. Center boards, therefore, need to 
have members from different regions and backgrounds. Hence, host country representation on 
a board should be limited to one nominee. A board may still wish to invite other host 
representatives to attend its meetings as observers as and when necessary. Where feasible, 
center charters should be amended in line with this recommendation. 
 
Recommendation 7): A similar rationalization of CGIAR nominees on boards is also in order. 
Presently, the number of nominees varies widely, the maximum being eight. It is 
recommended that the number of CGIAR nominees should not exceed two unless there are 
legal problems that may cause a center to lose its international status or privileges. CGIAR 
should strengthen its consultation and nomination process in order to ensure that its nominees 
meet the competencies needed by the Boards. 
 
Strategy and Direction Setting 
 
As the highest decision-making body of a CGIAR Center, the board is ultimately responsible for 
ensuring that the center’s strategy and programs are consistent with its mandate, mission and 
goals, and are also aligned with the CGIAR’s priorities and strategies.  All center boards are 
therefore required to devote time and effort to strategic planning and direction-setting, and to do 
so in a manner that enables the board to appropriately take into account the diverse perspectives 
of a variety of stakeholders represented by the CGIAR, as well as the many beneficiaries the 
CGIAR system and its centers are ultimately expected to serve. 
 
Strategic planning is thus not a new function for the Boards; but with a fast-changing 
environment and continually evolving CGIAR priorities, it is an activity to which they have 
rightly given much greater attention in recent years.  Building on past experience, and 
recognizing the need for adopting a more-systematic and participatory approach to strategic 
planning, some centers have also utilized such means as special retreats and in-person 
consultations with stakeholders, virtual meetings and electronic consultation tools, and external 
facilitators to help improve the data and processes used for strategic planning.  All these efforts 
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and new practices have helped; many CGIAR centers are presently undertaking strategic 
direction-setting in a more effective and participative manner than in previous decades.  
 
Despite these improvements, however, center boards themselves recognize that further progress 
is needed. The survey data obtained by the Panel indicates that a large majority of board 
members (80%) say that strategy setting is an interactive process involving all parties; and the 
remaining respondents are about equally divided in saying that the planning process is either 
board- or DG/staff- led.  Despite recent efforts, many weaknesses are identified, and there is 
considerable agreement on what these are.  In particular, the inherent complexity of the task and 
the constraints under which the boards and centers operate, and some of the systemic factors 
underlying these constraints and weaknesses are also recognized—but respondents seem to have 
found it harder to identify workable solutions for some of these shortcomings. 
 
On some boards, the capacity to undertake strategic planning is one such constraint. Many 
respondents believe that center programs have become more diverse, but in-depth board 
expertise and scientific knowledge is lacking in some areas of work. In other cases, the board has 
not worked through the relevant questions with sufficient rigor; or there has apparently been lack 
of clarity on goals for the center.  In some centers, respondents believe that the board has 
demonstrated a limited ability to think strategically, has tended to focus on tactical issues, or 
needs to engage better in the process.  
 
The pattern, unpredictability, and restrictiveness of donor funding is also considered a challenge. 
Respondents say that when donors do not fund approved plans, it is not clear what an 
“appropriate” strategy really means; and that the lack of adequate core funding, and the emphasis 
on project funding, greatly limits goal setting and achievement.  In some cases there is a gap 
between donor interests and the strategic issues identified by the board/center; fund-raising 
efforts take precedence over strategic planning, and a high proportion of opportunistic project 
funding contradicts the strategic approach; and the quest for additional funding has led to too 
many diverse projects that may not be well aligned with the center’s strategic requirements.  
 
Most boards are also constrained by insufficient unstructured time to explore strategic options.  
Many survey respondents comment on the shortage of time and resources for regular review and 
adjustment of strategy, and on the limited commitment of board members to participate in 
extensive, time-consuming processes of strategic planning.  Board members also find it difficult 
to anticipate and track the impact of complex long-term projects, and note that effective strategic 
planning requires quality inputs from management, and more interaction with scientists than time 
permits.  Background documents presented to the board sometimes do not provide a synthesis of 
the mass of data available, or are too long, wordy or late; or alternative strategies are not 
presented.  All of these constraints hamper the effectiveness of strategic decision-making by the 
board. 
 
There are system- level and external constraints as well. In some cases, turf battles between 
centers have impeded progress; and boards have found it difficult to incorporate opinions of 
diverse stakeholders and beneficiaries, and have had a limited opportunity to interact with 
NARS.  In some cases, survey respondents have also noted the apparent mismatch between the 
CGIAR/Science Council’s recommendations and the board’s more grounded and knowledgeable 
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perspective; confusion between Science Council and board roles; and poor linkages between  
program planning and resource mobilizatio n, leading to wasted effort in strategic planning. 
 
Thus, based on the survey data alone, there is obviously considerable room for improvement in 
strategic planning by center boards. Some constraints—such as time and information 
availability- are more easily rectified than others; and there is evidence from CGIAR Centers that 
the boards that seem to have a good handle on strategy are those that have set aside at least one 
additional half day per year and dedicated it exclusively to strategy and direction setting. Having 
only one board meeting a year, as is the case for some boards, usually precludes the board from 
having either the time or the perspective to focus on the strategic orientation of the center or its 
strategic objectives. The competencies of the individual trustees are also critical to this exercise.  
At least some of the trustees need to have management, governance or strategic planning 
experience in order to contribute in a meaningful way to the strategy and direction setting.   
 
The Panel believes that for a board to perform its strategic oversight function it needs to ensure 
that board competencies include the ability to think strategically and to look at the big picture.  
The board also has to ensure the DG has the capability to lead the development of strategy, and 
that there is sharing of good practices between centers (e.g., on how strategic objectives were 
formulated or processes for joint board /management sessions to establish or amend strategy) to 
facilitate effective strategic planning and to avoid reinventing the process. As well, management  
needs to understand how to make better use of the board in order to get advice and guidance on 
strategy, and has to present information to the board accordingly.  Donors too need to recognize 
that an annual funding cycle and unpredictability of funding seriously constrain a board’s ability 
to do effective strategic planning.  
 
Recommendation 8): Limitations of time and the overload and urgency of the operational 
programs of centers often lead to a relative neglect of strategic functions in some of the 
boards. It is imperative that this imbalance is rectified by providing adequate time and 
resources to the boards to perform their strategic functions of planning, review and oversight.  
 
In addition, the boards need to ensure that they themselves have adequate capacity to effectively 
guide and oversee strategic planning by center management.  Recognizing this, some boards 
have undertaken a comprehensive self-assessment to identify current and future needs, and have 
adopted a “board development plan” to upgrade the board’s competencies, composition, and 
processes for performing its strategic functions.  This plan for improving the board’s 
effectiveness in addressing strategic issues—and for making the board itself more strategic in its 
approach—has led to the adoption of more systematic succession planning and such other board-
renewal activities as discussed elsewhere in this report.  Other issues, for example those related 
to the CGIAR system or the Science Council, are also important, but clearly beyond the scope of 
this stripe review.   
 
Performance Oversight and Assessment  
 
As noted earlier, the board is ultimately accountable for a center’s performance.  It must 
therefore ensure that it effectively ove rsees and assesses the center’s performance in all program 
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and management areas, and that it provides relevant, unambiguous, and timely guidance to 
management on all aspects of the center.   
 
Recognizing this, center boards (and the CGIAR) utilize a variety of oversight and assessment 
mechanisms to assure coherence between the CGIAR’s  priorities and the Centers’ strategy, 
medium term plans, and annual workplans and budgets.  They also have in place a long-standing 
system of periodic EPMRs and Center Commissioned External Reviews (CCERs), both of which 
seek to ensure that program and management performance are aligned with the Center’s strategic 
objectives.   In addition, a system of monitoring and assessing performance through the annual 
Performance Measurement System (PMS) has recently been introduced. 
 
Obviously, boards provide oversight of center activities both as a full-board and through its 
various committees. About 90% of survey respondents say that there are appropriate committees 
“to a great extent”; and  about 80% of the respondents say the boards’ committees do “not at all” 
overlap (and the remaining 15% say “to some extent”).  Thus, survey respondents believe that 
the committee structure is generally appropriate, though some areas of improvement remain.   
 
These areas include, for some boards, the need for better risk management; the need for a new or 
ad hoc committee for personnel issues and handling staff grievances; making sure that the 
program committee does not unduly get into management issues; and clarifying the role of the 
executive committee.  In some instances, there is need to clearly demarcate the responsibilities of 
the board and its program committee (in which sometimes the full board participates); and of the 
executive committee and audit/ finance committees.  However, the survey does not permit broad 
generalizations that cover all centers; and it was clear from the Panel’s interviews that whether a 
committee needs strengthening depends very much on the particular board.  
 
In general, survey respondents also recognize many strengths of boards in providing program 
oversight. These include the perception that most center boards have members with competency 
in providing scientific as well as governance oversight. Most boards have eminent scientists with 
an intimate knowledge of relevant programs, who interact with the center’s scientists; there is 
openness and transparency of board processes; and the boards engage external experts in some 
areas, as needed.  Survey respondents believe these strengths are the result of new practices 
introduced by some boards.  These practices include fewer but more critical board-commissioned 
CCERs, yearly review of research management to ensure delivery of results, and the introduction 
of a science advisory panel to enhance operations oversight.  
 
Some of these strengths are also recognized by the CGIAR members who responded to survey 
Questionnaire II.  Many of these respondents believe that the boards’ major strengths include 
board composition; diverse geographic representation; good balance between scientific and other 
disciplines reflective of global agenda; and the knowledge, experience, dedication, and 
commitment of members.  Other strengths are the boards’ influence on center programs; the 
functions performed by boards; and the centers’ linkages with the Science Council and other 
global committees of the CGIAR system. Some other CGIAR members consider board balance 
(disciplinary, geographical, and gender), appropriate size, personal integrity, technical expertise, 
and committee structure to be the key strengths of center boards. All these strengths contribute to 
effective oversight of program performance. 
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Despite these many strengths, however, survey respondents believe further improvements are 
needed in monitoring and program oversight, at least for some boards.  Their suggestions include 
more programmatic monitoring; more analytical reports; a systematic presentation of project 
monitoring on a regular basis; better quantitative indicators of program success; and linkage 
between financial and programmatic reports. Respondents also suggest greater use of quarterly 
reports on progress, finances, and funding prospects; and more regular information to specific 
committees.  Furthermore, they suggest better electronic communication and information 
sharing; more rigorous monitoring of reports between board meetings; and more timely and more 
user-friendly documentation for board discussions.  
 
The Panel fully endorses these and other suggestions by survey respondents (see Annex 4); and 
recognizes that not all boards would need to make all of the improvements suggested.  Instead of 
making detailed recommendations, it wishes to emphasize some general responsibilities of 
boards in relation to program oversight, and how they could be better performed.  
 
Recommendation 9): Recognizing that all centers are part of a larger system that needs to 
maintain strong support from a variety of stakeholders and shareholders, the Panel 
recommends that boards need to strengthen their role in ensuring that centers’ strategy fits 
well with the overall CGIAR priorities and strategies. This will require boards to ensure that 
there is a process in place that encourages management to embark only on programs or 
projects that are aligned with the agreed upon priorities.  
 
Recommendation 10): Board’s oversight of performance should use the MTP as the starting 
point. An important function of the board is to see to it that the annual program and resources 
allocated to it are consistent with the specific objectives stated in the MTP relevant to the 
review. The oversight function will also require that the board and management develop and 
use suitable performance indicators that reflect both process and outcomes. 
 
Recommendation 11): If system priorities and funding of regional partnerships and global 
programs increase in importance, center and systems’ governance structures will need to 
adjust to this new reality. To enhance the oversight of inter center collaboration among 
centers the Panel endorses the practice of joint board memberships. Boards of such centers 
may also occasionally meet jointly, to review their programs and performance. 
 
Financial Oversight  
 
Financial oversight is an important function for any board, and in view of the complexity of the  
CGIAR, this function is even more critical for center boards.  As in other organizations, the 
fiduciary duty of board members is to act honestly, in good faith, and with the best interests of 
the organization in mind, while disclosing any conflicts of interest.  These duties necessitate the 
use and application of the members’ skills and capabilities; and equally, that they recognize 
situations that exceed those skills and capabilities, and request the necessary help. 
 
In recent years, center boards have become increasingly aware of the importance of financial 
oversight, and the board competencies required to carry it out effectively.  According to survey 
 41  
respondents (see Annex 4), some boards have introduced better financial oversight by reviewing 
financial strategy and tracking financial indicators regularly; have strengthened board skills for 
oversight of finance and management; have revised the charter of finance and audit committees 
to make them similar to corporate boards; have introduced stricter and clearer audit policies; and 
now have more interaction with the center’s financial staff.  They have also increased the 
frequency of reporting financial information to the board; and have recognized the fiduciary 
oversight responsibility of the whole board, rather than just of its committees.  
 
Survey respondents were also asked to indicate the further improvements needed in financial 
oversight by boards.  Respondents acknowledge that a number of improvements are needed--
some of which require action by CGIAR stakeholders other than center boards.  Their 
suggestions for improving financial oversight include the following: further improving board 
capacity by strengthening the competency of all board members to ask the right questions in 
management and finance; increasing the number of board members with expertise in financial 
oversight and management (finance, audit, accounting skills); and ensuring that all board 
members appreciate their responsibility for the center’s financial position.  Also, they suggest 
that the boards’ finance and audit committees should have 3-4 members; and that there should be 
a specific CGIAR-wide financial orientation program for members of these committees.  
 
Other suggestions are that there should be more interaction between the boards’ finance and 
audit committees and the centers’ finance manager and internal auditors; more interaction among 
board members on financial matters; increased focus on risk assessments; and strengthening of 
the center’s internal audit function. Survey respondents also suggest increased regular financial 
reporting by management (e.g., a complete set of financial reports every quarter); improved 
circulation of financial  information to all board members; and increased time commitment to 
financial matters, e.g., through two executive committee and finance committee meetings per 
year.  
 
In addition, board members suggest more effective oversight/ interaction between the CGIAR 
Secretariat’s finance team and the center’s finance department; a clearer CGIAR policy on funds 
management; better use of benchmark and comparative indicators to understand critical spending 
patterns (over time, and across Centers); and closer continuing relationship between a center’s 
audit committee with CGIAR system’s internal auditors. 
 
From these suggestions it is apparent to the Panel that center boards clearly recognize their 
responsibilities for financial oversight, are aware of weaknesses, and are attempting to find 
solutions for improving oversight by the board.  The Panel endorses many of the suggestions 
made by board members themselves.  In so doing, it wishes to emphasize the importance of 
accurate financial reporting to the board, noting that the external benchmark calls for financial 
reporting that entails a fair and complete reporting of the facts with transparency and adequacy 
of disclosure, while complying with all applicable laws and regulations.  
 
In this context, the Panel is aware that some observers believe that there is a tendency in some 
centers to be too optimistic in financial forecasting and reporting.  Such unwarranted optimism 
can greatly increase the risks of misleading financial reporting.  It wishes to reinforce the view 
that DGs need to have very clear direction from their board in this area; and CGIAR-wide 
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incentives must be established to reward and/or recognize DGs for accurate financial reporting--
even when this may reduce, in the short term, donor support for the Centers’ initiatives. 
 
The Panel also notes that in recruiting appropriate skills for the board, increased attention needs 
to be given to the specific financial expertise required for the audit committee, while still 
retaining the other skills required on the board.  Some boards are apparently unsure of how to 
adequately strengthen financial capacity while maintaining the ability to undertake effective 
program oversight.  The Panel believes that sound governance requires that boards keep a 
healthy balance among all of its areas of accountability, not just the financial side of the 
organization.  Accordingly, its various recommendations seek to maintain the needed balance 
between heightened financial scrutiny and effective oversight of the scientific research that is the 
“core business” of the center.  
 
Recommendation 12): For improved financial oversight, besides supporting the other 
suggestions already contemplated by various boards, the Panel recommends that as part of the 
effort to strengthen the financial oversight function of the board, the chair of the audit 
committee should keep close contact with the CGIAR unit on internal audit so that the 
adoption of best practices and system improvements is facilitated.  In addition, the annual 
meeting of external auditors with both the audit committee and the full board should be a 
standard practice. Paid consulting services by the current external auditor should be 
prohibited.  
 
The Panel also emphasizes the need for greater efforts in managing risks by identifying and 
managing threats that could severely impact or bring down the organization. Traditiona lly, risk 
management was thought of as mostly a matter of getting the right insurance. However, this 
impression of risk management has changed dramatically. With the recent increase in rules and 
regulations, employee-related lawsuits and reliance on key resources, risk management is 
becoming a management practice that is every bit as important as financial or facilities 
management. 
Recommendation 13): An important function of the board is to assess the risks associated with 
the centers’ programs, finances, human resources, management systems, and general 
operating environment. Risk assessment statements should accompany all documents on 
programs presented to the board.  Similarly, the risks associated with proposed financing 
arrangements and donor commitments for specific projects should be made known to and 
discussed by the board.  The board should review such risks periodically.  
 
In addition, the Panel wishes to draw attention to external “best practice” that, in conformity with 
the SOX Act, requires CEO/CFO certification of financial statements.  The organization’s 
CEO/CFO are expected to certify that they have: (a) reviewed the reports / financial statements 
submitted to the Board; (b) that these reports contain no untrue statements or omissions of 
material fact, and that they fairly present the financial condition, in keeping with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); (c) that the appropriate internal controls exist, and that 
the auditors and audit committee have received disclosure of any deficiencies or fraud; and (d) 
that the CEO/CFO recognize that the statements are subject to independent audit.   
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Recommendation 14): In light of this best practice based on current US law, as well as 
relevant recent experience within the CGIAR, the Panel recommends that when the annual 
accounts and report are presented to the board, the DG and chief financial officer or director 
of finance should present a due diligence certification. 
 
Recommendation 15): In addition, to ensure openness and accountability, and to control costs, 
the Panel recommends that the financial approval/spending limits delegated to the DG and 
other senior officials should be authorized by and made known to the full board; the DG 
should submit an annual or periodic report on such expenditure to the Board; and a similar 
practice should be adopted for the Chair. 
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5. BOARD RENEWAL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Boards need to continually examine and renew their own capacity to effectively and efficiently 
perform their primary governance functions.  In recent years, center boards have paid 
considerable attention to such matters as: a) ensuring that board members better understand the 
CGIAR system and the center’s business; b) assessing and strengthening the capacity of boards, 
DGs, committees and members to carry out their respective responsibilities; c) undertaking 
succession planning for various positions; d) improving the efficiency of board processes for 
decision making; e) exercising firmer control over expenditures related to the conduct of board 
business; f) better utilizing the services of board secretaries; and g) in general, providing better 
oversight of staff relations and conflict-resolution mechanisms. 
 
In many of these areas, the Panel obtained survey data on current strengths, new practices 
introduced in recent years, continuing weaknesses, and suggestions for further improvement 
(Annex 4). In addition, the Panel has explored many of these topics through interviews and 
document review; as well as through an examination of best practices of boards of NGOs and the 
private sector, particularly in North America and Europe.  Its overall assessment is that while 
considerable efforts have been made by many boards, progress across the CGIAR system 
remains somewhat uneven and ad hoc; and more systematic efforts on an ongoing basis for “self-
renewal” of center boards could generate substantial gains at relatively low cost.  Some of the 
key areas in which further improvements seem to be needed are discussed below.  
 
Better Understanding of CGIAR and Center Business 
 
The CGIAR is a complex entity consisting of several components, each interacting with other 
internal and external partners in diverse ways. It also has a rich history, hallowed traditions, 
accepted policies, principles and practices, and a cultur al ethos (the “CGIAR-way” of doing 
things) that are not immediately apparent to a new-comer to the system.  The centers too have 
their own distinguishing history, culture, and business practices etc that need to be well- 
understood before a board member could contribute fully to the work of that center and the 
CGIAR system as a whole.   
 
Recognizing this, the CGIAR as well as each center, conduct formal orientation and leadership 
development programs for new members of boards and senior managements; and undertake a 
variety of less-formal activities to help familiarize board members with the context within which 
CGIAR boards operate.  (The Executive Leadership Program conducted for the CGIAR since 
2004 is open to CGIAR donor-members as well.) 
 
As noted in Annex 4, many survey respondents believe that orientation by the centers is now 
taken more seriously than before; however respondents have also suggested that participation 
should be compulsory, that there is need for continuous learning, and that the center- level 
orientation process requires more documentation.  Also, improved knowledge of the CGIAR and 
its issues should be emphasized, the center should arrange visits to outreach locations, more 
interaction with scientists is needed, and there should be increased participation in the center’s 
annual program and planning meetings.  All these are worthwhile suggestions. 
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With regard to the CBC’s (CGIAR’s) annual board orientation program, respondents believe it is 
good, and should be continued.  Roughly 45% of the survey respondents say that the CGIAR 
orientation of board members is adequate “to a great extent,” and the remaining 55% say “to 
some extent.”  One or more respondents suggest that this program should be attended soon after 
appointment; that it should be tied to the AGM, so participants can see how the CGIAR system 
works; and that the program continually up -date the management models and expertise used. The 
Panel’s interview data validated these general observations by survey respondents; but also 
highlighted the need to go a bit further in the same direction.  
 
Recommendation 16): Recognizing that CGIAR and center board orientation programs, 
executive leadership courses, and other development programs for new board members are 
critical for their effectiveness and better understanding of the CGIAR system and center’s 
business, the Panel recommends that the CGIAR orientation program be given to new 
members preferably after they have attended one board meeting that will give them some 
familiarity with the centers and their work. In addition, CGIAR members should have 
opportunity to become acquainted with center operations, participate in board orientation, and 
observe board meetings to create improved understanding between centers and CGIAR 
members. 
 
Board and DG Assessment  
 
Even the best performers can gain from periodic self-  and external assessments conducted in a 
professional, systematic, and culturally- sensitive manner.  As noted in the CGIAR Reference 
Guide No. 5, “Choosing a Director General: The Search and Selection Process”, and No. 6,  
“Evaluating the Director General: The Assessment Process”, one of the main responsibilities of a 
board is to select and assess the DG, and provide guidance for improving performance, as 
needed.  The board also needs to periodically assess its own performance, and that of its chair, 
Committees, and members, as noted in Reference Guide No. 7, “Board Self-Assessment”. 
 
The survey data summarized in Annex 4 indicates that many boards have recently strengthened 
their DG- and self-assessment practices. About 75% of the respondents say that board members 
participate in evaluation of the DG “to a great extent,” and the remaining 25% say “to some 
extent.”  Furthermore, about 45% of the respondents say they participate “to a great extent” in 
evaluation of board committees and the remaining 40% say “to some extent.”   
 
The new and better practices introduced in recent years by some boards include restructured or 
better self- and DG- assessment; annual self-evaluation of the board; review of board 
competencies; and development of board performance indicators (though this is at a preliminary 
stage).  Informal mechanisms and processes—such as self-appraisal of the board and the DG 
followed by a frank discussion (which is considered by the respondent to be a very effective 
approach); and more frequent face-to-face communication between the board chair and the DG 
in the context of a strengthened relationship have also yielded promising results.  
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The Panel considers all these steps to be very encouraging; and commends the Boards that have 
made a special effort to strengthen board and DG assessment.  It wishes to reinforce the main 
thrust of the “Reference Guides for CGIAR Centers and their BOTs” on assessment.   
 
Recommendation 17): The Panel reiterates that the annual evaluation of the center DG is the 
responsibility of the full board.  It recommends that a wide range of inputs, including feedback 
from center staff should be sought by the board as part of the evaluation process. The findings 
of the evaluation and their implications should be discussed in the full board, and 
communicated by the board chair to the DG. As part of the annual assessment and review 
process, remuneration, incentives and other benefits given to the DG should be disclosed to 
the board. 
 
Recommendation 18): The Panel further recommends that for assessing their own 
performance, Boards should conduct their annual self assessment and an evaluation of the 
chair in a formal manner with clear guidelines. Committees and thei r chairs should also be 
evaluated in a similar manner. The board chair should discuss with each member his/her 
performance annually and offer guidance for improvement as appropriate.   
 
This self-assessment needs to be supplemented by periodic external assessment of board 
performance.  The CGIAR has instituted the EPMR process for this independent assessment of 
Centers and their Boards; and the survey data indicates that CGIAR members believe the EPMRs 
should provide more in-depth, objective, and frank assessments of center governance.  They 
consider it important that the CGIAR Secretariat provide top financial and management expertise 
to EPMR teams; and that the CGIAR itself should hold centers much more accountable to 
actually implementing EPMR recommendations, and should withhold support when performance 
is not satisfactory.   
 
For improving the CGIAR’s system of monitoring governance across centers, the CGIAR 
members’ suggestions include improving the EPMR process and its follow-up; ensuring the 
independence of the monitors; and better implementation of the CGIAR’s performance 
measurement system and associated follow-up measures.  The Panel has not undertaken an 
independent review of the EPMR process. It is, however, aware that some changes have been 
incorporated in the context of the new monitoring and evaluation process initiated by the SC in 
collaboration with the CGIAR Secretariat and approved by the CGIAR. The Panel strongly 
reiterates the crucial role of EPMRs in providing an independent cross-check of center 
governance, and as an important means for strengthening the performance and accountability 
of center boards.   
 
Succession Planning and Appointments 
 
One of the primary means of board renewal is, obviously, the addition of new blood.  When 
circumstances change and new center and board needs are identified, and as current members 
and the DG complete their terms or leave the center for other reasons, the board has an 
opportunity to systematically assess current strengths, identify competency and other gaps, and 
engage in a well-thought out process of succession planning and appointing new members of the 
board and committees, as well as the board chair and DG.    
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In general, the Reference Guides for Centers and their BOTs provide a sound basis for moving 
forward when filling vacancies.  These guidelines are in line with global best practice, which 
emphasizes open and transparent search and selection process. 
 
Besides ensuring adequate representation and balance on the board, the succession planning 
process is an important opportunity to overcome current or impending skill shortages.  
According to the survey results, about 60% of the respondents say there are skill shortages “to 
some extent,” and the remaining 40% say “not at all.”  There is a perceived shortage in many 
areas, though of course not on the same board.  The areas in which skill shortages have been 
noted by respondents include finance, accounts, management, governance, HR, legal, bio-
diversity, breeding, strategic vision, private sector, leadership, and ability to negotiate in the host 
country.   It is also recognized that with a smaller board size, and because of the need to maintain 
balance and diversity, it will not be possible to always get all the skills needed.  As well, on some 
boards, there will be a need for more time devoted to board business, not more skills. 
 
Survey results also indicate that roughly 40% of the respondents say board processes for finding 
new members/chairs are adequate and timely “to a great extent,” and the remaining 55% say “to 
some extent.”  Respondents suggested the following: strengthening the board’s nominating 
committee, seeking nominations from national system managers and policy makers and not just 
from board members and center staff, reducing the involvement of DGs, and above all, starting 
with an assessment of existing board skills. They also note that reducing board size could enable 
an increase in honorarium to attract better quality board members.  They note that it is often very 
difficult to find candidates when looking for specific characteristics; that good candidates are not 
always volunteers; and that the duties of board chair are too complex, and so better guidance is 
needed to ensure a good fit.   
 
Recommendation 19): Succession planning for board chair and members should commence at 
least a year ahead of the vacancy; and for the DG, the succession planning process should be 
set in motion with an even longer lead time. In addition to the DG’s appointment, the board 
should also approve the appointments of the deputy DG (if any) based on the 
recommendations of the DG. 
 
Respondents also want a better process for CGIAR nominees; a better pool of potential members 
and their curriculum vitae (CVs) at a central clearing house; a fuller pipeline of candidates of 
good quality, and a database with sufficient depth and diversity; and a continuously updated and 
readily accessible roster of experts and potential board members in various areas.  With regard to 
the CGIAR nomination process, respondents say that the process is frustrating, and needs 
substantial strengthening. Annex 3 provides additional detailed comments by respondents. 
 
Many of the comments were reinforced by respondents in the interviews with Panel members; 
and are supported by the Panel’s own review of existing documentation, and prior experience of 
succession planning by boards.  While no generalizations can be made, the Panel is convinced 
that in the case of some boards at least, a more systematic approach to filling board vacancies 
would be very helpful. 
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The Panel has looked at the process for appointing CGIAR nominees to center boards, and 
believes that this process needs further streamlining. The CGIAR procedures for selecting 
CGIAR nominees to center boards were launched in early 2005 for a pilot period of two years. 
An ExCo ad hoc committee was named to act on behalf of the ExCo for the nominations. In the 
initial pilot year, the system encountered some issues in implementation. Center boards’ 
nomination or selection committees and board chairs felt that the suggested candidates did not 
match their criteria and requirements, and that the attention given to qualifications and merits 
was not sufficient. It appeared to the boards that the  financial management, governance 
competence and possibly CGIAR system perspective were the only selection criteria even for 
those boards who thought to have adequate representation of some of these capacities among 
their members. Centers feel strongly that beyond governance and finance competence, they need 
board members who understand their business, guide them in strategic thinking and oversee 
science.   
 
It was also pointed out that the time schedule was not realistic and the communication between 
boards on one hand, and the CGIAR Secretariat and ExCo ad hoc  committee, on the other, was 
inadequate. 
 
Members of the ad hoc committee and ExCo were likewise frustrated with the process. Views 
among the stakeholders on the influence they should take on the selection differ widely. While 
some members are confident with the existing system and do not seek more influence on the 
selection process, others call for much more influence and direct appointment of board members 
by the ExCo to center boards.  
 
The ExCo ad hoc committee identified three major weaknesses in the procedures: 
(1) Inconsistency in the criteria applied for the selection of the CGIAR nominees; 
(2) Lack of awareness and knowledge about the new process; and 
(3) Tight tentative time schedule for each step of the nomination 
 
The ExCo decided to pilot another cycle using the same procedures and make amendments in the 
second cycle. The results so far have been more encouraging, with several nominations having 
been accepted by the centers concerned.  
 
Recommendation 20): CGIAR should strengthen its consultation and nomination process in 
order to ensure that its nominees meet the competencies needed by the boards. The 
nomination process has to build on a better understanding of the profiles or the selection 
criteria between the CGIAR and the centers. Financial management and governance are 
criteria that have indeed become more important. However, knowledge of relevant areas of 
science, research for development, business operations, communication skills and stakeholder 
relations are equally important criteria. 
 
Recommendation 21): For members-at-large, a Board should carry out a systematic analysis 
of its needs for expertise/skills/representation. In order to improve transparency in the 
recruitment process, CGIAR stakeholders and shareholders should be invited to submit 
nominees for the available membership slots. 
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Board Efficiency and Expenditures 
 
In the CGIAR centers, annual board costs for 2005 averaged about $270,000; and ranged from 
about $200,000 to $400,000, depending on the center.  These costs have increased slightly dur ing 
the past few years. There are differing views on board costs.  Some survey respondents consider 
them low and this is regarded as  a current strength. Some CGIAR members think that the cost is 
on the high side. Overall, the cost of center boards compares favorably with the governance costs 
of comparable organizations in the non-profit sector. However, the efficiency of board operations 
obviously is-and must remain-a concern in the CGIAR, as it is in all organizations operating on a 
tight budget.   
 
CGIAR Board operations are reported to have improved in recent years.  According to survey 
respondents, some Boards have introduced new modes of operation to improve oversight; there 
is greater clarity on background papers expected; a manual for board practices has been 
developed; and the reserved powers of the board and delegated powers of the DG have been 
documented. Almost 80% of respondents say that information material received by the board is 
adequate in terms of quality, quantity, and timing; and the remaining 20% are about equally split 
between “don’t know” or “it is not adequate.” 
 
Similarly, about 75% of the respondents say the project management system provides timely 
programmatic and financial information to the management and the board; and about 55 % of 
respondents say the system is serving the board’s needs “to a great extent.” Many respondents 
believe their Boards are being well served by a respected, active, and committed board Chair; 
and that Board committees function reasonably well. Interview data supports this view; and since 
the Panel has not made a direct assessment of Board operations, it hesitates to make broad 
generalizations about the Board efficiency.  
 
Based on the limited interview and survey data available to it, and since almost 55% of the 
CGIAR members who responded to the survey believe Board costs are “much too high” or 
“high”, the Panel believes some further improvements in efficiency might still be needed.     
 
Recommendation 22): The Panel recommends continued attention to further increasing the 
efficiency of the boards.  Appropriate agenda setting, timely circulation of papers/documents 
well ahead of meetings, and summarizing the issues for strategic discussion and decision 
making will enable members to be both more effective and more efficient.  The chair needs to 
play a lead role in defining the agenda, running efficient meetings and facilitating decision 
making.   
 
Services to the Board and Staff Relations  
 
Survey respondents seem generally satisfied with the quality of services provided to the board by 
the centers’ administrative staff, particularly the board secretary. However, interview data 
suggests that in some instances, the reporting relationship between the board chair and secretary 
may need to be clarified or strengthened, and made more independent of center management, 
particularly the DG.   
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Recommendation 23): Because the adequacy, independence, and efficiency of services 
provided by the board secretary are essential for the effective and efficient running of a board, 
the Panel recommends that the board secretary should report to the board chair in regard to 
all board matters. Annual evaluation of the board secretary should be dealt with by the board 
chair in consultation with the rest of the board and other relevant officials. 
 
Finally, the Panel notes that boards also need to provide open channels of communication to all 
staff of the center they oversee.  Furthermore, because of the international status and autonomy 
of Centers, local labor laws do not apply for most staff of CGIAR centers.  This places a special 
responsibility on boards to serve as the final arbitrator of staff grievances, if and when they arise.    
 
Recommendation 24): While maintaining a clear separation of the functions of the board and 
management in the areas of human resource management and staff relations, the Panel 
recommends that in terms of grievance redressing and conflict resolution mechanisms for the 
staff, there should be a provision for an appeal of the last resort to the board when all other 
remedies have failed. Such appeals should be directed to the board chair. The mechanisms 
need to be strengthened, made transparent, and fully communicated to staff.  
 
Accountability of Boards 
 
Every organization is accountable for its performance to a set of people or entities who exercise 
an oversight, control or regulatory function in relation to its activities. In the case of the center 
boards, the process of accountability is more complex than in the corporate world, partly because 
of its history and the absence of a legal status for the CGIAR.  
 
The proximate stakeholder of centers is the CGIAR. An intermediate set of stakeholders is the 
national agricultural research systems (NARS) of developing countries.  A more distant, but 
significant stakeholder is the developing world’s poor farmers for whose benefit the research is 
being undertaken. Though the CGIAR System could claim that it serves the interests of the poor-
- since developing country governments and NGOs are its members--the fact remains that poor 
farmers (and consumers) are a separate set of stakeholders.  
 
In terms of center accountability, there are thus three levels. First, center boards are accountable 
to the CGIAR, the proximate stakeholder that also wears the mantle of the shareholder in view of 
its investments. Second, boards are indirectly accountable to NARS, the recipients of many of 
their research products and services.  And third, they are accountable in the final analysis to the 
developing world’s poor farmers who are not represented in any forum through an organization 
of their own. This broader perspective on accountability is a useful framework within which to 
assess the current CGIAR practices and notions of accountability. 
 
It is easier to design and enforce accountability mechanisms when the stakeholders are organized 
and possess powers of control.  In the past few years the direct clients of the CGIAR centers’ 
research, the national programs, have become better organized. Through national fora, public and 
private research organizations have harmonized their positions, established research priorities, 
and strengthened partnerships. Regional fora have become important partners with national and 
international organizations for research collaboration in the region. In the Global Forum for 
International Agricultural Research (GFAR) the interested agricultural research organizations 
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strive to contribute to a more efficient, effective, and coherent global agricultural research 
system. At the global and regional levels, therefore, research priorities and activities of CGIAR 
centers need to complement the agricultural research undertaken by other entities in the public 
and private sectors.  
 
While the NARS are organized and can insist on indirect accountability to them, the final 
custome rs of CGIAR centers’ research--the unorganized poor farmers and consumers--have no 
clear-cut mechanisms of accountability in relation to center boards. To the extent that CGIAR 
represents their interests or has members dedicated to farmer concerns, the CGIAR can be 
construed as serving the accountability needs of the farmers too. However, there are other ways 
in which the pressure of accountability can be exerted on the boards on behalf of the farmers. 
Participative research designs, impact assessment, farmer feedback on the programs or activities 
of centers in the field, etc., can provide useful information on the performance of centers.  
 
In our survey, the Panel asked respondents: “To whom are the center boards accountable?” The 
survey has yielded a range of answers to this question. Most of the respondents have affirmed 
that Boards are accountable to the CGIAR system. Some have gone further and stated that they 
are also accountable to the developing countries and the poor that the Centers are meant to serve.  
These answers bring out the importance of recognizing the boards’ accountability to different 
stakeholders.  To some extent, however, the diversity of answers reflects the complexity of the 
concept of accountability. It is also symptomatic of the lack of a common understanding of this 
important subject among members of the boards and CGIAR members.  
 
Of the different answers given by respondents, the most puzzling is the view of some board 
members that their board is accountable to the center itself.  It probably stems from the view that 
the center is an autonomous entity and hence the board is responsible to it.  What is forgotten 
here is that the board is the oversight authority for the center, and that it cannot be accountable to 
the body it oversees.  By implication, the respondents seem to feel that they are not accountable 
to any other entity.  It is possible that some respondents are not well versed in the 
interrelationships between different parts of the CGIAR System. The remedy in part lies in the 
proper orientation of new board members. 
 
Recommendation 25): The CGIAR centers are ultimately accountable to the poor in the 
developing countries. To ensure accountability towards these beneficiaries, center boards need 
to ensure that research priorities, products and processes are designed in such a way that they 
serve the needs of the poor. Sharing this information in a transparent manner is one way to 
demonstrate accountability. 
 
Recommendation 26): The board is accountable to its stakeholders for the performance of the 
center. Asymmetry of information can be a serious barrier to the exercise of accountability. To 
effectively perform its roles and responsibilities, the board should seek and obtain all the 
necessary information from the management. 
 
CGIAR members are comparable to the shareholders’ body to which a corporation is 
accountable. In both cases, with numerous members and a single annual meeting, it is difficult 
for the primary stakeholders to enforce accountability.  To help overcome this problem, in spite 
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of the lack of legal status of the CGIAR, it has put in place several mechanisms to ensure that 
centers are held accountable for their performance. This includes a number of central bodies such 
as the Science Council (SC), Executive Council (ExCo) and the CGIAR Secretariat. Each of 
them in turn has put in place a set of institutional mechanisms to operationalize and enforce a 
certain measure of accountability.  
 
Thus, the Science Council that assists the System in formulating CGIAR strategies and priorities 
provides a framework against which centers and boards can be judged. Through its use of 
EPMRs and performance indicators, the Council endeavours to hold the boards accountable for 
center performance. The CGIAR, assisted by the ExCo, takes decisions and corrective action 
(including closure of centers or denial of funds) that conveys strong signals in terms of 
accountability of the boards. The Secretariat assists in the implementation of CGIAR decisions. 
The CGIAR is thus able to hold the boards accountable for performance, even if the actions and 
signals are delayed, given the complexity of the processes involved.   
 
While these mechanisms provide guidance and checks and balances for accountability, the Panel 
believes that the boards’ ability to perform their functions will be greatly enhanced by greater 
coherence in the functioning of various parts of the CGIAR system. When implemented 
efficiently, the CGIAR’s various accountability mechanisms can result in a sustainable balance 
between the autonomy of Centers and their accountability to internal and external stakeholders. 
 
The Panel was not asked to evaluate the working of the ExCo and Science Council and the extent 
to which they have contributed to the enhancing of board accountability to the CGIAR System. 
However, some survey respondents have expressed their concerns about the “interference” of 
these two bodies in the boards’ functioning.  With the active and decisive role the Science 
Council is perceived to have assumed, some centers and board members seem to feel that the 
Science Council infringes on the centers’ autonomy. In contrast, the Panel believes that in view 
of the accountability of Centers to stakeholders and final clients, the insistence on system 
priorities and their translation into the centers’ research programs is vital for the CGIAR.  
 
In the Panel’s view, both ExCo and Science Council have a legitimate role to play in ensuring 
the accountability of the centers and their boards. The efforts of the Science Council to 
strengthen strategic and program planning and to complement it with a performance 
measurement scheme deserve full support. Coherence and effectiveness of the Systems’ various 
planning, priority-setting, and accountability mechanisms will remain decisive for the continued 
credibility of the centers. Moreover, the SC-led priority-setting system is necessary to 
counterbalance the effects of continuously changing agendas of development administrators and 
investors. 
 
To ensure accountability towards the poor (the ultimate beneficiaries of the CGIAR), the Science 
Council and center boards also have to ensure that research priorities, products and processes are 
designed in such a way that they can serve the needs of the poor, and that the research outcomes 
are relevant for them.  In this manner, accountability checks can be built into the planning and 
monitoring system itself, so that they do not create an additional administrative burden on the 
centers. 
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Recommendation 27): The CGIAR has put in place an overall system that provides a 
framework for ensuring that centers are held accountable for their performance. This 
includes a number of central bodies such as the SC which assist in the overall setting of 
priorities and strategies and evaluate the relevance and quality of programs, ExCo which 
performs delegated functions on behalf of the general membership, and the Secretariat which 
assists in the implementation of CGIAR decisions. While these mechanisms provide guidance 
and checks and balances for accountability, the Boards’ ability to perform their functions will 
be enhanced when greater coherence in the functioning of these parts. CGIAR members 
should assist center boards not only by providing overall strategic goals and directions, and 
other checks and balances but also by aligning their financial contributions and project 
support closely with these directions. 
 
Recommendation 28): Central bodies established by the CGIAR, such as the SC, ExCo, and 
the Secretariat, are essential for the formulation and implementation of the mission and 
strategies of the CGIAR System as a whole. In performing these functions, they should seek to 
minimize the administrative burdens placed on the centers and the boards through their 
interventions. 
 
Recommendation 29): In the ultimate analysis, the board is responsible for the fit between the 
center’s programs and projects, and the overall CGIAR strategy. Irrespective of the vagaries of 
donor funding, accountability for the decisions and outcomes rests with the board. Special 
attention needs to be given by the board to the projects financed by restricted funding because 
departure from center strategy is most likely in this area. 
 
Based on survey responses and prior knowledge of the CGIAR, the Panel is of the view that the 
CGIAR and center boards are already promoting greater openness and transparency with respect 
to governance of the centers. However, it would like to emphasize the importance of further 
steps in this direction. 
 
Recommendation 30): The Panel recommends that annual reports of the centers should 
publish performance indicators, both outcome and process related, so as to enable all 
stakeholders to understand and assess the impact of center programs. Major board decisions 
and quarterly updates of center’s financial accounts should also be published on center 
websites. 
 
In addition, the Panel believes that the more funding is brought in line with priority setting, the 
more coherent, credible, and effective the whole CGIAR system would be.  Recent changes in 
the pattern of financing center programs have important implications for the accountability of 
boards to the CGIAR.  When center operations are fully funded by the CGIAR through 
unrestricted funding, it is easier for the System to demand accountability from the boards. 
However, Centers are now being forced to seek project funds of a restricted nature from different 
ministries or department of the same CGIAR members and from their field offices in developing 
countries.  These offices may have priorities that are different from those of the CGIAR.  This 
poses a dilemma for the centers as it often calls for a departure from their strategic plans.  If 
compromises are not made, they stand to lose the project and the money that goes with it. When 
centers have to scramble for funds for their survival, boards will find it difficult to hold the 
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management accountable for the implementation of the agreed strategy.  Similarly, when 
collaborative programs with other centers and external partners increase, boards will not have 
full control over the outcomes.   
 
There are two ways to resolve this seeming dilution of accountability.  One is for members to 
ensure that project funding from other parts of their departments or other ministries are also 
consistent with CGIAR’s priorities.  The other is for the boards to insist that management does 
not seek support for project proposals or accept any project funds from donors that are 
inconsistent with the center’s approved program strategy. Despite the real possibility that some 
donors may cause a dilution of the center’s agreed strategy though ad-hoc funding, the buck 
should stop with the board whose responsibility is to maintain congruence between CGIAR's 
strategy and the center’s program.    
 
The Panel is aware that the CGIAR is considered by some observers to be an “under-governed 
and over-evaluated system”.  Some of the CGIAR members who responded to the survey say 
that donors can enhance quality of governance of the centers by insisting on more in-depth, 
objective, and frank assessments of center governance during the EPMR; by requiring the 
CGIAR Secretariat to provide top financial and management expertise to EPMR teams; by 
holding Centers much more accountable for actually implementing EPMR recommendations; 
and by withholding support when performance is not satisfactory.   
 
The changes suggested by CGIAR members in the system of monitoring governance focus on 
improving the EPMR process and follow-up, as well as improving monitoring of the governance 
of Challenge Programs by the ExCo.   Other suggestions include: greater independence of the 
monitors; greater participation by center management and the boards; more objective and open 
self-reporting; fully implementing the performance measurement system and follow-up 
measures; and discussing in the ExCo whether further accountability mechanisms are needed.  
Some possible reasons for these suggestions could be that in some EPMRs, governance issues 
were not covered in sufficient depth; some CGIAR members insufficiently trust the existing 
review system (CCERs and EPMRs); and that administrative or institutional requirements of 
some donor agencies require them to conduct additional reviews to satisfy their own 
constituencies.  
 
While the Panel does not have an independent judgment of the quality and rigor of assessment of 
governance issues in recent EPMRs, it would caution against the introduction of additional 
donor-driven reviews that would only contribute to a review overload.  Instead, a better approach 
would be to further strengthen the CGIAR systems’ own governance and accountability 
mechanisms.  For this, the existing review system--with EPMRs (including the review of center 
governance), center’s annual reviews, stripe reviews, CCERs, and performance measurement  
system--would need to be strengthened, where appropriate.   
 
The purpose would be to enhance the coherence and complementarity of the various planning 
and accountability mechanisms at the system and center levels.  This would hopefully reduce the 
need for separate donor-initiated reviews.  To provide opportunities for donors and other 
stakeholders to shape and assess the center’s research program, they could be invited to 
participate in planning and review events of the centers. 
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The Panel’s survey also showed that board members believe substantial improvements of Board 
operations have been undertaken in recent years, but most CGIAR members were not aware of 
many of the new practices introduced.  This could be an indication of insufficient 
communication between board members and donors. It could also indicate that some CGIAR 
members have limited and occasional contact with boards, in part due to their agencies’ staff 
rotation policies or the limited time which the donor representatives can or wish to devote to 
CGIAR matters.  As well, the available knowledge of those who have a better insight into the 
CGIAR may not be used efficiently.  On the other hand, it is equally possible that many Board 
members do not understand the center’s donors well, and hence are unable to tailor their 
communications effectively.  This problem could be addressed, in part, by involving CGIAR 
members in the planning and review activities of the center, as suggested above. 
 
Linked to accountability is the changing role and pattern of funding of the centers, as noted 
above, as well as donor policies for such funding.  In order to facilitate strategic planning and 
effective governance, and to give the boards more “elbow room” for adopting a strategic 
approach, some donors have recently developed long term strategies for their agencies, increased 
their unrestricted core funding, and introduced multi-year budgeting for their own agencies 
(which has enabled them to provide multi-year funding for the CGIAR).  These efforts are 
greatly appreciated by survey respondents who are members of center boards. 
 
However, while some donors have moved towards the funding of the approved research agenda 
and agreed priorities of the CGIAR, others continue with project funding within and outside the 
agreed agenda, or provide funding late or irregularly. There is thus a gap between the donors’ 
interests in strategic issues and the high proportion of opportunistic project funding provided.  
Funds for new, explorative, strategic research are reportedly getting scarcer.  
 
As well, board decisions on strategic planning and agenda-setting are apparently being 
undermined through project “deals”. It seems that few centers can completely and consistently 
resist project money even if it may distort the agreed agenda. To help overcome this problem, it 
would be essential that CGIAR members assist center boards not only by supporting overall 
strategic goals and directions--and insisting on other checks and balances through an effective 
accountability system--but also by closely aligning their financial contributions and project  
support with the approved priorities and strategic directions of the CGIAR.   
 
Funding and donor policies are, however, only one element that the boards need to consider.  
There are many other program and management aspects that help ensure alignment between 
center goals, programs, and performance.  Effective and diligent oversight of all of these aspects 
is the primary responsibility of the board, as noted throughout this report.   
 
 
Reference Guides for Boards 
 
The series of “Reference Guides for CGIAR International Agricultural Research Centers and 
their Boards of Trustees” published in 1997 include the following: 
 
1. The Role, Responsibilities, and Accountability of Center Boards of Trustees 
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2. The Role of the Board Chair 
3. Creating a Well-Balanced Board 
4. Building Effective Board Committees 
5. Choosing a Director General: The Search and Selection Process 
6. Evaluating the Director General: The Assessment Process 
7. Board Self-Assessment. 
 
In addition to the above guides, individual centers also have their respective board handbooks 
and guidelines. Governance breakdown is not due to lack of appropriate board operational 
guides; they occur because of failure to observe and implement what is in those guides.   
 
In general, the Panel considers the Guides relevant, timely, and comprehensive, and endorses 
their continued use by the CGIAR and center boards.  The Panel reviewed these guides and 
noted suggestions for their updating. Areas which have become more important and need to be 
clarified in the guidelines relate to the issues highlighted in chapters 4 and 5. The Panel offers the 
following suggestions for the updating of the “Reference Guide on the Role, Responsibilities, 
and Accountability of Center Boards of Trustees”: 
 
§ References to CGIAR and its structure and institutional mechanisms need to be updated 
in view of changes the System has gone through since this Guide was published in 1977. 
 
§ It may be useful to introduce the concepts of strategy and priorities on page 5 where 
Center policies and performance are discussed. 
 
§ On page 6 where financial resources are discussed, it is important to say that the boards 
are responsible to ensure that adequate audit mechanisms are in place, including internal 
audit. The Guide refers only to the external audit function. 
 
§ It may be useful to highlight on page 10 (under “board skills”) the fact that highly 
specialized scientists could be better used in advisory committees rather than on boards 
charged with broad governance functions.   
 
§ The use of new technologies such as internet and video conference should be mentioned 
in the context of board/committee meetings (page 11). 
 
§ Under “duties of the DG” on page 12, it should be stated that achieving a good fit 
between overall CGIAR strategy and center programs is a key function of the DG. 
 
§ On page 6, “the court of appeals” section needs to say that the process must be 
transparent and communicated to all staff. 
 
§ A section on board’s accountability to the stakeholders including the CGIAR would be 
desirable.  
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6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
 
Major Findings and Conclusions  
 
1. The evidence available to the Panel shows that several center boards have taken steps to 
improve their governance practices in recent years. It reflects increased commitment, 
leadership and willingness to change on the part of these boards.  The steps taken include 
measures to strengthen financial oversight, strategic planning, board self assessment, and 
orientation of new members. Boards, however, vary widely in the extent of these reforms 
and how well the y have been internalized. Significant gaps exist in the boards’ oversight 
functions with respect to strategy and finances.  
 
2. The delineation of roles between boards and management is reasonably clear in most of 
the boards. Boards, however, need to devote more time to their oversight role and be 
more proactive in seeking relevant information for this purpose from management. In a 
number of centers, the lack of adequate and timely information from management to the 
boards continues to be a problem.  
 
3. Board’s role in strategic planning and direction setting remains limited due to factors 
such as infrequent meetings, funding uncertainties, board capacity constraints and lack of 
adequate information. Mismatch between financing patterns and the requirements of 
strategic planning is another contributory factor.  
 
4. Exercise of financial oversight is also hampered by similar factors. Skill gaps in audit 
committees and boards, lack of professional personnel in finance departments, absence of 
timely information, and low levels of financial literacy among board members have 
contributed to this state of affairs. The problem has been exacerbated in some cases also 
by inadequate attention to early warning signals and a reluctance to take timely action. 
 
5. In some centers, full boards are not engaged in the evaluation of DGs, nor do they gather 
the relevant performance related information. Participation and transparency in the 
process leave much to be desired. There are similar gaps in the boards’ self assessment 
processes. 
 
6. Follow up actions to EPMRs and other performance reviews by centers remain weak or 
incomplete as boards have not played their oversight role adequately in this regard. The 
failure of oversight and accountability rather than inadequate planning is very much in 
evidence. 
 
7. The orientation programs and leadership courses initiated by the CGIAR are appreciated 
by the boards. The important role played by the Science Council, ExCo, and CGIAR 
Secretariat in providing strategic guidance and increased coherence and direction to the 
centers is also well recognized. There is, however, growing concern among boards about 
the administrative burdens created in the process.    
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8. Some of the governance practices followed by center boards come close to the best 
practices in the corporate and non-profit sectors. But in areas such as strategic planning, 
financial oversight, and information disclosure, center board practices lag behind global 
best practices. 
 
9. Many of the problems noted above can be traced to more basic constraints in the way the 
boards are structured and managed. Infrequent meetings, gaps in terms of the mix of 
skills needed to transact board business, crowded agendas, and large board size that 
reduces cohesion and focus among members are at the root of this problem.  
 
10. In addition to these limitations, there is the longstanding problem of a subtle imbalance 
between autonomy and accountability that characterizes the System and the centers. 
Despite the several new mechanisms put in place by CGIAR to monitor center 
performance and exercise accountability, their effectiveness still leaves much to be 
desired. Speedy remedial action by the boards and the CGIAR is difficult when center 
performance and accountability fail as there are many weak links in the chain. These are 
matters that call for thoughtful attention by the System as a whole. 
 
11. The findings reported above reflect the interlinked problems of both the centers and the 
CGIAR as a system. They highlight the importance of assessing center governance within 
the larger frame work of the CGIAR System. 
 
Recommendations  
 
In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the Panel’s recommendations cover the following 
main topics: (a) board structure, size, and composition ; (b) role of boards in strategy setting and 
performance oversight; (c) board renewal; (d) accountability of boards; and (e) comments on the 
Reference Guides for Center BOTs. 
 
A. Board Structure, Size, Composition  
 
1. The CGIAR as a system represents a wide range of stakeholders. The center board 
therefore needs to reflect this diversity and at the same time have the needed mix of skills 
to ensure that their functioning will be effective and efficient. The boards have done 
reasonably well in being representative of the stakeholders and shareholders. There is, 
however, unevenness in the mix of competencies and skills present in some of the boards.   
  
In order to perform this role, boards need to have a proper mix of skills to judge the 
quality and relevance of science, and to oversee the finances and overall accountability of 
centers. At a minimum, two persons with adequate financial, business and accounting 
knowledge and experience should be members on every board. At least three members 
with science or science management background should be available to a board.  
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2. The frequency of board meetings should be determined by the nature and scope of the 
business to be transacted. Given the mix of functions of center boards, the Panel 
recommends that full board meetings should be held at least twice a year. In addition, two 
more meetings may be required to review quarterly reviews of finances and 
programmatic matters. In order to minimize costs, these additional meetings may be 
conducted through telephonic or video conferences or through delegation to an executive 
committee that repo rts back to the full board. The duration of each meeting may be 
reduced, depending on the requirements of different centers.  Increased frequency will 
also enable boards to meet in other regions where research projects or partners are 
located. 
 
3. The proposals above may increase the time and attention that members may be required 
to give their boards. It will most certainly demand more time from the chairpersons of 
boards. This may necessitate a review of the compensation of Board members due to the 
increase in accountability, responsibility, expertise, and time required of them. This 
would apply, in particular, to board chairs and committee chairs.  
 
4. The duration of a member’s term on a board should not exceed six years. The current 
practice of most boards to renew a member’s term after three years is a sound one. It is 
important, however, that boards review more rigorously members’ contributions before 
confirming them for a second term. Members who fail to attend consecutive meetings or 
do not contribute adequately in the judgment of the boards should not be offered a second 
term. A board may choose to renew members for less than three years in order to have 
staggered membership to ensure continuity. 
 
5. Keeping in view the need for a board that is compact, accountable and well focused on 
governance, it is recommended that the size of the board should be between nine and 
eleven members, excluding the DG (ex-officio). A smaller board enhances the chances of 
synergy, participation, and focus.  A board with less than nine members may cause 
problems in terms of quorum and the mix of skills needed in a board. A much larger 
board may add unduly to costs, given the increased frequency of meetings. The Panel 
offers this as a guideline to be adapted to the needs of the centers. 
 
6. Consistent with their international status and mandate, centers serve many countries and, 
in many cases, more than one region. Center boards, therefore, need to have members 
from different regions and backgrounds. Hence, host country representation on a board 
should be limited to one nominee. A board may still wish to invite other host 
representatives to attend its meetings as observers as and when necessary. Where 
feasible, center charters should be amended in line with this recommendation. 
 60  
 
7. A similar rationalization of CGIAR nominees on boards is also in order. Presently, the 
number of nominees varies widely, the maximum being eight. It is recommended that the 
number of CGIAR nominees should not exceed two unless there are legal problems that 
may cause a center to lose its international status or privileges. CGIAR should strengthen 
its consultation and nomination process in order to ensure that its nominees meet the 
competencies needed by the boards. 
 
B. Role of Boards in Strategy Setting and Performance Oversight  
 
8. Limitations of time and the overload and urgency of the operational programs of centers 
often lead to a relative neglect of strategic functions in some of the boards. It is 
imperative that this imbalance is rectified by providing adequate time and resources to 
the boards to perform their strategic functions of planning, review and oversight.  
 
9. Boards need to strengthen their role in ensuring that centers’ strategy fits well with the 
overall CGIAR priorities and strategies. This will require boards to ensure that there is a 
process in place that encourages management to embark only on programs or projects 
that are aligned with the agreed upon priorities.  
 
10. Board’s oversight of performance should use the MTP as the starting point. An important 
function of the board is to see to it that the annual program and resources allocated to it 
are consistent with the specific objectives stated in the MTP relevant to the review. The 
oversight function will also require that the board and management develop and use 
suitable performance indicators that reflect both process and outcomes. 
 
11. If system priorities and funding of regional partnerships and global programs increase in 
importance, center and systems’ governance structures will need to adjust to this new 
reality. To enhance the oversight of inter center collaboration among centers the Panel 
endorses the practice of joint board memberships. Boards of such centers may also 
occasionally meet jointly, to review their programs and performance. 
 
12.  As part of the effort to strengthen the financial oversight function of the board, the chair 
of the audit committee should keep close contact with the CGIAR group on internal audit 
so that the adoption of best practices and system improvements is facilitated.  
 
 The annua l meeting of external auditors with both the audit committee and the full board 
should be a standard practice. Paid consulting services by the current external auditor 
should be prohibited.  
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13. An important function of the board is to assess the risks associated with the Center’s 
programs, finances, human resources, management systems, and general operating 
environment. Risk assessment statements should accompany all documents on programs 
presented to the board. Similarly, the risks associated with proposed financing 
arrangements and donor commitments for specific projects should be made known to and 
discussed by the board. The Board should review such risks periodically. 
 
14. When the annual accounts and report are presented to the board, the DG and chief 
financial officer or Director of Finance should present a due diligence certification. 
 
15. The financial approval/spending limits delegated to the DG and other senior officials 
should be authorized by and made known to the full board. DG should submit an annual 
or periodic report on such expenditure to the board. A similar practice should be adopted 
for the chair. 
 
C. Board Renewal  
 
16. CGIAR and center board orientation programs, executive leadership courses, and other 
development programs for new board members are critical for their effectiveness and 
better understanding of the CGIAR system and center’s business. It is recommended that 
the CGIAR orientation program be given to new members preferably after they have 
attended one board meeting that will give them some familiarity with the centers and 
their work. In addition, CGIAR members should have opportunity to become acquainted 
with center operations, participate in board orientation, and observe board meetings to 
enhance understanding between centers and CGIAR members. 
 
17. The annual evaluation of the center DG is the responsibility of the full board. A wide 
range of inputs, including feedback from center staff should be sought by the board as 
part of the evaluation process. The findings of the evaluation and their implications 
should be discussed in the full board, and communicated by the board chair to the DG. 
Remuneration, incentives and other benefits given to the DG should be disclosed to the 
board. 
 
18. Boards should conduct their annual self assessment and an evaluation of the chair in a 
formal manner with clear guidelines. Committees and their chairs should also be 
evaluated in a similar manner. The board chair should discuss with each member his/her 
performance annually and offer guidance for improvement as appropriate. 
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 The Panel strongly reiterates the crucial role of EPMRs in providing an independent 
cross-check of center governance, and as an important means for strengthening the 
performance and accountability of center boards. 
 
19. Succession planning for board chair and members should commence at least a year ahead 
of the vacancy. For the DG, the succession planning process should be set in motion with 
an even longer lead time. In addition to the DG’s appointment, the board should also 
approve the appointments of the deputy DGs (if any) and other members of the senior 
management team, based on the recommendations of the DG. 
 
20. CGIAR should strengthen its consultation and nomination process in order to ensure that 
its nominees meet the competencies needed by the boards. The nomination process has to 
build on a better understanding of the profiles or the selection criteria between the 
CGIAR and the centers. Financial management and governance are criteria that have 
indeed become more important. However, knowledge of relevant areas of science, 
research for development, business operations, communication skills, and stakeholder 
relations are equally important criteria. 
 
21. For members-at- large, a Board should carry out a systematic analysis of its needs for 
expertise/skills/representation. In order to improve transparency in the recruitment 
process, CGIAR stakeholders and shareholders should be invited to submit nominees for 
the available membership slots. 
 
22. Special attention needs to be given to increasing the efficiency of functioning of the 
boards. Appropriate agenda setting, timely circulation of papers/documents well ahead of 
meetings, and summarizing the issues for strategic discussion and decision making will 
enable members to be more effective. The chair needs to play a lead role in running 
efficient meetings and facilitating decision making. 
 
23. The board secretary should report to the board chair in regard to all board matters. 
Annual evaluation of the board secretary should be dealt with by the board chair in 
consultation with the rest of the board and other relevant officials. 
 
24. In terms of grievance redressing and conflict resolution mechanisms for the staff, there 
should be a provision for an appeal of the last resort to the Board when all other remedies 
have failed. Such appeals should be directed to the board chair. The mechanisms need to 
be strengthened, made transparent, and fully communicated to staff.  
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D. Accountability of Boards 
 
25. The CGIAR centers are ultimately accountable to the poor in the developing countries.  
To ensure accountability towards these beneficiaries, center boards need to ensure that 
research priorities, products and processes are designed in such a way that they serve the 
needs of the poor. Sharing this information in a transparent manner is one way to 
demonstrate accountability. 
 
26. The board is accountable to its stakeholders for the performance of the center. 
Asymmetry of information can be a serious barrier to the exercise of accountability. To 
effectively perform its roles and responsibilities, the board should seek and obtain all the 
necessary information from the management.  
 
27. The CGIAR has put in place an overall system that provides a framework for ensuring 
that centers are held accountable for their performance. This includes a number of central 
bodies such as the SC which assists in the overall setting of priorities and strategies and 
evaluates the relevance and quality of programs, ExCo which performs delegated 
functions on behalf of the general membership, and the CGIAR Secretariat which assists 
in the implementation of CGIAR decisions. While these mechanisms provide guidance 
and checks and balances for accountability, the boards’ ability to perform their functions 
will be enhanced when there is greater coherence in the functioning of these parts. 
CGIAR members should assist center boards not only by providing overall strategic goals 
and directions, and other checks and balances but also by aligning their financial 
contributions and project support closely with these directions. 
 
28. Central bodies established by the CGIAR, such as the SC, ExCo, and the CGIAR 
Secretariat, are essential for the formulation and implementation of the mission and 
strategies of the CGIAR System as a whole. In performing these functions, they should 
seek to minimize the  administrative burdens placed on the centers and the boards through 
their interventions.  
 
29. In the ultimate analysis, the board is responsible for the fit between the center’s programs 
and projects, and the overall CGIAR strategy. Irrespective of the vagaries of donor 
funding, accountability for the decisions and outcomes rests with the board. Special 
attention needs to be given by the board to the projects financed by restricted funding 
because departure from center strategy is most likely in this area. 
 
30. Center board should seek and ensure that it receives from management all the 
information the board needs for performing its guidance and oversight responsibilities—
for it alone has ultimate accountability for all aspects of center performance. 
 
31. Boards should promote greater openness and transparency with respect to the governance 
of the centers. Annual reports of the centers should publish performance indicators, both 
outcome and process related, so as to enable all stakeholders to understand and assess the 
impact of their programs. Major board decisions and quarterly updates of center’s 
financial accounts should be published on center websites. 
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E. Comments on Board Reference Guides 
 
32. The Panel has noted several policies and practices described in the “Board Reference 
Guides” that need updating or modification in light of the evolving best practices in board 
governance. Particularly important are roles and responsibilities of the board, 
accountability, and transparency. It is recommended that the Guides are revised under the 
guidance of the Committee of Board Chairs and the CGIAR Secretariat to serve as useful 
reference documents for all concerned.  
 
Some Ideas on Implementation 
 
Most of the recommendations of the report are directed to the boards of the individual CGIAR 
centers. The following specific steps are suggested to implement the above recommendations : 
 
§ Adjust board size and composition  
§ Revise host country agreement where feasible; adjust application when necessary 
§ Check the need for a board development strategy/plan 
§ Include in board assessments monitoring of the boards’ agendas, checking the attention 
given to strategic functions and the time attributed to most critical items. 
§ Check adequacy of finance competence or literacy on individual boards 
§ Assure regular risk and opportunity assessments 
§ Check adequacy of grievance redressing and conflict resolution mechanism and their 
communication to the center’s staff 
§ Publish major board decisions, key performance indicators and quarterly updates of 
financial accounts on centers’ web pages 
 
The CBC/AB may wish to initiate the follow-up actions on the recommendations which are 
common to all or most of the centers. These include revision of host country agreements, 
development of financial literacy, standardizing web based information and the revision of the 
board guides. 
 
The CBC/AB should also actively work with the ExCo and the CGIAR Secretariat to streamline 
the board nomination process, agree on the harmonization of profiles and on a better consultation 
process. In the organization of the board orientation programs, it should give particular attention 
to the enhancement of financial literacy.  
 
The CGIAR members, with the help of the central governance bodies, should assist the center 
boards in ensuring alignment of center programs/projects with CGIAR system priorities through 
their financial contributions.   
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Concluding Comments 
 
The Panel recognizes the relevance of assessing the effectiveness of center governance in the 
context of governance at the system level. There is no doubt the changes in governance structure 
that have taken place at the system level (i.e. establishment of ExCo, Science Council, and 
System Office; and the launching of CPs) during the past five years have implications on center 
governance, particularly in the way center boards are functioning. 
 
In various parts of the report, the Pane l has made reference to system level governance and the 
role of the central bodies of the CGIAR. A few recommendations that relate to the role of these 
bodies as they affect center governance were made. However, it did not undertake an in-depth 
look at the system level governance structure, processes, linkages among components, and their 
impact on center governance. Such exercise was deemed beyond the review’s TOR.   
 
.   
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Annex 1 
 
Stripe Review of Corporate Governance of CGIAR Centers --Terms of Reference 
 
 
Background 
 
The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance at the Board of Trustees (BOT) level, 
particularly in the context of the reform program initiated in 2001, is important for the CGIAR 
System. This is because the final responsibility for the future of the centers rests on the BOT and 
the essential role of each center’s board is “to create tomorrow’s center out of today’s” The CBC 
has recognized this role when it stated, as one of its primary goals, the willingness to be prepared 
to identify the need for and to lead change. 
 
At its meeting in Mexico on October 21-23, 2004, the CBC decided to commission an external 
stripe review of corporate governance of CGIAR Centers. At the 2004 CGIAR Annual General 
Meeting (AGM04), the CBC Chair informed the Group of this decision, and that the terms of 
reference (TOR) for the review would be prepared together with the CGIAR Secretariat. The 
present TOR is a result of tha t collaboration. 
 
Objectives 
 
1. To assess and evaluate the current corporate governance structure, processes, procedures/ 
practices, and overall performance of CGIAR Centers’ Boards of Trustees (BOTs). 
Specifically the review will canvass the Boards to examine (i) the effectiveness of Center 
Boards in providing oversight and policy directions to the Centers operations, including 
financial, program and administrative matters, (ii) capture some of the best practices of 
Boards and survey the extent to which Boards have responded to the particular operations 
, needs and circumstances of Centers.  It will also examine composition and structure of 
the BOTs and how they conduct their business, and how they assist Centers in the 
fulfillment of their mandates compared to the best practice in corporate and non-profit 
governance.   
 
2. To recommend to the CBC measures for improving the performance (i.e., effectiveness 
and efficiency) of Center Boards. 
 
3. To develop a Code of Best Practice for Center Boards and propose changes to the the 
existing “Guidelines on the role, responsibilities, and accountability of center Boards of 
Trustees in the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research”.  
 
Scope of Work 
 
The stripe review will provide an analysis of the following aspects of BOTs’ characteristics and 
operations: 
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1. Organization and Management of BOTs’ Business 
Composition and Structure 
§ BOT size and profile; fields of expertise, experience, diversity and tenure (terms 
of appointment) of members;  
§ Professional expertise in the Board in the areas of financial management science 
oversight, and institutional governance; 
§ Process of succession planning and selecting BOT members; and 
§ Adequacy of the number of BOT meetings per annum; management of Board and 
committee meetings. 
Orientation, Assessment and Adequacy of Information 
§ Performance measurements of BOT members and chairs; BOTs’ annual self-
assessments; 
§ Level of understanding (by members) of their role as BOT members and as 
members of board sub-committees (Executive, Program, Audit, Finance, HR, 
Nomination, etc); 
§ Board’s familiarity with the CGIAR, its mission, goals, strategies and priorities, 
the issues of priority being addressed by the CGIAR System, and how the Center 
fits into the overall System; 
§ Understanding of the delineation between BOTs’ and Center management teams’ 
responsibilities; 
§ Board’s familiarity with the CGIAR issued guidelines on Boards; and 
§ Adequacy and timeliness of information made available to members, prior to 
BOT meetings. 
 
2. BOTs’ Engagement with Centers’ Strategic Business 
 
Participation in Strategic Planning and Program Review 
§ Level of knowledge/understanding by BOT members of their respective Center’s 
vision, mission, strategy and their implementation; the engagement of the BOT in 
the formulation of Center’s mission and strategy and in monitoring the Center’s 
performance; and 
§ Oversight of Center program/science policies including intellectual property (IP), 
outputs and impacts analyses. 
Involvement in Fiscal Oversight 
§ Financial oversight, budgeting and reporting; and 
§ Implementation of clear policies for appointment, review and rotation of external 
auditors. 
Involvement in Policy Development 
§ Formulation of science and program policies as well as  finance, human 
resources,, and partnership policies; and 
§ The role played by the BOT in handling grievances. 
Adequacy of the annual DG evaluation process  
§ Process for annual evaluation of the Center Directors General (DG) and the 
methodologies used for the review of the DGs’ remuneration. 
Donor Relations, Partnership Facilitation, and Resource Mobilization 
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§ Relationship to donors, clients, and partner institutions; and 
§ Involvement in establishing marketing and fund raising strategies. 
 
3. Other areas pertinent to understanding how effectively the BOTs have performed 
their governance role. 
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Panel’s Biographical Information  
 
SAMUEL PAUL is the founder Chairman of the Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore. PAC is 
an independent think tank cum citizen action group that works on both local and national issues.   
An economist by training, he was educated at Syracuse University and the Harvard Business 
School in the US. For a major part of his career (1964-84), he was a Professor of Economics and 
later the Director of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. Subsequently, he was the 
World Bank’s advisor in public sector management in Washington (1985-91) and was involved 
in a variety of public sector reforms around the world. He has also served as a chief technical 
advisor for the International Labor Organization and Special Advisor to the United Nations 
Commission on Transnational Corporations in New York.  He has taught at Harvard and 
Princeton Universities in the U.S.A.  In India, Dr. Paul has served on several Government of 
India committees and was on the boards of the State Bank of India, Industrial Finance 
Corporation of India and several other companies. He is the recipient of several honours such as 
the Fred Riggs Award of the American Society of Public Administraton and the National 
Fellowship Award of the Association of  Indian Management Schools.  
 
Dr. Paul is the author of several books and numerous professional articles on economics and 
management. Among his books are Managerial Economics (Tata McGraw Hill, Delhi), 
Managing Development: Lessons of Success (Westview Press, USA), Strategic Management of 
Development Programmes (ILO, Geneva), and Corruption in India: Agenda for Action (Vision 
Books, Delhi). His latest book is  Holding the State to Account: Citizen Monitoring in Action 
(Books for Change, Bangalore, 2002). His articles have appeared in international journals such 
as the Economic Journal (London), Journal of Political Economy (Chicago), World Development  
(London), and the International Review of Administrative Sciences (Brussels). 
 
 
LI-LI ANN FOSTER is the founding President of Renaud Foster Management Consultants and 
recognized both nationally and internationally for her leadership in the fields of Corporate 
Governance, Executive and Director Recruitment and Executive Development. 
She has led a number of governance on search assignments in the public and private sectors, 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the International Network for Bamboo and 
Rattan (INBAR), Acacia Initiative (IDRC Dakar), Forest Products Association of Canada, and 
the Canadian Air Transportation Security Authority. 
 
A well-regarded public speaker and facilitator, Ms. Foster was a speaker on governance at a 
number of national and international conferences including: The World Council of Credit 
Unions, the Stabilization Funds of Canada, and the Regards Croisés sur la Gouvernance in Paris, 
France.  She has also been a governance speaker for AceTech (Academy for Technology CEOs), 
the Ottawa President’s Club and the 2003 ADM Forum.  Ms. Foster is a lecturer for the Schulich 
School of Business’ Corporate Governance Program at York University; using the governance 
modules she created, Ms. Foster works together with the Schulich School to provide workshops 
for Crown Corporations. 
 
Among her awards are included: Entrepreneur of the Year in 1999 (Ottawa), and as Chair of the 
Board for the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario (DICO) (1993 -1997), Ms. Foster 
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introduced a model of corporate governance for which the organization received the first 
Canadian award for Best Practices in the public sector (2001).   
 
Currently a Director of the Rideau Club of Ottawa, Ms. Foster has also been a Director for the 
SCO Health Services’ board, The International Alliance for Women (TIAW), and the Ottawa 
Board of Trade. Ms. Foster chairs the National Capital CEO Network and the Network for 
Executive Women, sponsored by Renaud Foster. 
 
Prior to 1986, Ms. Foster headed Ernst & Young’s human resources and executive search 
practice in eastern Ontario.   
 
Ms. Foster is a Certified Management Consultant and holds a B.Sc. from Concordia University. 
She also hold certificates in Governance, Financial Literacy, Audit Committee responsibilities, 
and Chair-CEO relationships.   
 
PAUL A. EGGER  is currently Lecturer at ETHZ, The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. 
Previous to his present position, he was head of East Asia Division of the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC), Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. As Head of the 
Agricultural Division, SDC from 1986-2000, he represented Switzerland in the CGIAR. In that 
capacity, he also served as the first Chair of the  Oversight Committee, a CGIAR Committee 
established in 1993 to ensure that due care and diligence is exercised in CGIAR’s and centers’ 
operations. 
Mr. Egger’s professional experience include, among others, the following: regional development 
planning, rural development and mountain development; institutional development and capacity 
building; policy and program development; building up of research partnerships and fostering 
European collaboration and participation in international agricultural research (served as 
Chairman of EIARD, European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development). 
Some of his contributions/achievements include: initiating the development of the Post Graduate 
Course on Development Studies (NADEL) at ETHZ;  organizing and implementing an 
interdisciplinary study on migration in Nepal; conceptualizing, planning and implementing one 
of the first "Integrated Rural Development Programs"; building up the National Potato Program 
in Nepal; planning, negotiating and monitoring numerous development and research programs; 
facilitating the funding and planning of the first project of the Consortium for Agroecological 
Development of the Andean Ecoregion (CONDESAN); establishment of the Committee for 
International Agriculture of the Swiss Federation of Agronomist and Food Science 
Technologies; initiating and planning a number of regional research networks in Latin-America 
and Africa; and establishment of the Agricultural Service at SDC  
He is currently a member of the BOT of Toni Hagen Foundation. He previously served on the 
board of Centre for International Agriculture (ZIL), ETHZ; CONDESAN; and International 
Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA, now ILRI), Addis Ababa 
 
Mr. Egger  has  a degree in agronomy (Agronomist, Dipl. Ing. Agr. ETHZ, Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology), a Diploma in Teaching, ETHZ, and participated in an Interdisciplinary 
Post-Graduate Course on Developing Studies, ETHZ.  
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Annex 3 
 
An Example of Best Practices Model 
 
The following is an example of a best practices model. Developed by Renaud Foster, this model 
is a best practice framework used by (amongst others) the Government of Canada for their 
current governance training in all of their Crown Corporations (i.e. government agencies). The 
model encompasses in a simple diagram a synthesis of the key accountabilities of any governing 
body/board, as well as the three dimensions within which these accountabilities must apply. 
Although the areas of accountability could be broken down further into smaller elements, for the 
sake of simplicity, this model breaks them down into six core sections.  
 
 
Legal &  
Regulator
Consideration
Performance 
Management 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Direction  
Setting 
Succession 
Planning 
Financial 
Oversight 
Stakeholder 
Communications 
Risks & Opportunities 
Management 
Structure and Composition 
Culture and Protocol 
Strategy & Direction  
 
 
Element Description 
Legal and Regulatory 
Considerations 
Identification of specific legal and regulatory requirements or limitations of 
the organization or the Board. 
Direction Setting Establishing the mission, vision, values, ethics and strategy.  
Performance Management Mechanisms to ensure the successful performance of the organization, the 
CEO, the Board and its Directors. 
Financial Oversight Setting financial plans, assessing results and ensuring the integrity of 
financial reporting. 
Risks and Opportunities 
Management 
Ensuring that all relevant risks and opportunities are systematically 
identified and acted upon for the benefit of the organization. 
Stakeholder Communications Strategies to ensure effective relationships and transparent communications 
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are maintained with all stakeholders. 
Succession Planning  Strategies for recruitment, development and compensation of Directors, the 
CEO and Senior Management. 
Roles and Responsibilities Duties and requirements of the Board and the separation of power and roles 
between the Board and Management. 
Structure and Composition 
Organization of the Board and its Committees.  This includes the numbers 
of Directors, representation strategies, diversity and competency 
requirements, and mandates of Committees. 
Culture and Protocol 
Often overlooked dimension of how the Board really operates including: 
relationships among Directors and with Management, meeting processes, 
decision making and information flow. 
Copyright Renaud Foster Governance Framework, Copyright  2006, Canada.
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Annex 4 
 
Summary of Survey Results 
 
1. Expectations and Major Issues  
 
In general, the issues raised by respondents to Questionnaire I were consistent with the Stripe 
Review’s terms of reference (TORs); and with the survey questionnaires.  Also, there was 
remarkable consistency of expectations and issues across respondent categories, despite some 
differences.  Most respondents wanted the panel to focus on the big picture, and to provide 
recommendations on board functions, organization, and management.  Some respondents 
expected an assessment of current practice and performance of boards; comprehensive guidance 
on best practice and how to get there; and expected boards to be considerably strengthened as a 
result (though some other respondents had doubts). 
 
Respondents were looking for a clear framework on governance of centers by their boards, 
focusing on the role and responsibilities of boards, and ways by which their effectiveness 
(including strategic adaptiveness) and efficiency (value for money) can be improved.  Key issues 
include accountability of the chair, board, DGs; transparency of decision processes and decisions 
made; oversight of management, including finance, and programs; board capacity (skills, size, 
selection, composition, representation, time available, number of meetings, leadership by the 
chair, etc); board-management relations and synergy, including relations with center staff; and 
board-, Science Council-, and CGIAR Secretariat relations and overlaps. 
 
There was concern that boards should remain independent (representative, empowered, listened 
to); the board should help maintain center autonomy in a changing CGIAR system; financial 
oversight should cover not only accounting practices but also efficient allocation and use of 
limited funds; proposed actions should not increase program risk by reducing the board’s 
oversight of science; and the board should help the Center strengthen its links with other CGIAR 
Centers, as well as with national research institutions in developing countries (including through 
adequate representation on the board). 
 
Respondents also wanted the Panel to keep in mind the individuality of centers and BOTs; the 
fact that some problems of boards and Centers are traceable to donors not providing sufficient 
funds or not honoring agreed Medium Term Plans and priorities; and the expectation/perception 
that boards of research institutions are/need to be different from other types of boards.  They 
wanted the Panel to provide guidance on best practices suitable for CGIAR center boards.  One 
or more respondents wanted the Panel to identify the ideal composition of boards; clarify what is 
meant in real life by due diligence, oversight, and fiduciary responsibility of boards; specify what 
role, if any, the CGIAR and Secretariat should have in determining board composition; and 
indicate how experimentation and risk-taking by boards could be encouraged.   
 
Thus, respondents’ expectations and issues covered the entire range of items included in the 
Panel’s TORs.  A large number of responses was received, covering many different aspects of a 
topic or issue.  These responses covered, in particular, the following topics: board effectiveness 
and efficiency; board capacity; time and commitment; accountability and independence; 
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oversight; strategic planning; systemic links; assessment; best practices; the corporate model; 
and suggestions for improvement. 
 
The CGIAR members’ expectations/issues relate primarily to nomination and selection of board 
members; due diligence on financial matters and solvency; roles, responsibilities, and TORs of 
board members; boards’ capacity to take a system-wide perspective; adjustment of boards’ roles 
so as to empower NARS; and revisiting EPMR procedures.  More specifically, CGIAR members 
expect the Panel to focus on the achievements of boards; their accountability; how to reorient 
them towards strategic issues; how to make boards more efficient; their cost; and the 
effectiveness of financial and institutional oversight.  They also want the Panel to address such 
issues as the impact of centers; the monitoring of quality of research undertaken by centers and 
their national/regional partners; responsiveness to requirements of clients for new technologies 
for development; and their policy on access to plant genetic resources.   
 
CGIAR members also list the following issues: size in relation to board responsibilities and 
functions; the disciplinary expertise on boards; the competence-balance needed; performance-
based reporting; coverage of governance and board issues in the center’s annual report; 
strengthening links between annual reports and MTPs; and the opinions of DGs and senior staff 
on the role of boards.  They want the review to consider the boards’ context, such as 
requirements of centers and donors; and their awareness of system-level issues and efforts at 
improved governance. 
 
2. Current Strengths of Boards  
 
In general, respondents to Questionnaire I believe that board strengths include the following: 
board size, composition, skills, balance, expertise, dedication, commitment, deep understanding 
of Center business, geographical and gender diversity, cohesiveness, and stakeholder 
representation.  Other strengths are the board’s committees, strategic emphasis, accountability, 
knowledge of programs, interest in external partnerships, board leadership, and openness and 
transparency of board processes.  Some respondents also believe that good members help with 
donor relations and fund-raising, and that conflict of interest policies are well defined 
(presumably for their board).  Some respondents, however, believe that accountability and 
committee functioning are not strengths.    
 
A large number and variety of specific comments were given (and are included in the full survey 
report).  Respondents say that current strengths encompass the following: structure; balance; 
functions; program oversight; committees; accountability; DG relations; board chair; and cost.  
(It is of course not possible to know which center boards the respondents are primarily referring 
to). A sampling of the perceived strengths of center boards is given below:   
 
Structure: board composition, balance, skills, expertise, diversity (geographical, discipline, 
gender, public and private sector experience); right composition and diversity of disciplines 
and experience; eminent scientists and administrators; balance between management and 
scientific acumen; and broad stakeholder representation.  
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Balance: good balance between continuity/stability and new views; broad representation of 
different regions and stakeholders, diversity of views, stakeholder involvement; bridge to 
ARIs, NARS etc.; support for new ideas and innovation; strong interest in inter-center 
collaboration and relationships. 
 
Functions: financial and program oversight, strategic direction; technical expertise, and 
knowledge of developing world; knowledge of business, and commitment to center mission; 
proximity with the business of one center, commitment to CGIAR’s cause. 
 
Program oversight: general policy and governance oversight; setting policy and long-term 
direction; combination of scientific oversight and governance responsibility; scientific 
oversight by board; bridging interests of stakeholders and scientists; strong, intimate 
knowledge of science programs and interaction with Center scientists; ability to respond 
rapidly in a crisis.  
 
Committees: board committees, board leadership, openness and transparency of board 
processes; enthusiasm to accept responsibilities and assignments; effective use of executive 
committee; engagement of independent experts in some areas; self-evaluation of board’s 
functioning and ability.  
 
Accountability: accountability and financial control is improving; oversight of financial and 
management issues; strong accountability to developing countries and development issues; 
accountability in selecting members and assessing DG; accountability to the Center.  
 
DG relations: guidance and help given to DG in various areas; independence from Center 
management; making staffing changes when needed; performance of board members in 
collaboration with the DG; good board-management relationship; oversight and support of 
DG. 
 
Board Chair: active and strong commitment by board chair; strong respected board chair; 
board members’ diligence and responsiveness on issues that arise between meetings; 
valuable conduit for staff to address management; good rapport between board, management, 
and staff. 
 
Cost: low cost (~ $250K/yr); size (not less than 12) and balance of expertise; low-cost, 
nimble. 
 
Some of these strengths are also recognized by the CGIAR members who responded to 
Questionnaire II. Respondents believe that the boards’ major strengths include board 
composition, diverse geographic representation, good balance between scientific and other 
disciplines reflective of global agenda, and the good knowledge, experience, dedication, and 
commitment of members.  Other strengths are the boa rds’ influence on center programs, the 
functions performed by boards, their ownership and loyalty, informality, and linkages with the 
Science Council and other global committees of the CGIAR system. Some other CGIAR 
members also consider balance (disciplinary, geographical, and gender), appropriate size, 
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personal integrity, technical expertise, committee structure, and collective action through the 
CBC to be the key strengths of center boards.  
 
In general, CGIAR members believe that boards add most  value in review of center strategies 
and plans; program oversight; priority setting; political representation; participation in the 
CGIAR; partnerships and inter-center collaboration; exchanging information and good practice 
across boards; and linking the center to external bodies.  Boards are also perceived to add value 
in DG recruitment; review and guidance to program activities; scientific oversight; planning and 
monitoring research; financial management; links with other CGIAR institutes; and geographical 
representation that allows for some networking.  Respondents say the boards add least value in 
financial and program oversight, DG recruitment; and shareholder representation. Other areas 
include fund raising; enhancing program content; oversight of financial and organizational 
management; strategic planning; monitoring and evaluation; and helping national /regional 
research institutes reach CGIAR scientific standards. 
 
3. Recent New Practices 
 
In general, board chairs and members list a fairly large number of new practices introduced in 
the past 2-3 years; and other categories of respondents recognize the efforts being made by 
boards to improve governance of centers.  However, since CGIAR members list far fewer new 
practices introduced by the boards--see their response to Questionnaire II, below--there seems to 
be insufficient communication with external stakeholders regarding the range and number of new 
practices introduced. 
 
The practices most- frequently mentioned by board members include the following: more and 
better involvement in strategic planning; better fiscal oversight and auditing; emphasis on 
accountability; succession planning; self- and DG assessment; board orientation; risk 
management; and a stronger nominations process.   Other practices mentioned, though less 
frequently, include new board TORs; better use of review processes and monitoring; better 
communications between meetings; timely and better information provided to the board; stronger 
role of board secretary; more dialogue with staff; new investment strategy; advice to DG on HR 
matters; and greater focus on strategy and policies.  
 
Clearly, respondents believe that boards have introduced many new practices in recent years; and 
the glass is now at least “half full”.  Some of the broad areas in which improvements have been 
made, and the specific “new” practices listed by respondents, include the following (some of 
these are clearly center-specific, i.e., have been introduced by the particular board on which the 
respondent serves): 
 
Financial oversight: boards have introduced better financial oversight; financial indicators 
tracked regularly; financial strategy reviewed regularly; updated fiscal practices; 
strengthened board skills for oversight of finance and management; finance and audit 
committee charter similar to corporate boards; stronger audit committee; more interaction 
with center’s financial staff; stricter and clearer audit policies; stronger financial expertise on 
board; reporting frequency of financial information;  increased and scope expanded 
improvement in regular fiduciary oversight by the whole Board, rather than committees.  
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Program oversight: board review of center effectiveness; program committee (PC) review of 
operations; more involved in development of strategic plan; strong involvement in strategy 
development; strategy retreats; involvement of the PC (particularly its Chair) in planning; 
fewer but more critical board-commissioned reviews (CCERs); yearly review of research 
management to ensure delivery of results; and science advisory panel enhanced operations 
oversight.  
 
Accountability for governance: better awareness and actions on governance and 
accountability issues; risk management; fund raising strategy; program and monitoring 
system; full participation in development of Medium Term Plans; and in approving program 
and budget quarterly updates from management to the board. 
 
Board operations: new modes of operation to improve oversight; clarity on background 
papers expected; board practices manual developed; statutes changed; reserved powers of 
board and delegated powers of DG documented; management reforms (fiscal and personnel) 
undertaken; board chair elected one year in advance, with one year training period; careful 
succession planning of board members; and board-development strategy launched.  
 
Assessment: restructured/better self- and DG- assessment; annual self-evaluation of board; 
review of board competencies; development of board performance indicators (preliminary); 
informal self-appraisal but frank discussion (very effective approach); board chair-DG 
relationship strengthened, and face-to-face communication more frequent.  
 
Capacity and commitment: attendance at board orientation program by all members; board 
training by external professionals and internal team building and strategy seminars; board 
retreat, leading to annual self-assessment; more finance experts appointed to board; board 
Secretary role and functions being reviewed; increased frequency of meetings; shorter 
meetings; one full board and 2 ExCo meetings per year; more use of emails and conference 
calls between meetings.  
 
Inter-center collaboration: more interactions with other Center Boards; better cooperation 
with others; collaboration with other CGIAR organizations; cross-Center membership.   
 
As examples of recent new practices, CGIAR members list greater emphasis on strategy and its 
periodic assessment; the oversight function; self assessment; term limits on DG appointment; 
coordination across center boards; and participation in the ExCo.  CGIAR members also list 
improvements in the scrutiny of financial management issues, strategy building, training of 
Board members, and risk management.  In addition, they believe new practices have been 
introduced in self-assessment and review of board composition; introduction of a Human 
Resources advisory committee (on a particular board); and the strategy of cross-membership on 
center boards. 
 
4. Role in Strategy Setting  
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A large majority of board members (80%) says strategy setting is an interactive process 
involving all parties. The remaining respondents are about equally divided between board- and 
DG/staff guiding the process.  All categories of respondents agree that a major function of boards 
is strategy setting, and that they have been devoting increased attention to this function.  The 
process used is largely considered to be interactive, with involvement of most stakeholders--
though some respondents believe that the board or DG/staff largely guide the process.   
 
Despite these efforts, many weaknesses are identified, and there is considerable agreement on 
what these are.  However, the inherent complexity of the task, the constraints under which the 
boards and centers operate, and some of the systemic factors underlying these constraints and 
weaknesses are also recognized—but respondents seem to have found it harder to identify 
workable solutions for some of the weaknesses identified, which cover a wide range.  A 
sampling of respondents’ comments--most of which were one-off, but can be clustered into 
general categories relating to different aspects of the problems faced in strategic planning--
include the following:  
 
Board capacity: Center programs are more diverse, but in-depth board expertise and 
scientific knowledge lacking in some areas; the board has not worked through the relevant 
questions in regard to the future relevance of the center; lack of board clarity on goals for 
center; limited ability to think strategically; tendency to focus on tactical issues; the board 
needs to engage better in process.  
 
Donor funding: if donors do not fund approved plans, it is not clear what an appropriate 
strategy really means; the lack of core funding, and the emphasis on project funding, greatly 
limits goal setting and achievement; there is a gap between donor interests and the strategic 
issues identified by the board/Center; high proportion of opportunistic project funding 
contradicts the strategic approach; the quest for funding leads to too many diverse projects. 
 
Managing complexity: difficult to monitor decentralized project work; difficult to track 
impact of complex long-term projects; it requires quality inputs from management; there is 
need to avoid agenda setting by the researchers; need more interaction with scientists; 
background documents do not provide synthesis; documents are too long, wordy, late; 
alternative strategies are not presented. 
 
Time and commitment: there are time constraints; there is insufficient unstructured time to 
explore options; shortage of time and other resources for regular review and adjustment of 
strategy; board members are not available for annual planning; not all members are involved. 
 
Managing external relationships: the comparative advantage of the center needs to be taken 
into account; turf battles have impeded progress until recently; it is difficult to incorporate 
diverse options of diverse stakeholders; need beneficiary inputs; complexity of obtaining 
genuine participation of multiple stakeholder perspectives; limited opportunity to interact 
with NARS. 
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Board leadership: Center management has a tendency to lead the process; it depends on 
board chair’s leadership; board may be too influenced by DG/staff; board is not offered/ does 
not develop alternative scenarios. 
 
System constraints: mismatch between CGIAR and SC recommendations and the board’s 
more knowledgeable perspective; confusion between SC and board roles; poor linkages 
between program planning and resource mobilization; difficulty in understanding role of 
ExCo/ CGIAR Secretariat which seem to impose arbitrary constraints. 
 
5. Improvements Needed in Financial Oversight  
 
In general, boards seem to recognize their responsibilities for financial oversight, are aware of 
weaknesses, and are attempting to find solutions for improving financial oversight by the board. 
Respondents acknowledge that a number of improvements are needed, and have suggested a 
fairly large number of one-off ideas—which are clustered below.  Some of the suggestions seem 
obvious, but necessary, solutions to some of the problems identified in particular centers--though 
these improvements could be more generally needed as well. Some suggestions require action by 
CGIAR stakeholders other than center boards.  The respondents’ suggestions for improving 
financial oversight include the following:  
 
Board capacity: improve competency of board members in management and financials 
skills; increase number of board members with expertise in financial oversight; acquire 
expertise through training programs, e.g., CGIAR orientation program; board should include 
experts (one) in financial management (finance, audit, accounting skills); appoint a member 
with finance/audit expertise and time (retired) and ability to ask the right questions; all board 
members should appreciate their responsibility for center’s financial position. 
  
Finance and Audit Committees: extend financial responsibility from 1-2 to 3-4 members; 
have specific financial orientation program for members of audit and executive- and finance 
committees; provide training for audit committee chair. 
 
Financial oversight: need more interaction between the board’s finance committee and the 
center’s finance manager and the internal auditors; more interaction between the board 
members on financial matters; increased focus on risk assessments; strengthen center’s 
internal audit function; stronger working relationship with center’s internal audit function. 
  
Information and meetings: improved information circulation of center’s financial outlay to 
board members; more regular financial reporting by management (e.g., complete set of 
reports every quarter); quarterly financial reports to board members so that they can monitor 
and respond if needed; increased time commitment; two executive committee and finance 
committee meetings per year.  
 
System support: more oversight/ interaction between the CGIAR Secretariat’s finance team 
and the center’s finance department; clearer policy on fund management; and more easily 
understandable financial reporting; better use of benchmark and comparative indicator data 
to understand critical spending patterns and trends; board members should receive much 
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better and clearer comparative information from the CGIAR Secretariat; more comparative 
analyses, over time and across Centers; closer continuing relationship between audit 
committee with CGIAR system internal auditor. 
  
6. Improvements Needed in Monitoring  
 
Respondents recognize the need to improve monitoring, and offer many suggestions for doing 
so.  They also indicate that this will need to be a concerted long-term effort; and that there are 
several “structural” constraints of time, skills, mode of work, incentives and payment, resource 
and information availability, training etc. that need to be addressed at the board as well as the 
System level.  Hence some of these suggestions require action by stakeholders other than the 
center boards, including the CGIAR Secretariat and donors. 
 
According to the respondents, the improvements needed in monitoring include the following 
(though, obviously, the improvements needed in a particular board depend on the specific 
situation of that center): 
 
- Program oversight: more programmatic monitoring; more analytical reports; improved 
financial, project and HR information and management systems, and simpler reports for 
board members without management expertise; limit information to support decision 
points and strategic and policy discussions.  
 
- Assessment: a systematic presentation of project monitoring on regular basis; graphic 
presentation of financial trends, and in comparison with other centers; periodic review 
and update of human resource policies; better understanding by board of projects’ follow-
up and exit strategies; better quantitative indicators of program success; and link between 
financial and programmatic reports.  
 
- Reports and information: greater us e of quarterly reports on progress, finances, and 
funding prospects; more regular information to specific committees; more transparency in 
financial matters from the center’s corporate and management team.  
 
- Capacity building: more time involvement by the board; more financial expertise on the 
board; and more interaction with internal auditors; continuous training on basic 
accounting and finance; more time in board meetings to deal with issues generated 
outside the center, etc.  
 
- Time and incentives: more frequent board meetings; more frequent visits of board 
members to the center; time availability of board members; more time to read and digest 
documents prior to board meetings; routine dialogue among board members and with 
Chair between meetings.  
 
- Information sharing: better information sharing and board engagement between 
meetings; more frequent information; more rigorous monitoring of reports outside board 
meetings; more electronic communication between board meetings; receive documents in 
advance.  
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- Donor and system support: a clear message by the CGIAR on financial accountability of 
boards; sanctions to ensure future adherence to guidelines or give consideration in annual 
performance evaluation process; improve interest in reading financial reports; more 
professional and relevant advice from CGIAR Secretariat, less self-serving to their own 
agendas. 
  
7. Donor Practices and Center Governance  
 
In general, the positive role played by donors is recognized by all categories of respondents.  
They say that criticisms of boards by donors have helped alert boards to the need and critical 
importance of financial management, so boards are stronger now; there is general pressure to 
improve governance; and there is more transparent accounting.  The push by some donors on risk 
management has helped Centers improve their risk management processes (one particular donor 
has insisted on a risk management statement). Donors have also helped by working with the 
CGIAR Executive Council; undertaking consultations on a regular basis at CGIAR meetings; 
through improved collaboration within CGIAR Centers, and increased support for collaborative 
projects; and by giving importance to EPMRs—which has kept the researchers’ work focused 
and encourages them to move ahead faster. 
 
Respondents also appreciate donors’ development of long term strategies for their agencies, and 
an increase in unrestricted funding (e.g., DFID, Canada); multi-year budgeting; increased 
commitment to core funding by some donors (e.g., UK, Norway, Canada); and support for the 
NEPAD Fish for All in Africa.  In addition, donors are appreciated for helping identify or 
nominating board members with financial, fiduciary, and private sector experience; or for 
seconding their own staff or identifying other experts suitable for appointment as center staff.  
Respondents recognize that donors have held back their financial contribution pending 
improvement in board performance, particularly relating to weak center financial management; 
and have undertaken reviews and audits to ensure that center governance/ systems are adequate.  
The use of donor-country nationals on center boards has facilitated donor-center relationships; 
and donors have introduced a new procedure for appointing CGIAR nominees for center boards. 
 
8. Other Aspects Panel Should Cover  
 
Respondents provided a number of very useful comments on center boards, and the CGIAR 
System, and also gave suggestions for the Panel to consider in moving forward with its own 
work.  Some of these have been covered elsewhere as well; and are loosely clustered below, 
under broad topic headings: 
  
- Board capacity and operations: the Panel should consider quality of research and of 
scientists; how to increase participation of local and regional stakeholders; adherence to 
core mandate and comparative advantage; examine whether the CGIAR is too focused on 
financial aspects of governance; suggest how to increase geographical and gender 
balance; views on optimal management of board’s time; length of board member terms. 
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- Assessment: examine the use of CCERs; the systematic follow-up of EPMRs, which are 
expensive and time consuming; the planning of the following EPMR and the use of 
personnel with current knowledge of the center; criteria to evaluate boards; suggest tools 
to guide board-mana gement interface, examine ways of improving effectiveness of 
CGIAR System activities. 
 
- System interactions: the Panel should be absolutely clear with the donors about why 
decisions are being made at the system level rather than the center level; how the CGIAR 
Chair can become more productively involved; reduce the tendency of the CGIAR 
Secretariat to impose unwarranted rules and ideologies on Centers; the Science Council 
seems to have aspirations of becoming a governance body; create a super-board that 
provides professional governance to all Centers. 
 
- Corporate model: the Panel should consider that a “one size fits all” system will not work 
well for a complex organization like the CGIAR; the CGIAR Centers can’t be governed 
by corporate board models; non-profit Board models in which trusteeship and leadership 
come together seem to be the way forward; if CGIAR wants more corporate- like boards 
then the extra time and energy put in by board members cannot be “voluntary” as 
generally the case is now. 
 
- Future direction: There is a need to help boards evolve to meet the changing needs of the 
CGIAR; the Alliance Board should monitor needs and interface with the System to 
explore models that boards may consider; the System is in constant churning because of 
System demands— which diverts management attention; avoid straining the good 
relations that many Centers have with local government and donors; remember that most 
Board members are more or less volunteers and have limited time; keep in mind the 
transactions costs tha t might result from its own recommendations.   
 
9. Responses to Detailed Questions 
 
- Board Accountability: There was a variety of responses.  However, most respondents say 
the board is accountable (in rough order of frequency) to the center itself; 
investors/donors; the CGIAR system; stakeholders; beneficiaries; the poor; and 
developing country societies.  Most respondents say that the Board is accountable to 
several of these stakeholders.  Some respondents also say that the Board is accountable to 
the beneficiaries/poor, and the CGIAR Chair--though legally only to the center itself and 
to the host country, as per the legal Agreement that initially established the center. 
 
- Charter and Host Country Agreement: About 55% of the respondents say the charter and 
host country “do not at all” impede proper governance of the center; the remaining 45% 
say it does “to some extent.”  Some of the impediments, in one or more charter, are the 
following: too many prescribed CGIAR-nominees, so the Board size is too large --but 
(according to the same respondent) in practice it is not a problem or relevant, and is a 
“minor” issue; size of host-country representation can limit obtaining the right skills mix 
or downsizing; and sometimes they are not fully engaged as Board members; the host-
country agreement can limit dealing with staff malfeasance, or currency movements, or 
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spousal employment, or shifting headquarters location; and the host country agreement 
hinders reorganization vis-à-vis other Centers. 
 
- Responsibilities of Board and Management: About 80% of the respondents say there is 
clear separation between responsibilities of Board and Management “to a great extent”; 
and the remaining 20% say “to some extent.”  (The pattern is fairly similar among board 
Chairs and members and DGs).  Some respondents believe that sometimes the line is 
flexible depending on issues; and program oversight, personnel matters, and donor 
relations are areas where Boards can cross the line into management.  Some respondents 
also point out that the DG is a member of the Board (so the line separating them is not 
clear). 
 
- Board Orientation: Roughly 55% of the respondents say that the orientation of Board 
members is adequate “to some extent,” and the remaining 45% say “to a great extent.” 
The specific comments and suggestions regarding orientation by the center are that now 
orientation is taken more seriously than previously; participation should be compulsory, 
not voluntary; there is need for continuous training, using distance learning and CDs etc; 
and the center-level orientation process requires more documentation.  Also, improved 
knowledge of CGIAR and its issues should be emphasized; the center should arrange 
visits to headquarters and outreach locations; at least one orientation visit to a field site is 
needed; more interaction with scientists is needed; and there should be increased 
participation in the center’s annual program and planning meetings.  With regard to the 
CGIAR/CBC’s board orientation program, respondents believe it is good and should be 
continued.  One or more respondents suggest that this program should be attended soon 
after appointment; and that it should be tied to the AGM, so participants can see how the 
CG system works.  However, it was also noted that the program should use up-to-date 
management models and experts. 
 
- Board Size: Board size varies from 10-17 members; with about 50% of the respondents 
saying the size is 12-13 members (sometimes excluding host country representatives).  
Furthermore, roughly 50% of respondents say the Board size is appropriate “to a great 
extent”; and 40% say it is appropriate “to some extent.” (The pattern was similar across 
different categories of respondents.)  Some respondents say the board could be smaller--
most often with reduction in number of host country representatives; but this must be 
done carefully as it is a highly sensitive issue.  
 
- Board Composition: Roughly 55% of the respondents say the board composition is 
appropriate and balanced “to a great extent” in terms of skills; and about 40 % say it is 
“to some extent”.  The changes needed include the following: the board should not 
appoint host country members; gender balance; and avoid donor representation.  There is 
need for more: strategy (and less science); development perspective; financial and 
management expertise; women; corporate business skills in finance and HR; private 
sector experience; non-economists; good minds to ask the right questions; and visionaries 
for center and CGIAR missions. 
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- Board Balance: About 55% of the respondents say the Board is balanced “to a great 
extent” in terms of representation of stakeholders; and the remaining 40% say it is “to 
some extent.”  Sample comments from respondents: the board does not have 
representatives on it—members are all there in their personal capacity; so what balance is 
required? board does not need to be balanced in terms of stakeholders; with the diversity 
of stakeholders, it is impossible to have representation of all; the poor beneficiaries, 
farmers and their community organizations are not represented at all; senior scientist 
from host country and from center could be appointed as ex-officio; more geographical 
diversity, women, and social scientists are needed; NARS representatives are sometimes 
imposed on the board; and host countries should nominate more than one member to 
allow center to select. 
 
- Other Changes in Board Size, Composition, Balance and Structure: The other changes 
suggested cover a wide range, including the following: there should be interlocked 
memberships with other center boards, with policies on conflict of interest; a task force is 
studying the options, including use of specialized Committees to guide certain programs, 
so as to reduce board size; and there is need to consider a System board.  Other 
comments: resist pressure to have only financial experts, so that program direction and 
quality does not deteriorate; donor countries should agree to share board representatives; 
reduce CGIAR nominees; reduce host country representatives; to not have more than one 
representative from any one nationality; focus on skills, science, and keep size to 12 or 
less; stakeholders must be adequately represented; and there is a need for more women 
from the South; and a wider and more professional pool of potential Board members. 
 
In addition, there is need for improved flow of information and working methods; new 
ways of functioning and standards of quality etc.; ensuring that the Chair is strong on 
governance and good meeting processes; the board Chair and members should devote 
more time to the board; there is a need for more than 2 meetings per year, some virtual.  
Some respondents also say that the CGIAR Secretariat’s role in appointing board 
members is confusing; the board nomination process needs to be improved; and the DG 
should not be involved in preparing shortlists or selecting board members.  Some say that 
the System still has too many “professional” board members jumping from board to 
board; there is need for young, fresh board members; and no one should be allowed to 
serve on more than 2 boards simultaneously or sequentially. 
 
- Board Committees: Responses pertaining to board committees are summarized below, 
separately for each question.  Appropriate Committees: About 90% of the respondents 
say there are appropriate Committees “to a great extent”; and the remaining 10% say “to 
some extent.”  Areas for improvement are: risk management; revised board manual; need 
for new or ad hoc Committee for personnel issues and handling staff grievances; avoid 
Program Committee getting into manage ment issues; clarify role of Executive 
Committee; train Chairs of Committees; and they should meet to discuss outcomes of 
Committee meetings.  Committee Overlaps: About 80% of the respondents say the 
Committees’ overlap is “not at all,” and the remaining 15% say “to some extent.” 
Comments: separate tasks of board and Program Committee (in which sometimes full 
board participates); and of Executive Committee and Audit/ Finance Committees.  Skill 
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Shortages: About 60% of the respondents say there are skill shortages “to some extent,” 
and the remaining 40% say “not at all.”  There is shortage of finance, accounts, 
management, governance, HR, legal, bio -diversity, breeding, strategic vision, private 
sector, leadership, and ability to negotiate in host country.   It is also recognized that with 
smaller board size, and because of the need to maintain balance and diversity, it will not 
be possible to always get all the skills needed; and there is need for more time devoted to 
board business, not more skills. 
 
- Board Committees Needing Strengthening: Many respondents did not mention any 
Committee that needs strengthening, or said “none.”   Others mentioned the Program, 
Nomination, Audit, Finance, and HR Committees (in rough order of frequency). Whether 
a particular committee needs strengthening presumably depends on the board—since 
almost all Committees were mentioned by one or more respondent.  Some Committees 
are considered strong, but need to meet 2 times/year (instead of once per year). 
 
- Board Selection: Roughly 55% of the respondents say Board processes for finding new 
members/Chairs are adequate and timely “to some extent,” and the remaining 40% say 
“to a great extent.” Respondents want a better process for CGIAR nominees; a better pool 
of potential members and their CVs at a central clearing house; improvements in the 
Nominations Committee; and better selection of and succession planning for the board 
Chair (in rough order of frequency).  Comments and suggestions: do more homework; 
need larger and better pool of suitable candidates; need to have a phase- in period for new 
members; simplify the process of selection; pipeline of candidates is too limited, and not 
diversified enough; prepare a roster of experts and potential Board members in various 
areas; need an ongoing up to date list so that NC could select names without delay when 
required. 
 
Respondents also suggest strengthening the board’s Nominating Committee; besides 
asking board members and center staff, should perhaps involve NARRDs in identifying 
nominees; normally board members recommend each other and keep circulating in the 
System; DGs are too involved; should start with assessment of existing board skills. They 
also note that reducing board size will enable increase in honorarium to attract better 
quality board members; it is very difficult to find candidates when looking for specific 
characteristics; good candidates are not always volunteers; and duties of board Chair are 
too complex, and so better guidance is needed to ensure a good fit.  With regard to the  
CGIAR-nomination process, respondents say that individual recommendations are best, 
but  CGIAR lists are not very helpful; the CGIAR nominee database has no added value; 
need a larger database; CGIAR nominee process is frustrating; too many CGIAR-
appointed members; Secretariat proposals of unqualified persons has slowed down the 
process; changing, unclear, and inconsistent process and rules for CGIAR nominees has 
hampered boards severely.  
 
- Adequacy of Information Material: Almost 80% of respondents say information material 
received by the board is adequate in terms of quality, quantity, and timing; and the 
remaining 20% are about equally split between “don’t know” or “it is not adequate.” 
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- Project Management System: About 75% of the respondents say the project management 
system provides timely programmatic and financial information to the management and 
the board; the remaining 25% are about equally split between “no” and “don’t know.” 
About 55 % of respondents say the system is serving the board’s needs “to a great 
extent”, and the remaining 40% say “to some extent.”  The frequency of programmatic 
and financial reports is about evenly divided between quarterly, semi-annually, and 
annual reporting.  About 55% of respondents say the board draws upon these reports “to a 
great extent,” and the remaining 45% say “to some extent.” 
 
- Opportunities and Risks: In general, the opportunities monitored by boards (in rough 
order of frequency) include funding prospects, major events at headquarters and regions, 
new projects and expansion of the mandate, research progress, and publications.  The 
risks monitored include financial, investment, security, resource allocation, and human 
resource risks.   
 
- Assessment of Board and DG: About 75% of the respondents say board members 
participate in evaluation of the DG “to a great extent,” and the remaining 25% say “to 
some extent.”  And, about 45% of the respondents say they participate “to a great extent” 
in evaluation of Board Committees, and the remaining 40% say “to some extent.” 
 
- CGIAR Performance Management System: Roughly 45% of the respondents say the 
board uses the CGIAR’s performance management system “to a great extent,” 45% say 
“to some extent,” and the remaining 10% say “not at all.” Specific comments: the tool 
and process is still at pilot stage; not all indicators are relevant; it is too complicated; 
unclear weighting of scores; probable omissions of important categories such as outputs, 
outcomes and impact; lack of clarity of some defined indicators. 
 
• Donor Relations: Roughly 45% of the respondents say aspects of donor relations “do not 
at all” make governance difficult, 45% say it does “to some extent,” and the remaining 
10% say it does “to a great extent.” Specific comments: donors are funding similar work 
in competing areas; donors want own representatives on boards or want to second own 
research staff; there is risk of influencing or even driving the research agenda; too much 
project funding, too small proportion is core— it distorts the agenda; low recovery rates 
for overheads by some donors; dearth of unrestricted funding for new initiatives; high 
transaction costs; multiple/different requirements for evaluation/accountability prevent a 
consistent approach across the program.  
 
10. Other Responses from CGIAR Members 
 
· Limiting Factors: A large number of factors are perceived by CGIAR members to limit 
board effectiveness.  The factors include the failure to balance powers between the board 
and senior managers; the current politics of CGIAR that seeks to micro-manage Centers; 
emphasis on political correctness and not competence; confused messages from donors—
where process is rated higher than productivity; and the boards’ limited knowledge of the 
CGIAR system.  Other limiting factors include poor board processes and poor 
preparation for meetings, leading to a focus on program rather than management 
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oversight; honorary nominations that equate to lack of understanding or role and function 
and too little time dedicated to the board; too much concentration on demonstrating how 
well the Centers are working; and ambiguity about board and center accountability.  One 
or more respondents also believe that boards are too science-centric; the DGs are too 
powerful; and that five DGs have no financial limits from their Boards—which, from the 
governance perspective, is unacceptable. 
 
- The list of perceived limiting factors also includes the following: board members, except 
host country representatives, represent no shareholder, nor even know what the 
shareholder interests are; board members come from a narrow pool of candidates, which 
is a caricature of the old -boys-network; board members have a narrow range of expertise, 
largely technical; lack of in-depth knowledge of center’s operations; dependency on 
management for critical information; and insufficient contact with center staff below the 
senior management level.  Other limitations are the board’s relationship with the center’s 
DG; insufficient contact with center clients; allocation of too little time and effort to 
understanding of center business in depth; boards often uncritically support management 
actions despite damage being done to the health of a center; and boards nearly always 
promote center interests at the cost of system level efficiencies and effectiveness.   
 
- Improvements Suggested: A number of improvements are suggested by CGIAR members 
(most are one-off comments).  Some members say that the needed expertise should be 
available on boards; allocate time during board meetings for interaction with scientists, 
perhaps through workshops, retreats etc; greater exposure to center’s work in the field, 
with clients; request members for more time involvement with boards, and provide 
incentives if necessary.  Other suggestions are to attract higher quality members and 
place lower priority on politically correct representativeness; increase the number of joint 
board members; shrink and consolidate boards; and have smaller boards with critical 
types of expertise.   
 
- Some CGIAR members also want ensure that key stakeholders are more involved in 
board selection and prescribe a set of board competencies. Other respondents want 
greater attention to board nominations, and say that there should be some CGIAR 
nominees on boards, and the CGIAR should ensure that at least 2 members on each board 
are se lected by the system and are charged with promoting system effectiveness. Another 
suggestion is to seek involvement of a global search company in the CGIAR nominee 
process. However, some members suggest the opposite: a more hands-off approach by 
the donors--who should instead pay by results achieved; acceptance that some Centers 
may fail and should be closed or merged; and clear messages on the roles of the Centers 
in the total development agenda—i.e. the centers cannot do everything.   
 
- Appropriateness of Corporate Model: When asked about the appropriateness of the 
“corporate” model for the center boards, responses spanned the full range, from “not at 
all” to “to some extent” to “to a great extent.”  Individual respondents say that it depends 
on what is meant--this needs to be defined, particularly for members from the public 
sector; the board should be allowed to be more decisive and less concerned about 
political correctness; boards should be smaller; and there should be a ceiling on cost of 
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boards.  It was also suggested that the ExCo, through the CBC, should provide guidelines 
to develop the corporate model of governance; and the CGIAR should provide and 
enforce guidelines that require adequate levels of expertise in financial, administrative, 
and legal matters.  
 
- Center Boards and the Alliance Board: Responses of CGIAR members cover a wide 
range (all are one-off responses).  They say that the Alliance Board could work with the 
ExCo to develop guidelines for the corporate model of governance; develop a code of 
ethics for board members to improve accountability, and avoid conflicts of interest; insist 
on the promotion of system- level efficiencies, but as proposed is very unlikely to do so; 
and the Alliance Board might eventually become the board of all centers.  CGIAR 
members also say that the  Alliance should be represented in the selection panel for a new 
board member for an individual center; the Alliance board could take on some functions 
– particularly the oversight of system-wide and challenge programs 
 
- Other Aspects Panel Should Cover: Other comments by CGIAR members are that since 
the CGIAR has created its boards and their governance over several years, to change 
Board governance (and some changes in size and composition are desirable) will require 
CGIAR members to change as well.  They say that greater diversity is needed in the 
recruitment pool of DGs; the key issue is not one of autonomy but of accountability; the 
total costs of governance – committees, travel to them etc -- should be reviewed and 
valued.  Other suggestions are that Board members should also have more knowledge 
about problems of poor and diversified countries; the Panel should select ten important 
national research-related agencies and test their governance frameworks against the 
CGIAR Centers – there is a huge gap; and that the Stripe Review must take the big 
picture--since the CGIAR is over-governed and under-managed. Some CGIAR members 
also say that boards should give greater attention to impact assessment and performance 
indicators; and there is a need for better orientation to board members so that they 
promote System- level interests at least equally with center interests.  
 
11. Responses from CGIAR Members to Detailed Questions  
 
- Board Autonomy: Of the nine CGIAR members who responded to this question in 
Questionnaire II, about 30% say center governance should be more autonomous from the 
CGIAR Secretariat/System office, about 45% say from the donors, and 10% say from 
clients.  And, of the eight CGIAR Members who responded to this question, 25% say 
center governance should be less autonomous from the CGIAR Secretariat/ System 
office, and the remaining are split equally (about 38% each) between donors and clients.   
 
- The areas of conflict between the centers’ claim of autonomy and the legitimate interests 
of other stakeholders include the following: shareholders have no representation on any 
board, this is inappropriate and would be considered illegal in many countries; center 
autonomy can impede stakeholder needs for integrated approaches; excessive inter-center 
competition and crowding out of NARS are a function of center sovereignty and donor 
fragmentation; and centers are increasingly competing with NARS. 
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- CGIAR Members and Center Governance: The CGIAR members who answered this 
question focused primarily on two aspects: the CGIAR nominations process, and EPMRs.  
They say that CGIAR members can enhance quality of governance of the Centers by 
taking the process for CGIAR nominees more seriously; working diligently to develop a 
pool of highly qualified potential board members; nominating and appointing these 
members by CGIAR consensus; and exposing boards to scientists of advanced research 
institutes.  They should also insist on more in-depth, objective, and frank assessments of 
center governance during EPMRs; require the CGIAR Secretariat to provide top financial 
and management expertise to EPMR teams; hold Centers much more accountable to 
actually implementing EPMR recommendations; and withhold support when 
performance is not satisfactory. (All these are one-off suggestions, in no particular order.)   
 
- The changes suggested by CGIAR members in the system of monitoring governance 
across the centers focus on improving the EPMR process and follow-up, as well as 
improving monitoring of the governance of Challenge Programs by the ExCo.  Other 
changes suggested: independence of the monitors; greater participation by center 
management and the boards; more objective and open self-reporting; fully implement the 
performance measurement system and follow-up measures; discuss whether further 
accountability mechanism  needed; more representation of scientists from developing 
countries in the Science Council; more attention to dissemination of science; greater 
clarity on respective responsibilities of CGIAR and the Centers; a more cost-effective 
AGM; and greater effort in the board nomination processes. 
 
- Other suggestions on how CGIAR members can enhance governance: the method of 
nominating members should be independent of center’s top management; provide/ensure 
nominations of qualified candidates; more active engagement with boards—demand 
transparency from boards; consider collective action to establish a more direct 
accountability mechanism; more communication; reduce CGIAR mechanisms that are 
not cost effective, like the AGM; insist on a fixed tenure period for DGs and board 
members; meddle less; give clearer and consistent messages; and be consistent in policies 
and funding criteria. 
 
- Board Skills: CGIAR members consider technical/scientific skills to be over-represented 
on boards; and financial, administrative, and management skills to be under-represented. 
More specifically, the skills often over-represented on Boards are considered to be: 
biological scientists, science, technical/research interests, and discipline-specific science 
competencies; as well as economics or other social sciences, detailed knowledge of 
CGIAR center operations, development generalists, and networking skills.  The skills 
often under-represented on boards are: basic sciences, and research managers; and the 
private sector, financial and organizational management, and strategic planning.  Also, 
corporate and board experience, leadership and strategic vision, communication, and 
board succession expertise; as well as knowledge of current donor policies, donor 
practices and commitments; and people with knowledge of delivery systems and 
business, and fund-raising. 
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- Board Costs: Of the eleven CGIAR members who responded to this question, opinions 
covered a wide range.  About 10% say cost is “much too high”; 45% say it is “high”; 
35% say it is “moderate”; and 10% say it is “low”.  
 
- CGIAR Members Influence on Boards: Of the eight responses, 50% want CGIAR to have 
influence in board appointments “to a great extent,” about 40% say “to some extent.” 
Suggestions: be involved in identifying board members; direct nomination of a certain 
number of board members by the CGIAR; do not allow lobbying for specific 
appointments; and process should be more consultative and transparent. 
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Annex 5 
 
Financial Oversight From a Trustee’s Perspective 
 
This Annex discusses the following aspects: (a) What to do to fulfill one’s responsibilities as a 
Director/Trustee; (b) What to watch for in financial reporting; and (c) Current best practices in 
financial oversight. 
Fiduciary Role  
All Directors/Trustees are expected to use all of their skills and capabilities and to recognize when they 
need help and obtain it.  By contrast, Audit Committee Members require a higher level of financial 
competency and, from a practical po int of view, are more liable to being sued if things “go wrong”. There 
are two key remedies that Audit Committees can take into account when dealing with fiduciary issues. 
The first is prevention: competency, training, and the application of best governance practices. The 
second is mitigation: making sure that an organization has adequate indemnification and insurance 
coverage. 
 
Financial Reporting  
 
Financial reporting is all about the fair and complete reporting of facts, ensuring transparency 
and adequacy of disclosure while complying with appropriate rules and requirements.  From a 
broad picture perspective, the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) look for 
completeness, consistency and disclosure. 
 
For completeness, a Trustee must verify the integrity of the universe of economic activities for 
the organization, and that the internal controls and accounting policies are in place to ensure that 
integrity.  To address consistency, an organization needs to adopt accounting policies that work 
for the organization and stick with them.  This permits a Trustee to compare information year 
over year to ensure the desired consistency.  Disclosure assists a Trustee in the evaluation of the 
information.  Disclosure must be presented in the body of the financial statements or in the notes 
to those statements.   
 
To further explore the disclosure aspect, a review of the evolution of the Management Disclosure 
and Assessment (MD&A) statement is appropriate (see Box 7). 
 
Box 7: The Management Disclosure and Assessment  (MD&A) Statement  
 
The MD&A originally was a document written by management for current and prospective investors.  With 
the evolution of governance and the establishment of best practices, the MD&A is now considered a key 
part of the governance disclosure regimen.  The responsibility remains with Directors/Trustees to ensure 
the integrity of the document which, for many organizations, has grown from a “1 pager” to a complete 
section in the Annual Report. 
 
The General Deficiencies that have been identified in MD&A statements include: 
• Omitted information that may be material to investors/donors/funders  
• Disclosed excessive amounts of immaterial information 
• Biased disclosure in favour of good news 
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• Insufficient forward-looking orientation 
• Inadequate internal policies for preparing, reviewing and approving the MD&A 
 
 
Financial Reporting - Red Flags 
 
There are a number of Red Flags that have been identified to assist Directors/Trustees in the 
identification of inaccurate or potentially fraudulent reporting.  These include: 
 
• Accounting changes strictly to enhance revenues 
• Frequent, significant changes in estimates that impact revenues 
• Changes in independent auditors over accounting disagreements 
• Failure to enforce the code of conduct 
• Complex business arrangements not well understood and appearing to serve little practical purpose 
• Large year-end transactions that result in significant revenues 
• Unusual accounting policies for revenue recognition and cost deferrals 
• Accounting changes strictly to enhance revenues 
• Widely dispersed business locations with decentralized management and a poor internal reporting 
system 
• Unexpected reorganization, replacement of management, or high turnover in positions such as 
Comptroller or CFO 
• Internal audit operating under scope restric tions 
• Overly optimistic projected results 
• Reluctance to make changes in systems or procedures recommended by the internal or external 
auditors 
 
Financial Reporting - Guidelines for the Recognition of Revenues 
 
Typical issues that face a Trustee relate to their interpretation of the information presented in financial 
statements.  In brief, revenues must be attributed only to the period when the product or service is 
rendered and the resources consumed, or that portion of the product or service and related resources.  For 
example, the advance signing of a contract for future year (or fiscal period) delivery cannot be recognized 
as revenue even if an advance payment is received.  In fact, such a situation would have to be recorded as 
a liability since the organization owes the product or service and has done nothing (yet) to earn it.  By 
contrast, if for example, 10% of a multi-year contract were rendered in the first year, then 10% of the 
revenues should be recognized in that same period, regardless of how much had been paid (or not paid) 
on the contract. 
 
Box 8: Financial Oversight--Best Practice Examples 
A. Guidelines for the Board 
 
The guidelines for oversight required by the board include: 
• Ensuring management provides a good overview 
• Challenging management on the content  
– Principles and methods used for the construction of information 
– Compliance with regulatory requirements and certification 
– Inconsistencies with the current situation or outlook 
– Sufficient disclosure without “over exposing” the organization 
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– Important omissions 
– Significant changes from previous reports  
– All items, especially risks, formerly reviewed with the board  
– Involvement and agreement of the external auditors  
– Provides a complete and integrated view of the organization’s situation 
B. Sample Questions for Management 1 
 
As Trustees, Best Practice Principles suggest a number of sample questions that can and should be asked of 
Management in each of the following categories: 
Financial Statements 
– What were the most significant audit and financial reporting issues discussed by management 
and the auditors during the year? 
– Are there significant balance sheet accruals / reserves that differ from exact needs? 
– What are the organization’s revenue recognition policies and were there any instances where 
the company may be considered to be “pushing the limits”? 
– Is there anything in the financial statements that concerns management? 
– Is there anything that could create a risk exposure? 
 
Accounting System or processes 
 
– Are there any significant deficiencies in our accounting system? 
– What process is used to assess and assure the integrity of new or revised operating of financial 
systems? 
– Have the auditors identified “material” or major control deficiencies, and if so, what is your 
view about the seriousness of the issue? 
Auditor Relations 
• Is the external / internal audit comprehensive enough to address the important financial and 
control risks? 
• What is your overall evaluation of the internal and external auditors’ performance and what are 
the strengths and weaknesses  of key members of those teams? 
• Have the external auditors met your expectations with respect to the quality and rigor of the 
audit? 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Audit Committees, National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), 2003 
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Annex 6 
 
A Sample Code of Ethics2 
Code of Ethics for (organization’s name)’s Board of Directors  
Statement of Commitment 
[A statement of commitment will emphasize the responsibility of the board and each member to 
the membership, and to the board as whole both as the statement is being developed and in 
perpetuity as it is discussed with each nominee and incumbent. An examp le of a Statement of 
Commitment is:] 
“In establishing policy for and on behalf of (organization’s name)’s members, I am a custodian 
in trust of the assets of their society/association. The members recognize the need for competent 
and committed elected board members to serve their organization and have put their trust in my 
sincerity and abilities. In return, the members deserve my utmost effort, dedication, and support.” 
“Therefore, as a board member/director of organization name, I acknowledge and commit that I 
will observe a high standard of ethics and conduct as I devote my best efforts, skills and 
resources in the interest of organization name and its members. I will perform my duties as 
board member/director in such a manner that members’ confidence and trust in the integrity, 
objectivity and impartiality of organization name are conserved and enhanced. To do otherwise 
would be a breach of the trust which the membership has bestowed upon me.” 
Ethical Guidelines 
[A listing of items which the not- for-profit organization considers to be in conflict should be 
developed by the board, and included in the overall code of ethics. An example of a 
comprehensive listing of items follows. Each organization should include items which may be 
unique to their own membership.] 
General 
1. I will always hold the betterment of the membership of the organization as my priority, 
including during all participation in discussions and voting matters.  
2. I recognize that I am obligated to act in a manner which will bear the closest public 
scrutiny.  
3. It is my responsibility to contribute to the board of directors any suggestions of ways to 
improve the organization’s policies, standards, practices or ethics.  
4. I  will  not  abuse  my  position  as  a board  member  by   suggesting  to   any  
organization employee that I am entitled to  or  expect any  special treatment beyond 
regular members of the organization.  
                                                
2 This document was taken from “Ethical Guidelines for Board Members of Not-for-Profit Organizations” by Allan 
Lowe  from The Association Xpertise Inc.,http://www.axi.ca/TCA/Mar2004/guestarticle_4.shtml 
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5. I will declare any conflict of interest, be it real, potential, or apparent, which is not 
immediately obvious with regard to any matter being discussed in my presence during a 
meeting.  
6. If the board decides at any time during a meeting that I have a conflict, I will accept their 
request that I refrain from participating in the discussion and I will leave the meeting at 
the board’s request. I understand that the board’s decision will be recorded in the 
minutes, either with or without the reasons for the decision being also recorded  
7. I understand that the following activities are considered by the organization to be 
conflicts of interest, and that conflicts of interest are not limited to the following 
situations:  
· where a director makes a decision or does an act motivated by other or additional 
considerations than “the best interests of the organization  
· where a director personally contracts with the organization or where he/she is a director 
of other organizations which are contracting with this organization  
· where a director learns of an opportunity for profit which may be valuable to him/her 
personally or to another organization of which he/she is a member, or to other persons 
known to the director  
· where  a  director, in  any  circumstance  as related to the  organization,  puts  his/her  
personal interests ahead of the best interests of the organization 
Information 
8. I will not knowingly take advantage of or benefit from information that is obtained in the 
course of my official duties and responsibilities as a board member, and that is not 
generally available to membership  
9. I will be alert to information which the organization can use to develop improved policies 
and strategies  
10. I will protect the organizations information closely and will not release or share 
confidential information without the permission, preferably in writing, of the person who 
provided it  
11. I will maintain confidentia lity of all information which the board deems ought to be kept 
confidential  
Resources 
12. I will be mindful of resources which are in my trust on behalf of the organization, and 
will help establish policies which ensure the maximization of secure and protected 
resources  
13. I expect to be reimbursed for legitimate expenses incurred by myself for the sake of the 
organization. I will keep all such expenses reasonable and justifiable and will discuss 
expenses which may be in question with the organization’s president  
Gifts and Hospitality 
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14. Should business associates or others offer me gifts, favors, or benefits on a personal basis 
because of the business the organization does with them, I will recognize that such offers 
may be an effort to secure advantage from me, and I will reject such offers on the basis 
that it is against the organization’s policy to accept gifts from business contacts. The most 
I will accept will be normal promotional handouts of a nominal value.  
15. I will not routinely accept the hospitality of others. For example, when meals are taken 
with business colleagues, I will pay for as many meals as do my colleagues.  
Representing the Organization 
16. As part of my duties as a board member, I represent the organization informally and 
formally to other associations, societies, government officials, and business 
representatives. I recognize that it is important that I represent the organization in such a 
way as to leave others with a positive impression of the organization. In my duties I will 
preserve and enhance the good reputation of the organization and will avoid behavior 
which might damage its image.  
Interpretation 
17. The president of the organization shall ensure that the practice of this policy will be fair, 
just, and equitable in all situations of interpretation and application.  
Enforcement 
18. The president is ultimately responsible for immediate interpretation, application and 
enforcement of the board members’ code of ethics policy. All complaints concerning a 
possible code of ethics violation shall be made in writing to or by the president with a 
copy provided to the complainant.  
The president shall make an initial determination of the issue and shall attempt initial resolution 
of the problem with the complainer and the complainant. 
If this initial attempt at resolution is not successful, the president shall appoint a tribunal 
composed of three board members to investigate the complaint. The tribunal is required to 
investigate as required and submit a written report to the president within 30 days. The president 
will render his/her decision within ten days of receiving the tribunal’s report. 
The president’s decision may be appealed in writing to the board of directors for consideration 
the board’s next regular meeting at the organization’s next regular scheduled meeting for a final 
decision. The final decision shall be delivered in writing to the complainer and complainant.  
Delegation and Penalties 
19. Should the president be the subject of a written complaint, the vice president shall 
perform the duties normally assigned to the president in this matter. 
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20. Penalties imposed for breach of the code of ethics may include, but are not limited to, the 
following:  
· Excluding the director from portions of all future meetings and discussions which relate 
to the stated conflict of interest, and/or  
· censure of the director, in private, in public, or both, and/or  
· removal of the director from office by a resolution passed by a vote of two-thirds of the 
members voting at an annual or special general meeting of the not-for-profit 
organization’s members, provided that notice of such a proposed resolution is given with 
the notice calling the meeting.  
I have read and I accept  (organization’s name)’s Code of Ethics for Board Members 
_____________________     
Date 
                      ____________________________________ 
Signature of Director or Nominee 
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 Annex 7 
 
List of Persons Interviewed  
 
CGIAR Members  
 
Peter Core, ACIAR, Australia 
Anne Germaine, Canada 
Lijian Zhang, China 
Marc Debois, EC 
Hosny El Lakany, FAO 
Denis Despréaux,  France 
Jochen de Haas, former representative of Germany 
Marina Puccioni, Italy 
Mr Mizoguchi, Japan 
Ruth Haug, Norway 
Katharina Jenny, Switzerland 
Andrew Bennett, Syngenta Foundation 
Jonathan Wadsworth, UK 
Franklin Moore, USAID 
Robert Bertram, USAID 
Denis Kyetere, Uganda 
 
CBC (Chairs of Center Boards) 
 
Jim Jones, CIAT 
Yves Savadin, CIAT (designate) 
Lena Lange, CIMMYT 
James Godfrey, CIP 
Margaret Catley-Carlson, ICARDA 
Guido Gryseels, ICARDA (designate) 
Eugene Terry, World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF) 
Uzo Mokwunye, ICRISAT  
Frances Stewart, IFPRI (acting) 
Mortimer Neufville, IITA 
Uwe Werblow, ILRI 
Anthony Gregson, IPGRI 
Keijiro Otsuka,  IRRI 
Remo Gautschi, IWMI 
Gaston Grenier, Africa Rice Center (WARDA) 
Trond Bjorndal, World Fish Center 
 
CDC (DGs of Centers ) 
 
Joachim Voss, CIAT 
Masa Iwanaga, CIMMYT 
 35 
Pamela Anderson, CIP 
David Kaimowitz, CIFOR 
Adel El-Beltagy, ICARDA 
Mahmoud Solh, ICARDA (designate) 
Dennis Garrity, World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF) 
William Dar, ICRISAT  
Joachim von Braun, IFPRI 
Peter Hartmann, IITA 
Carlos Sere, ILRI 
Emile Frison, IPGRI 
Robert Zeigler, IRRI 
Kanayo Nwanze, Africa Rice Center (WARDA) 
Stephen Hall, WorldFish Center 
 
Board Members 
 
Andrew Bennett, CIFOR  
Madura Swaminathan, CIP 
Ruth Egger, CIP 
Bryan Harvey, IITA 
 
Center Staff 
 
Bruce Scott, ILRI 
Carlos Eduardo Alonso, CIP  
Roger Cortbaoui, CIP 
Michael Jackson, IRRI 
 
 
 
Partner Organizations  
 
Mohammad Roozitalab, Chairman GFAR 
Calisto Bias, Ministry of Agriculture, Mozambique 
Sushama Nath, Secretary, ICAR and Additional Secretary to the Government of India  
 
Advisory Group 
 
Uwe Werblow, CBC 
Usha Barwale, CGIAR Private Sector Committee 
Francisco Reifschneider, CGIAR System Office 
Kevin Cleaver, World Bank  
 
Science Council 
 
Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Chair 
Ruben Echeverria, Executive Director 
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System Office 
 
Francisco Reifschneider 
Selcuk Ozgediz 
Shey Tata 
John Fitzsimon 
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Annex 8 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations  
 
 
AB    Alliance Board 
AE    Alliance Executives 
AGM    CGIAR Annual General Meeting 
BOT    Board of Trustees 
CBC     Committee of Board Chairs 
CCER    Center-Commissioned External Review 
CDC    Center Directors Committee 
CEO    Chief Executive Officer 
CFO     Chief Financial Officer 
CGIAR    Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
CP    Challenge Program 
DG    Director General 
EPMR    External Program and Management Review 
ExCo    CGIAR Executive Council 
MTP    Medium-Term Plan 
NARS    National Agricultural Research Systems 
OC    CGIAR Oversight Committee 
SC    Science Council 
SOX    Sarbanes-Oxley Act (a US Law) 
SRCG    Stripe Review of Corporate Governance 
TOR    Terms of Reference 
 
 
 
 
 
